





Vol 35 • No 2 • 2019
Refuge
Canada’s Journal on Refugees  
Revue canadienne sur les réfugiés
Vol. 35, No. 2
Centre for Refugee Studies, Room 844, Kaneff Tower, York University




Johanna Reynolds and Christina Clark-Kazak
Editor-in-Chief 
Dagmar Soennecken
 Managing Editor Kathryn Barber
 Book Review Editor Dianna Shandy
Editorial Advisory Board
Sharryn Aiken, Queen’s University; Laura Bisaillon, University of Toronto Scarborough; 
Megan Bradley, McGill University; François Crépeau, McGill University; Jeff Crisp, Oxford University;  
Judith Kumin, University of New Hampshire, Manchester; Susan McGrath, York University
Founded in 1981, Refuge is an interdisciplinary journal published by the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University. The journal aims to 
provide a forum for discussion and critical reflection on refugee and forced migration issues.
Refuge invites contributions from researchers, practitioners, and policy makers with national, international, or comparative perspec-
tives. Special, thematic issues address the broad scope of the journal’s mandate, featuring articles and reports, shorter commentaries, 
and book reviews. All submissions to Refuge are subject to double-blinded peer review. Articles are accepted in either English or French.
Refuge is a non-profit, independent periodical funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and supported 
by the membership of the Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (CARFMS). The views expressed in Refuge do 
not necessarily reflect those of its funders or editors.
Refuge is indexed and abstracted in the Index to Canadian Legal Literature, Pais International, Sociological Abstracts, the International 
Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and Canadian Business and Current Affairs. In accordance with the journal's open access policy, the 
full text of articles published in Refuge is also available online through our website, www.yorku.ca/refuge.
© 2019. This open-access work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Licence, which 
permits use, reproduction, and distribution in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided the original authorship is credited and 
the original publication in Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees is cited.
Cette œuvre en libre accès fait l’objet d’une licence Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, laquelle auto-
rise l’utilisation, la reproduction et la distribution de l’œuvre sur tout support à des fins non commerciales, pourvu que l’auteur ou les auteurs 
originaux soient mentionnés et que la publication originale dans Refuge : revue canadienne sur les réfugiés soit citée.
ISSN (online): 1920-7336




Special Issue on Private Sponsorship in Canada
Johanna Reynolds and Christina Clark-Kazak . . . . .3
A Reflexive View of Refugee Integration and Inclusion:  
A Case Study of the Mennonite Central Committee and 
the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program
Luann Good Gingrich and Thea Enns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(Mis)Trusted Contact:  
Resettlement Knowledge Assets and  
the Third Space of Refugee Reception
Christopher Kyriakides, Arthur McLuhan,  
Karen Anderson, Lubna Bajjali,  
and Noheir Elgendy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
What Roles Does Type of Sponsorship Play  
in Early Integration Outcomes?  
Syrian Refugees Resettled in Six Canadian Cities
Michaela Hynie, Susan McGrath, Jonathan 
Bridekirk, Anna Oda, Nicole Ives, Jennifer Hyndman, 
Neil Arya, Yogendra B. Shakya, Jill Hanley,  
Kwame McKenzie, and SyRIA.lth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
“We Feel Like We’re Home”:  
The Resettlement and Integration of Syrian Refugees  
in Smaller and Rural Canadian Communities
stacey Haugen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
How Do Sponsors Think about “Month 13”?
Patti Tamara Lenard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Fostering Better Integration through Youth-Led  
Refugee Sponsorship
Carolyn mckee, lee-anne lavell, Michelle Manks, 
and Ashley Korn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
Resettling Refugees through Community Sponsorship:  
A Revolutionary Operational Approach Built on  
Traditional Legal Infrastructure
jennifer bond and ania Kwadrans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Australia’s Private Refugee Sponsorship Program:  
Creating Complementary Pathways or  
Privatizing Humanitarianism?
Asher Hirsch, Khanh Hoang, and Anthea Vogl . . . .109
book reviews
The Migrant Passage:  
Clandestine Journeys from Central America
By Noelle Kateri Brigden
kimberly Sigmund. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 
Forging African Communities:  
Mobility, Integration and Belonging
Edited by Oliver Bakewell and Loren B. Landau
Susanna Fioratta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124 
The Criminalization of Migration:  
Context and Consequences
Dirigé par Idil Atak et James C. Simeon
David moffette et Martha Vargas Aguirre . . . . . . .126
Refugee Resettlement:  
Power, Politics, and Humanitarian Governance
Edited by Adèle Garnier, Liliana Lyra Jubilut, and  
Kristin Bergtora Sandvik
geoffrey Cameron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Forced Migration: Current Issues and Debates
Edited by Alice Boch and Giorgia Donà
Anita h. Fábos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
3
© Johanna Reynolds and Christina Clark-Kazak, 2019. This open-access work is 
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Interna-
tional Licence, which permits use, reproduction, and distribution in any medium 
for non-commercial purposes, provided the original authorship is credited and the 
original publication in Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees is cited.
Cette œuvre en libre accès fait l’objet d’une licence Creative Commons Attribu-
tion-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, laquelle autorise l’utilisation, la 
reproduction et la distribution de l’œuvre sur tout support à des fins non commer-
ciales, pourvu que l’auteur ou les auteurs originaux soient mentionnés et que la 
publication originale dans Refuge : revue canadienne sur les réfugiés soit citée.
Introduction: Special Issue on  
Private Sponsorship in Canada
Johanna Reynolds and Christina Clark-Kazak
Introduction
The Canadian government, community organizations, 
sponsorship agreement holders, and ordinary people have 
invested significant time, energy, and resources in the reset-
tlement of refugees to Canada since the establishment of the 
private sponsorship program in 1979. Other countries are 
beginning to adopt and adapt private sponsorship in very 
different contexts. However, there has been limited research 
to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of sponsorship as a 
resettlement process. 
The Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) Program pro-
vides Canadian citizens the opportunity to identify and spon-
sor refugees for resettlement to Canada. For twelve months 
or more, sponsored refugees receive settlement and financial 
support from their sponsorship group. A sponsorship group 
can be formed in various ways: by five or more permanent 
residents or citizens, also called a Group of Five (G5), who 
collectively arrange to sponsor a particular refugee living 
abroad; or by community sponsors, such as an organization, 
corporation, or association; and a constituent group, working 
with a sponsorship agreement holder (SAH), can also support 
a refugee or family in their community of settlement. Sup-
port during this first year of sponsorship (both through direct 
service provision and financial support) is provided by the 
sponsorship group in partnership with service providers.1 The 
Blended Visa Office–Referred (BVOR) Program, launched in 
2013, is a new category of hybrid sponsorship, a cost-sharing 
initiative between the Canadian government and sponsorship 
groups, through which refugees are referred for resettlement 
by UNHCR and approved by Immigration, Refugees and Citi-
zenship Canada (IRCC). 
To complement a previous Refuge special issue focusing 
on the historic establishment of Canada’s private sponsor-
ship and a forthcoming edited volume by Shauna Labman 
and Geoffrey Cameron, this special issue focuses specifically 
on lessons learned from sponsorship efforts and concrete 
suggestions for future policy and programming. The articles 
in this issue make empirical and conceptual contributions to 
understanding the diversity and context specificity of spon-
sorship, particularly in relation to the variability of “success,” 
as well as the ways in which Canadian-specific examples can 
or cannot be “exported” to other countries.
Literature Review: Private Sponsorship in Canada
While Canada’s private sponsorship program has existed for 
forty years, until recently there was little academic literature 
evaluating the program and its impacts. Shortly after the 
large-scale sponsorship and resettlement of Indochinese 
refugees to Canada in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a few 
articles described and analyzed the process2 and evaluated 
Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
4
refugees’ integration.3 In the early 2000s some practitioners 
published reflections on private sponsorship,4 while schol-
ars analyzed resettlement outcomes of sponsored refugees5 
and relationships and partnerships amongst actors involved 
in sponsorship.6 There was also limited literature on the 
World University Service of Canada’s (WUSC) Student Refu-
gee Program (srp).7 Despite these important efforts, there 
was no comprehensive systematic account and evaluation of 
Canada’s private sponsorship system.8
To partially redress this gap, a special issue of Refuge9 
focused on the historical establishment of private sponsorship 
in response to Indochinese refugees. Subsequently Molloy and 
colleagues published a book10 recounting the experiences of 
Canadian government officials who set up and implemented 
those early private sponsorship efforts.
In the context of relatively large-scale resettlement of Syr-
ian refugees to Canada through private sponsorship, govern-
ment assistance, and BVOR channels in 2015–16, and efforts to 
“export” the Canadian sponsorship model,11 new research has 
emerged. Scholars have focused on motivations and experi-
ences of sponsors,12 peer networks,13 regional variations,14 
and new administrative processes and categories of spon-
sorship.15 A forthcoming edited volume by Labman and 
Cameron will use case studies to explore the conceptual and 
historical basis for sponsorship and prospects for successful 
“exportation” of the program.
This research has established several important findings 
about private sponsorship as a resettlement strategy. The dis-
cretionary decision-making involved by UNHCR, government 
actors, and private sponsors naming specific persons to reset-
tle has resulted in some variability in who gets chosen, from 
what areas, and what resources they have once they arrive in 
Canada. For example, Turner has critiqued the exclusion of 
single Syrian men from recent resettlement efforts.16 Hynd-
man, Payne, and Jimenez demonstrate how the prioritization 
of private sponsorship of Syrians by the Canadian govern-
ment in 2015–16 caused delays in the resettlement of refu-
gees from other regions.17 Sponsorship groups have variable 
experience in sponsorship,18 resulting in uneven support 
to, and resettlement outcomes of, refugees.19 The introduc-
tion of a new BVOR sponsorship category also blurs private 
sponsorship with government assistance.20 Relatedly, some 
critique the privatization of refugee protection.21 
This special issue complements this literature in three ways. 
First, while much of the literature has focused on the legal 
and bureaucratic process of private sponsorship, Kyriakides 
et al.; Hynie et al.; McKee et al.; Lenard; Good Gingrich and 
Enns; and Haugen in this issue turn their attention to the 
micro-level human relationships at the heart of sponsor-
ship. Second, two articles in this issue (Kwadrans and Bond; 
Hirsch, Hoang, and Vogl) provide a comparative perspective 
on sponsorship in Canada and other countries.22 Third, 
articles in this special issue attempt to offer practical lessons 
learned to guide current and future private sponsorship. 
Measuring the “Success” of the Canadian Private 
Sponsorship of Refugees Program
The articles in the first section consider the variability of 
“success” in sponsorship programs and perceptions of “suc-
cess” by sponsored and sponsoring groups. The program 
has been recognized globally as unique “because it deeply 
empowered ordinary individuals from any background to 
take primary responsibility for all aspects of welcoming and 
integrating the newcomers” (Kwadrans and Bond, this issue). 
Indeed, the personal efforts and deep commitment of many 
individuals and refugee sponsorship groups is immeasurable. 
What motivates civil society to engage in refugee sponsor-
ship? What are some of the complexities of the sponsor–
sponsored relationship, and how might they be resolved? 
How is “success” defined and by whom? What markers of 
“success” are achievable within the first year of arrival, and 
how can sponsored refugees best achieve them? What condi-
tions make a private sponsorship “successful”? Alternatively, 
what is viewed as a sponsorship “failure”? The following 
articles provide strong empirical contributions that frame 
sponsorship programs in Canada, including student-led ini-
tiatives and faith-based groups. 
Good Gingrich and Enns aptly explain how markers 
of refugee success or “integration” are falsely based on an 
expectation that the sponsored refugee will adapt quickly to 
the new society, typically defined by a narrow understanding 
of self-sufficiency, framed as financial independence or an 
emotional sense of belonging and trust. The authors employ 
a reflexive analysis that shifts our gaze from the refugee 
“Other”—the targets of these policies—to the institutional 
and interpersonal relationships of private refugee sponsor-
ship. They outline the complex nature of these relationships 
and show how these roles and relationships develop and 
change. The authors focus on the Mennonite Central Com-
mittee (MCC) as their case study, the first agency to set up 
the private sponsorship of refugees in Canada. They dem-
onstrate how the Mennonite or MMC ethos influenced spon-
sor–newcomer relationships and associated values and goals 
in MCC’s refugee sponsorships.
According to Kyriakides et al., resettlement success 
depends in part on pre-arrival communication. Kyriakides 
et al. demonstrate the importance of regular pre-arrival 
contact via digital applications such as Facebook, Skype, 
and Whatsapp for more “successful” and positive resettle-
ment experiences. In their study with groups of privately 
sponsored Syrian refugees in Ontario, understanding reset-
tlement “needs” was influenced by the level of interpersonal 
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trust that had developed between refugees and their sponsors. 
Pre-arrival exchanges that were conducted via social media 
have the potential to translate resettlement information 
into resettlement knowledge assets, what the authors term 
“third spaces of refugee resettlement,” reducing uncertainty 
by bridging the gap between interpretation and expectation, 
and the actual conditions encountered in resettlement. The 
result was to mutually reduce the uncertainty of resettle-
ment. As noted by the authors, another important result of 
pre-arrival correspondence is that both sponsored and spon-
sors engaged and corresponded from their respective social 
roles, thereby also recognizing the needs that corresponded 
to those roles, be it as parents, spouses, and so on.
However, conditions of variability influence the settlement 
experience of refugees in Canada. In their mixed-methods 
study on newly arrived adult Syrian refugees in British Colum-
bia, Ontario, and Quebec, Hynie et al. consider whether 
early integration benefits observed among government- 
assisted refugees (GAR) and PSRs can be attributed to pre-
migration differences, or to the anticipated benefits of pri-
vate settlement, specifically potential differences in social 
capital between GARs and PSRs. They apply the holistic inte-
gration model, which moves the responsibility for success 
(or failure) of integration purely from the individual level, 
to also include conditions in the dominant host society and 
broader socio-political contexts of integration (e.g., colonial, 
racist, and xenophobic policies). The authors demonstrate 
that a host of pre-migration conditions affect the integration 
pathway, including length of time in transit and associated 
physical and psychological hardships, previous knowledge of 
English/French, having relatives in Canada, and the impor-
tance of local contexts in which they settle. Importantly, the 
authors show that PSRs are not a homogenous group and that 
comparing settlement outcomes of PSRs with other groups 
such as GARs is ineffective, given the variability within and 
between the categories. 
The importance of place in settlement outcomes is also 
clearly demonstrated in Haugen’s article, which discusses 
the important role that smaller cities or rural communities 
play in hosting privately sponsored refugees. Despite inad-
equate infrastructure and settlement challenges in smaller 
communities (e.g., lack of newcomer services, lack of public 
transportation, limited access to higher education, and reli-
gious and racial discrimination), rural communities can also 
offer benefits to refugee families who decide to remain there, 
including affordable housing and strong social supports. The 
author’s findings from rural communities in Alberta, Sas-
katchewan, Ontario, and Nova Scotia emphasize the unique-
ness of place while at the same time contribute to knowledge 
about the process of integration and refugee resettlement 
experiences outside urban centres. 
Lenard draws attention to the structural conditions that 
make independence within one year difficult to achieve. 
The infamous “month 13” requires that refugees become 
independent with a year of their arrival, and sponsors are 
tasked with supporting their pathway to independence. And 
yet multiple conditions and variables result in refugees not 
being prepared to be on their own by the time their sponsor-
ship ends. Lenard explains that there is also a common mis-
understanding of what constitutes independence, or what 
skills are needed for newcomers to become independent, 
including tensions between sponsors and sponsored around 
financial budgeting. For example, a common misconception 
is that financial self-sufficiency is synonymous with integra-
tion. Lenard shows that there is need for a deeper and more 
nuanced understanding of what “success” at month 13 looks 
like and that independence and integration into Canadian 
society is gradual: “The failure to attain it by month 13 means 
neither that the newcomers have failed, nor that the sponsor-
ship has failed.”
The article by McKee et al. focuses on the World University 
Services of Canada (WUSC) Student Refugee Program. This 
youth-to-youth sponsorship model is an effective approach 
to integrate young refugees into their receiving community. 
Youth volunteers, they argue, can play an important role 
in supporting integration for newcomers to Canada. More 
than 130 refugee students are resettled to Canadian post-
secondary institutions each year, through more than ninety 
campus-based WUSC local committees. The authors argue 
that resettling refugee youth to Canadian post-secondary 
institutions reduces many barriers to integration faced by 
other refugee youth, such as providing access to education, 
language training, and employment opportunities. Their 
results show that local committees were instrumental in 
providing refugee students with job opportunities both on 
and off campus. Furthermore, interviewed participants also 
indicated feeling “at home” and attributed this feeling to the 
support of the local committee and the broader community, 
even in cases where their ethnic community was largely 
absent. An important lesson from the SRP is that “youth are 
uniquely positioned as innovative leaders capable of mobi-
lizing their peers and community on global issues.” Engaging 
students in refugee sponsorship by raising awareness about 
global migration can have ripple effects both on campus and 
in the broader community. 
These articles collectively demonstrate that pre-arrival 
conditions, social and structural barriers, policies, and insti-
tutional supports all need to be carefully considered when 
assessing what constitutes the “successful” integration of 
newcomers to Canada.
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Private Sponsorship in a Global Context 
The second section highlights examples of private sponsor-
ship programs in other countries that seek community-based 
solutions to fill the resettlement gap. Community sponsor-
ship programs are unique in that they empower ordinary cit-
izens to welcome and integrate refugee newcomers into their 
communities. They are viewed as a complementary model to 
state-led resettlement commitments. How does such a pro-
gram function when there is no national framework, as in 
the United States? Or when the state uses community-based 
solutions in lieu of their own national commitments, which 
result in downloaded responsibility, as in Australia?
Bond and Kwadrans provide a comparative analysis of 
the legal and administrative frameworks that have under-
pinned sponsorship programs in Canada, the United King-
dom, New Zealand, and Argentina. They also briefly exam-
ine the introduction of co-sponsorship in the United States, 
a country without any formal national program. What policy 
structures are required to operationalize community spon-
sorship programs? The authors highlight a historic overview 
of the Canadian model, focusing on the original legislative 
changes that created the foundations for the world’s largest 
community sponsorship program. As they further explain, 
the Canadian model offered a unique referral mechanism 
that permitted sponsors to identify refugees they wished to 
resettle and was enabled by an explicit provision in the 1976 
Immigration Act. This model underscores the very minimal 
legislative framework necessary to facilitate introduction of 
this radically different approach to refugee resettlement. The 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, on the other hand, each 
introduced community sponsorship into pre-existing and 
well-established refugee resettlement infrastructure. Alter-
natively Argentina—a newer resettlement country—created 
a resettlement program delivered exclusively through a 
sponsorship model. The final case study, the United States, 
is a large resettlement country that does not have a national 
community sponsorship program. Nevertheless, a number 
of American civil society organizations have recognized 
the potential of sponsorship and built their own mini infra-
structure within the country’s broader overall resettlement 
scheme. The authors show that sponsorship models are not 
“one size fits all,” encouraging countries to consider new 
sponsorship programs without undertaking wide-scale leg-
islative reform.
Hirsch, Hoang, and Vogl examine Australia’s current 
Community Support Program (CSP), which began in late 
2017, as a cautionary tale: a sponsorship program that reduces 
government accountability and financial commitment to 
humanitarian resettlement programming. The authors also 
demonstrate that the eligibility criteria for CSP shows a pref-
erence for “job ready,” “economically self-sufficient” refugees 
between the ages of eighteen and fifty, with “functional Eng-
lish,” an overall higher integration capacity, and from par-
ticular countries of origin. This “cherry picking” of refugees 
undermines the humanitarian nature of this program and 
discriminates on the basis of gender, age, and other criteria. 
The authors provide an important discussion on whether 
this program can preserve its humanitarian focus as a dura-
ble solution for refugees or whether economic independ-
ence and other criteria in fact support an economic model 
of self-sufficiency. 
The Future of Private Sponsorship?
The Global Compact on Refugees calls upon states “to estab-
lish private or community sponsorship programs that are 
additional to regular resettlement” in order to provide timely 
access to durable solutions to refugees.”23 Canada’s private 
sponsorship program has gained global attention as a leader 
in refugee resettlement.24 In 2019 Canada will resettle four 
times more privately sponsored refugees than in 2015.25 It 
is thus imperative that we pay close attention to the evalua-
tion of Canada’s private sponsorship system and the lessons 
learned provided in new and emerging research to guide 
future private sponsorship.
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A Reflexive View of Refugee Integration and 
Inclusion: A Case Study of the  
Mennonite Central Committee and the 
Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program
Luann Good Gingrich and Thea Enns1
Abstract
Through a qualitative case study with Mennonite Central 
Committee (MCC) sponsorship groups and former refugee 
newcomers, we adopt a reflexive, relational, and systemic 
lens (Bourdieu) to analyze the institutional and interper-
sonal relationships in the Private Sponsorship of Refugees 
(PSR) Program, and more specifically, the ways in which 
MCC Ontario’s sponsorship program invigorates or frustrates 
dynamics of social inclusion. We situate the institutional 
relations of the PSR Program as nested social fields and sub-
fields, revealing complementary and competing systems of 
capital that direct explicit and implicit visions for “success” 
in MCC sponsorships. A peculiar Mennonite/MCC social 
field and structure of capital generates institutional and 
social tensions, yet an ambivalent disposition or divided 
habitus presents possibilities for seeing, understanding, and 
challenging dynamics of social exclusion. 
Résumé
À travers une étude de cas qualitative avec des groupes 
de parrainage du Comité Central Mennonite (MCC) et 
d’anciens nouveaux arrivants comme réfugiés, nous adop-
tons une perspective réflexive, relationnelle et systémique 
(Bourdieu) pour analyser les relations institutionnelles et 
interpersonnelles dans le Programme de parrainage privé 
des réfugiés, et plus spécifiquement les façons dont le pro-
gramme de parrainage du MCC Ontario fortifie ou entrave 
les dynamiques d’inclusion sociale. Nous situons les diverses 
relations institutionnelles du Programme de parrainage 
privé des réfugiés comme étant des champs et sous-champs 
sociaux imbriqués, révélant des systèmes complémentaires 
et concurrents de capital qui orientent des visions explicites 
et implicites de la “réussite” dans les parrainages du MCC. 
Un champ social et une structure de capital Mennonite 
singuliers génèrent des tensions institutionnelles et sociales. 
9
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Toutefois une disposition ambivalente ou un habitus divisé 
présentent des possibilités pour voir, comprendre et remettre 
en question les dynamiques d’exclusion sociale.
What Is the Sponsor’s Role?
Your role … is not to provide instant answers, but rather to encour-
age the newcomers to weigh and test a variety of possibilities…. 
Sponsors should be involved in a mutual learning process…. Each 
culture, and individuals within that culture, have their own way of 
doing things…. Remember that they, as yourself, need to be treated 
as people with feelings and needs…. Patience, mutual respect, good 
humour and love are invaluable assets as you work together in 
resettlement.2
The Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) Program in Canada has been hailed by some as an exemplar for social inclusion and integration of refugee newcom-
ers into the host society. This self-proclaimed “pioneering 
refugee resettlement program,”3 overseen by Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) through the Refu-
gee Sponsorship Training Program (RSTP), gives “ordinary 
people across the country” the opportunity to use their own 
personal resources (monetary and otherwise) “to be directly 
involved in the resettlement of refugees from abroad.”4 
According to IRCC, the role of a sponsor, post-arrival, is “to 
support the refugees for the length of the sponsorship [one year]. 
This includes help for housing, clothing and food, as well as 
social and emotional support.”5 Sponsoring groups are directed 
to partner with IRCC-funded Service Provider Organizations 
(SPOs) to “support the settlement and integration of PSRs.”6
While settlement and integration are not defined in gov-
ernment documents, emphasis is given to independence and 
self-sufficiency. For example, the RSTP Handbook for Sponsor-
ing Groups states, “During the first year, newcomers learn a 
tremendous amount and generally move from a high degree 
of dependence to a high degree of independence. Through 
it all, your role is that of an enabler, supporting newcomers 
to equip themselves, make their own decisions and find out 
as much as possible about their new environment. Above all, 
you are providing warm friendship and support.”7
The specific outcomes identified by the Canadian gov-
ernment—“finding employment, learning English, learning 
life skills to function in Canada”8—suggest that priority is 
placed on effecting individual level adaptation so that the 
refugee newcomer family reaches economic self-sufficiency 
through paid work. In contrast, we open this article with an 
excerpt from a 1979 Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) 
document when the PSR Program was in its infancy. This 
passage provides a glimpse of a peculiar Mennonite/MCC 
ethos that is defined by a non-conformist and communal 
heritage, culture, and institutional structure.9 This, we argue, 
is consequential for the nature of sponsor–newcomer rela-
tionships, associated values and goals, and positions and dis-
positions that develop through MCC’s refugee sponsorships. 
We adopt a reflexive, relational, and systemic lens to ana-
lyze the institutional and interpersonal relationships in the 
private sponsorship of refugees. We are most interested in 
examining the tensions and contradictions of sponsor–new-
comer relationships and associated positions and disposi-
tions (or habitus) that are produced, at the institutional 
and interpersonal scales. We situate the PSR Program as a 
social field with a particular system of capital and habitus. 
This theoretical lens brings to our attention the symbolic 
economy, or logic, of the social relations of private sponsor-
ship, revealing both complementary and competing systems 
of capital that direct explicit and implicit visions for “success” 
in MCC sponsorships, and result in institutional and social 
tensions and an ambivalent disposition or divided habitus. 
We argue that the “double privatization” of the PSR Program 
is consequential, even in shaping individual private sponsor-
ship roles and associated dispositions. Equally important in 
this case example is the unique synergies between MCC as 
an organization and the congregations that make up its base 
of support, many of which have sponsored refugees for a 
sustained period of time. Thus, we theorize, these local and 
global synergies reproduce a distinct Mennonite ethos (or 
social field) that is embodied in institutions and individuals.
In this article we draw on focus group and interview 
data with MCC constituent group (CG) members and former 
refugee newcomers, along with organizational documents, 
to examine the nature and evolution of the relationships, 
responsibilities, positions, and dispositions of private 
sponsorship.10 We begin with a brief history of the private 
refugee sponsorship program in Canada and MCC’s part in 
its development, followed by an outline of this study’s theo-
retical framework and methodology. The bulk of the article 
is devoted to our analysis of institutional and interpersonal 
relationships, tensions, contradictions, and possibilities as 
they emerged in our data. 
Private Refugee Sponsorship in Canada 
Complementing Canada’s Government-Assisted Refugee 
(GAR) Program, the 1976 Immigration Act officially institu-
tionalized the PSR Program. Cameron and Labman note that 
“sponsorship is permitted through three types of sponsorship 
groups: ‘Groups of Five,’ ‘Community Sponsors,’ and ‘Con-
stituent Groups (CGs),’ who are members of an organiza-
tion that is a Sponsorship Agreement Holder (SAH).”11 As of 
February 2019, there were 114 SAHs across Canada,12 75 per 
cent of which are connected with religious communities.13 
Approximately 65 per cent of refugees privately resettled are 
sponsored or co-sponsored by a SAH.14 
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Until recently, much of the literature on private refu-
gee sponsorship has focused on program evaluation and 
history15 and falls within the context of the Indochinese 
refugee movement, when the program was initially used 
and internationally recognized.16 Research tends to com-
pare refugee resettlement streams (e.g., gars versus PSRs) 
or demographic features and is focused more on outcomes 
for refugee newcomers than on processes and practices 
in resettlement.17 More recently an influx of research has 
addressed the realities of private sponsorship of Syrian refu-
gee newcomers, considering identity18 or motivations and 
characteristics of sponsors.19 There is a much smaller body 
of literature on the unique history and involvement of MCC 
during this time and prior to signing the first Master Agree-
ment.20 MCC’s role in refugee resettlement is acknowledged 
within the larger fabric of Christian institutions in Canada,21 
while some literature specifically addresses cross-cultural 
and religious interactions between Indochinese refugees and 
their Mennonite sponsors.22 Our focus is on the sponsoring 
relationships within a larger social system and specific social 
subfield of MCC as a SAH.
Theoretical Considerations: Models of Integration, 
Social Fields, and Structures of Capital
Integration and inclusion are regularly considered critical to 
settlement of refugee newcomers.23 In practice, integration 
and inclusion are often used interchangeably, notwithstand-
ing discrete conceptual roots and distinct vast literatures. 
Particularly in the context of settlement services for immi-
grants and refugees, inclusion may emphasize a subjective 
sense of belonging and trust over the material realities of 
settlement and integration.24 
Despite their ubiquity, definitions and indicators of inclu-
sion, or integration, commonly remain implicit and specific 
to national contexts and cultural trends that shift over time, 
revealing the normative nature of an unquestioned social 
ideal. We consider concepts of refugee integration or inclu-
sion to be produced by an assumed logic that is associated 
with material and symbolic capital (or resources) in a social 
field. 
From an individualistic and categorical point of view, 
integration is most often equated with participation in 
various social arenas, and interventions focus on increas-
ing individual capacity for meaningful incorporation into 
mainstream communities and institutions. For example, 
the stated objective of settlement services in Canada is “to 
help them [refugee newcomers] to become participating 
members of Canadian society as quickly as possible.”25 This 
familiar evaluative gaze lands squarely and exclusively on 
the refugee newcomer, producing an invisible yet ideal-
ized individual and collective self. Integration or inclusion 
through person-change measures—to help them fit into 
social systems, institutions, and cultural norms—implies a 
“centre” or series of centres whereby voluntary engagement 
or mandatory insertion moves an individual from exclusion 
to inclusion.26
Offering more depth of meaning and complexity, a popu-
lar analogy for integration or inclusion of immigrants and 
refugees is a “two-way street,”27 recognizing the need for 
reciprocal change between newcomers and hosts, where 
“both the receiving communities and the newcomers change, 
and change each other.”28 Emphasis is placed not only on 
rights, but also on responsibilities of both the newcomer and 
residents29 to create the “opportunities for the immigrants’ 
full economic, social, cultural and political participation.”30 
This interpersonal change remains focused on the level of 
the individual, yet gives some recognition to the self in rela-
tion to the Other.
Aiming for a more robust conception of integration, or 
inclusion, that recognizes refugee newcomers as “stakehold-
ers” in integration rather than sites of intervention, Lamping, 
Bertolo, and Wahlrab posit that the primary goal of resettle-
ment is not to provide services, but to build relationships and 
a welcoming community.31 Similarly, Hynie’s holistic integra-
tion model strengthens the emphasis on changes within the 
social context and on the interrelatedness of different social 
levels or dimensions.32 This shift from the individual to the 
social as the unit of analysis and site of intervention requires 
situating the Other in a social context, stressing place change 
over person change.
A key principle or value that operates in MCC’s refugee 
sponsorship program is a concept of “mutually transforma-
tive relationships,”33 suggesting a model of integration or 
inclusion that expands the sites of intervention to include 
interpersonal change, place change, and even system change. 
We propose that an approach to integration or inclusion of 
refugee newcomers that is congruent with the Mennonite/
MCC ethos (or structure of capital) situates refugee sponsor-
ship within the broader context of forced migration—in con-
flict that is at once interpersonal and systemic, manifesting 
itself in fractured relationships between individuals, groups, 
communities, societies, and nations. This, we argue, is the 
essence of social exclusion.34 In writing about transforma-
tive relationships in protracted internal and international-
ized conflict—contexts that produce refugees—Mennonite 
scholar and practitioner John Paul Lederach emphasizes the 
“interdependence between various levels of society affected 
by and affecting change processes.”35 Thus, a system-change 
model of integration involves transformation at all levels—
personal, relational, institutional, and cultural.36 
Seeing integration, or inclusion, as conflict transforma-
tion, or system change, is uncommon in refugee-receiving 
Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
12
countries in the Global North.37 The social and legal envi-
ronments of host nations are relatively just and fair, com-
pared to refugee source countries, and by virtue of offering 
safety and protection, a national moral superiority is implied. 
Furthermore, this narrow perspective denies the inextrica-
ble ties between “refugee-producing” and “refugee-saving” 
nation-states, and the incessant historical practices that give 
rise to collective violence and “populations that have expe-
rienced a deep fracture in human relationships as a result of 
fundamental violations of their human rights.”38 Especially 
in the relationships of refugee sponsorship, system change is 
a demanding point of view, as a critical gaze must be turned 
to the self and the Other in social and historical relations of 
power. To recognize the sustained conflict and slow violence 
of “soft domination”39 requires eschewing common sense 
binaries to, instead, hold paradox.
Some definitions of terms are required. According to 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the social world is made 
up of multiple and diverse social fields and subfields, or are-
nas of contest and struggle.40 A social field, analogous to a 
field of play in a highly competitive game of sport, is defined 
by its structure of capital, both material and symbolic, as 
individuals and groups compete for available resources that 
are effective and valued in that social field. All social space 
is ordered according to the legitimate means of appropriat-
ing and circulating capital, and the resulting structure and 
volumes possessed by individuals and groups engaged in 
any given social field. Occupants of various positions in 
social fields “seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard 
or improve their position.”41 In other words, a particular dis-
position, or habitus, is associated with advancement in this 
social field, with the accumulation of various species of capi-
tal. The habitus—much more than identity—is “socialized 
subjectivity” and “the product of collective and individual 
history,” which is expressed through taste and disposition, 
or embodied habits that are adjusted to social economies 
in which we engage.42 A divided habitus, or “coherent 
incoherence,”43 is a necessary “conciliation of contraries”44 in 
response to competing social fields and structures of capital, 
and coincident and opposing positions (i.e., dominant and 
dominated) in each. We will draw on this tripartite concept 
in the analysis that follows.
Methods and Methodology: A Case Study of MCC
History of MCC and Canada’s Private Sponsorship Model
Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) was founded in 1920 
when famine and the decimation of Mennonite communi-
ties in Ukraine during the Russian Revolution stirred Men-
nonites in North America to respond to the need of their 
co-religionists.45 In addition to aid, resettlement to Canada 
was an important aspect of the work of the newly formed 
organization.46 Between 1923 and 1930, Canada accepted 
over 21,000 Mennonites from the Soviet Union, with the 
understanding that Canadian Mennonite communities 
would provide for and resettle these newcomers. In the fol-
lowing decades, MCC expanded its relief and international 
development work well beyond assistance to fellow Men-
nonites.47 According to William Janzen, a long-time director 
of MCC Canada’s (MCCC) Ottawa office, the historical experi-
ence of MCC in refugee resettlement served as a precedent 
for Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugee (PSR) Program, 
which was established more than fifty years after MCC was 
established.48 Janzen also served as one of the negotiators of 
Canada’s original Master Agreement, which MCCC signed in 
1979. This agreement with the federal government provided 
the legal basis for MCCC to work with local congregations 
that, in turn, offered organizational and logistical support 
for groups of citizens to privately sponsor refugees. MCCC 
has sustained a vibrant refugee sponsorship program among 
Mennonite churches for forty years. 
Today MCC defines itself as “a worldwide ministry of Ana-
baptist churches,” with national offices in both Winnipeg 
(Manitoba) and Akron (Pennsylvania), enabling congrega-
tions to become engaged in “relief, development and peace 
in the name of Christ”49 at home and abroad. 
MCC provides a longstanding and unique case example 
for considering the relationships of private sponsorship in 
Canada for at least four key factors: its origins in provid-
ing aid to refugees; its role in Canada’s private sponsorship 
program; its ties with Mennonite and Anabaptist churches 
and their refugee heritage; and the sustained engagement of 
individuals, sponsorship groups, and sponsoring congrega-
tions in private sponsorship. 
Research Methods
This analysis emerged from a qualitative research partner-
ship between MCC Ontario (MCCO) and York University. 
Our study used a reflexive community-based framework, 
whereby the research purpose, question, design, and data 
generation were collectively formulated and conducted in 
a partnership between researchers at York University, the 
MCCO Refugee Sponsorship and Settlement Associate, and 
the MCCO refugee program coordinator. The objective of this 
study was to examine how the relationships and practices 
within MCCC’s private sponsorship program invigorate or 
frustrate dynamics of social inclusion. 
Qualitative data were gathered in 2018 through seven 
focus groups with five to eight sponsors each, totalling forty-
nine participants from twenty-one churches in six geograph-
ical regions that sponsored refugees through MCC Ontario 
between 2007 and 2015; seven interviews with seventeen 
former refugee newcomers who were sponsored by one of 
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the sample groups;50 a key informant interview with Brian 
Dyck, the National Migration and Resettlement Program 
coordinator; and MCC documents and publications. None 
of the sponsorships were named cases, but rather the spon-
sored individuals and families were identified through the 
Visa Office Referred (VOR) or Blended Visa Office–Referred 
(BVOR) Program. This is significant for the purposes of our 
study, since sponsors had no prior relationship with the refu-
gee newcomers they sponsored. Apart from one sponsoring 
church that was affiliated with the Evangelical Missionary 
Church of Canada, all congregations within the sample were 
members of Mennonite denominations that are formal con-
tributing constituents of MCCC, with the majority belonging 
to the Mennonite Church.51 MCCO staff used its database 
to identify sponsors across Ontario and provided formal 
invitations on behalf of the organization. Because a primary 
objective of the research was to understand the nature and 
development of sponsorship roles and relationships over 
time, the sample of CGs was limited to those who had spon-
sored a family or individual prior to the 2015–16 Syrian reset-
tlement efforts. Contact information for CGs before 2007 was 
limited, thus our sample captured sponsors between 2007 
and 2015. However, as the data reveal, several congregations 
had been sponsoring for decades, even since 1979. A purpo-
sive sample of these long-standing groups that had engaged 
in multiple sponsorships prior to 2015 was selected from 
regions in Ontario with the largest representation of these 
groups: Waterloo Region, Stratford, Niagara, and the Greater 
Toronto Area. Aiming for multiplicity of perspective, purpo-
sive sampling was further employed to add three additional 
focus groups: (1) sponsors from the Leamington area, to 
provide a rural perspective; (2) sponsors from Ottawa Men-
nonite Church, to understand the experiences of the longest-
standing CG with the most completed sponsorships; and 
(3) a CG comprising individuals who attended two different 
Mennonite churches and were sponsored through MCCC but 
independent of either congregation. Subsequently, sponsors 
extended the invitation to participate to those whom they 
had sponsored, resembling a purposive snowball sampling 
method, as recruitment was limited to former refugee 
newcomers with whom sponsors had an ongoing relation-
ship. Refugee countries of origin represented included Iraq, 
Syria, Eritrea, South Sudan, and Colombia. Interpreters were 
used for four of the seven newcomer interviews, for Arabic, 
Tigrinya, and Spanish. 
Focus group discussions and interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed. Discussions with sponsors centred 
on the following topics: expectations or goals of sponsor-
ship, values and guiding principles of sponsorship, shifting 
and growing relationships between sponsor and sponsored 
refugees over time, best practices, and personal experiences 
of sponsorship. Demographic information for each focus 
group participant was collected prior to each focus group. 
Thematic analysis of the focus group data was conducted 
through a collaborative and iterative approach, combining 
independent analyses by authors Enns and Good Gingrich, 
and collaborative analysis with MCCO program coordinators. 
Direct quotations from former refugee newcomers52 are 
identified with pseudonyms, and those from sponsors with 
the number of the focus group.
A Reflexive Lens
Research and practice that adopt a relational and systems 
framework are necessarily reflexive. In other words, the 
focus of attention is on the ways in which we engage with 
one another, as well as the outcomes of our work together. 
We identify the overarching methodology that guided this 
research project as “epistemic reflexivity.”53 Bourdieu’s prac-
tice of reflexivity entails the systematic analysis of practice 
in everyday social relations, “the objective archeology of our 
unconscious,” and the arbitrary.54 Reflexive sociology “is 
critical of established patterns of power and privilege as well 
as of the politics that supports them.”55 More simply, a reflex-
ive analysis shifts our gaze. Rather than the conventional 
focus on excluded individuals or groups—the Other—who 
are the targets of policies and services to help them become 
included or integrated, we take as our object of study the 
social spaces that comprise this largely uncontested “centre,” 
specifically, the institutional and interpersonal relationships 
of private refugee sponsorship: a primary objective is “to his-
toricize and so denaturalize that which seems most natural 
in the social order,” to the point of seeming inevitable.56 Epis-
temic reflexivity requires us to see what we take for granted, 
to recognize that we have a world view that is not the only 
way to view the world. 
Institutional Relations: The Nested Social Fields of 
Refugee Sponsorship
As for all social fields, the institutional relations of private 
sponsorship are arenas of contest and struggle. Specifically, 
MCCC has a duty through its sponsorship agreement to func-
tion as an extension of the federal government (IRCC) in 
carrying out the directives of the PSR Program. Yet equally 
important in our case example is MCCC’s obligation to its 
constituency of Mennonite and affiliated congregations. 
Thus, MCCC is answerable to two distinct constituencies and 
systems of institutions, policies, and practices. As a broker 
between government directives and sponsors, MCCC must 
hold in tension two conflicting sets of values, or structures 
of capital. We will explore the institutional and interpersonal 
implications of these contradictory social fields and struc-
tures of capital in the following sections. 
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The Market-State Social Field 
With its primary purpose of refugee settlement, Canada’s PSR 
Program fits within the social welfare arm of the nation-state. 
Yet private sponsorship programs do not fall neatly under 
one of the four sectors commonly associated with national 
welfare states: government (or public), market (or private 
for-profit), community/voluntary sector (private not-for-
profit), and family (private and informal). The “settlement 
and integration of PSRs” is to be achieved through a “part-
nership of support” from informal civil society (sponsorship 
groups) and publicly funded Service Provider Organizations 
(SPOs).57 
Canada’s PSR Program is designed to be a public-private 
partnership, but direct service provision and a portion or 
all of the cost is delegated to the formal not-for-profit com-
munity/voluntary sector as well as informal family and civil 
society, yet the state imposes the legal framework and prac-
tice regulations. This is a double privatization, as the mar-
ketized public transfers international and domestic respon-
sibility to both the formal and informal not-for-profit private 
sectors, blurring multiple boundaries within and beyond the 
nation-state. 
The logic or structure of capital of the PSR Program is 
made explicit in its goals, the terms for “success,” and what 
sponsors are “to make/to do.”58 Even a cursory glance at 
IRCC guidelines and instructions for sponsors reveals that 
the standard for successful private sponsorship is measured 
primarily by a particularly narrow version of self-sufficiency 
of refugee newcomers at the end of the one-year sponsor-
ship. In practice, whether defined as settlement, integration, 
or inclusion, the outcome is most often assessed through 
individual and static indicators of financial independence 
and/or an emotional sense of belonging and trust. Market 
logic assumes that the subjective and material realities of 
social exclusion are best addressed through paid work. Such 
person-change measures constitute enforced dependency on 
the market. This is social exclusion by design, as we know 
that inclusion is not available for everyone through paid 
work.
The Mennonite/MCC Social Field: A Countercultural 
System of Capital
Despite a range of personal beliefs and contradictory expres-
sions of proximity or distance to religion and the Mennonite 
church, a common sponsorship ethos, or structure of capi-
tal, runs through official MCC discourse and all participant 
responses. This ethos is institutionalized in MCC and its 
constituent churches and is reinforced in the specific prac-
tices of synergy that are mutually productive for Mennonite 
organizations, MCC programs, and participating individuals. 
We have argued elsewhere that MCCC has maintained a com-
mitment to refugee sponsorship largely as the result of his-
torical beginnings steeped in refugee resettlement, its local 
and national credibility as a SAH, its substantial presence and 
history in international development work, and its structure 
and grassroots connections with Mennonite and affiliating 
denominations in North America.59 Consequently, we theo-
rize this diverse yet singular social context as a social field, 
with its own “institutional boundaries,” “barriers to entry,” 
and “specialists in the elaboration of a distinctive source 
of authority and sociodicy.”60 As with all social fields, the 
Mennonite/MCC social field functions according to its own 
discernible structure of capital that cuts across place and 
time and directs the accumulation and exchange of mate-
rial and symbolic assets, and produces a particular habitus 
or disposition. 
We identify the following distinct features of the Men-
nonite/MCC social field that have supported and sustained 
a unique model of refugee sponsorship with long-standing 
sponsoring groups for over forty years. 
A Heritage of Persecution
Mennonite identity is steeped in “refugeeness.” The MCC dis-
position, or habitus, is rooted in stories of Mennonite refu-
gees from the twentieth century. Janzen and Epp-Tiessen 
identify the significance of an inherited refugee story, most 
importantly flight from the Soviet Union during and after 
the First and Second World Wars, in motivating Mennon-
ites to become involved in the sponsorship of Indo-Chinese 
refugees. Epp-Tiessen explains: “They, their parents, or 
grandparents had been refugees, and they now wished to 
ease the suffering of others.”61 A familiar and inspiring grand 
narrative is the almost 400-page first-hand account of MCC’s 
second refugee resettlement effort of 12,000 uprooted Men-
nonites from Russia to South and North America from 1941 
to 1949, as told by lifelong MCC workers and Canadian Men-
nonites Peter and Elfrieda Dyck (1991). The title, Up from the 
Rubble: The Epic Rescue of Thousands of War-Ravaged Men-
nonite Refugees, contains the essence of this legendary David 
and Goliath story. 
Nearly half of the sponsors in our study articulated a 
familial refugee story. This sense of personal connection to 
“refugeeness” was repeatedly identified as a motivating factor 
for sponsors: “I think one of the reasons that I feel strongly 
about this is that my parents were refugees after the Second 
World War.”62 Some respondents described a direct and inti-
mate relationship with MCC, as they associated their current 
life in Canada with the support and aid provided by MCC 
when they themselves, or their family, resettled in Canada 
as refugees. When asked why they chose to sponsor through 
MCC, an older couple noted, “When we talk about our family 
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experience, it was MCC who was there, and they found spon-
sors for my parents and they found sponsors for [my wife] 
and family. The natural choice.”63 
While not all North American Mennonites reference a 
familial refugee past from the twentieth century, the Men-
nonite heritage and collective identity also draws from sto-
ries of sixteenth-century Anabaptists, who were persecuted 
for opposing the religious and political leaders and institu-
tions of the day. The Anabaptist disposition is countercul-
tural, even radical, outside the mainstream and inclined 
toward the margins. Mennonites often use this history to 
identify with the disadvantaged and powerless, as social and 
cultural capital—far more important than material capital in 
a Mennonite social field—is associated with (triumph over) 
oppression and suffering. This “posture” for the dispossessed 
and the outsider has shaped the particular Anabaptist/Men-
nonite interpretation of biblical teaching and theological 
explanations for MCC’s vision and mission of “serving with 
humility and in partnership to meet local needs with local 
solutions” and “to prevent violence and promote peace and 
justice.”64 
A Culture of Beliefs in Action/An Ethos of Sponsorship
A practical and collective response to human crisis or need 
is an obligation that grows out of religious and humanitarian 
beliefs and values that have shaped Mennonite cultures for 
over 500 years. For focus group participants who articulated 
a refugee past, sponsorship was clearly expressed as a means 
to strengthen their Mennonite identity by weaving this herit-
age with their current practice. Some also drew on classic 
formulations of Anabaptist/Mennonite theology to explain 
their motivation to sponsor: “Our congregation is very influ-
enced by Anabaptist theology. Specifically, we recognize the 
call of the gospel to make a difference in the world and dis-
cipleship and service, so the thrust of our service is that we 
want to reach out to some of these people globally that are 
in stressed situations.”65 Discipleship, central to Mennonite 
theology and culture, emerged as an important element 
for some sponsors who specifically described sponsorship 
through MCC as “an extension, a practical part of [Mennon-
ite] faith”66 and of “loving mercy and acting justly.”67 One 
respondent from a congregation in southern Ontario with a 
long history of sponsorship noted that refugee sponsorship is 
a “Christian service,” and there “seems to be this understand-
ing that within the call to discipleship we should be doing 
something, and we do this.”68 Although all respondents had 
some affiliation with a Mennonite church or heritage, several 
explicitly articulated that their involvement in sponsorship 
was not tied to faith: “The fact that we can do it is why we 
did it. Not out of any obligation, out of any faith, or anything 
else. It was just that we had the means, and therefore we 
could participate.”69 For these sponsors, MCC’s “theological 
hands-off ” stance made it possible to participate in “a hands-
on, real thing—it’s not just talking about it…. This is real. 
I can contribute to making a real difference, a meaningful 
difference.”70 For Mennonites in Canada, whether claiming 
religious affiliation or not, sponsorship through MCC gives 
expression to a past refugee experience, a current represen-
tation of triumph over hardship, and a sustained collective 
identity as people of peace. In turn, a unique MCC sponsor-
ship ethos is reinforced. 
A Community of Sponsoring Communities
MCC’s structure expresses an organizational commitment to 
“relationships with our local partners and churches”71 that is 
consistent with Anabaptist principles of community, mutual 
aid, and sharing of material and social resources. The church 
as a faith community provides a natural structure and cul-
ture for sponsorship. A prominent theme in focus group 
discussions was the mutually supportive and constitutive 
relationship—an institutional synergy—between MCC and 
affiliated churches. Congregations that have maintained a 
long-term engagement in private sponsorship are heavily 
reliant on MCC, its structure, reputation, and staff support. 
In turn, the stability of MCC’s refugee program is owed to 
the sustained engagement of individual congregations. The 
tight connection between Mennonite churches and MCC was 
articulated by a focus group member: “Our churches are all 
part of MCC, we are constituents of MCC—we see MCC as the 
extension of our local congregation that does the local and 
international relief and development work and MCC as an 
extension of the community and development work.”72
In addition to the reputation and practical support of MCC, 
long-standing congregational structures, practices, and rela-
tionships offer the material, social, and symbolic resources 
necessary for refugee sponsorship. Local congregations are 
an established collective of people who provide financial 
and in-kind resources, form sponsorship groups, replace 
group members as necessary, generate additional supports 
and resources, connect with community networks, and have 
ready access to a physical space to hold events or meetings. 
Many churches have designated funds for refugee support in 
the form of mission budgets, benevolence funds, or even a 
designated budget line specifically for refugee resettlement 
needs. Further, the congregation provides a financial and 
social safety net, a pool of potential resources. 
Furthermore, MCC’s extensive international development 
work and the involvement of North American Mennonite 
churches has cultivated institutional and interpersonal 
relationships that extend across place and time. MCC has 
programs in fifty-six countries and is involved in another 
ten countries, with 1,118 workers around the world,73 and 
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depends on both local staff and a substantial contingent of 
North American Mennonite volunteers to implement its 
international programs. With its unique capacity to pro-
vide accessible and popular international programming 
that grows a community of returned alumni—known as 
“MCCers”—MCC’s international work is infused into local 
congregations through interpersonal relationships. The high 
number of refugees sponsored from specific countries (e.g., 
Colombia, Palestine) reflects MCC’s long-term and trusted 
relationships with international and local partners in those 
countries, including churches, governments, service organi-
zations, and communities. 
Peacebuilding
A centrepiece of Anabaptist/Mennonite theology and tradi-
tion is pacifism, or non-violent resistance. Similarly, MCC 
values initiatives that encourage “relationship-building 
as peacebuilding.”74 MCC views sponsorship through this 
peace lens, and hopes for “transforming and everlasting” 
relationships,75 particularly between people of different 
faiths and cultures. Writing as an employee of MCC, Steph-
anie Dyck states that MCC encourages sponsors to “move to 
deeper levels of engagement” with newcomers to encourage 
a “mutually transformative process of integration and com-
munity building.”76 While much of the material on success-
ful sponsorship of refugees emphasizes self-sufficiency and 
independence, MCC’s focus on mutually transformative 
relationships is somewhat unusual in the world of refugee 
sponsorship. For example, unlike many SAHs that select 
refugees to sponsor through named cases, MCC is committed 
to meeting the resettlement needs of any refugee, regardless 
of religion or culture.77 This was a deliberate decision made 
after a review of the sponsorship program in 2008, when 
MCCC stipulated that at least 60 per cent of all cases were 
to be referred by UNHCR or the Canada Visa Office in order 
to prioritize those who had been identified as most in need. 
Further demonstrating this commitment, MCCC resettled 
approximately one-third of all refugees identified for reset-
tlement by UNHCR in 2017.78
MCC’s goal of relationships of mutual transformation 
appears in various organization documents and repeat-
edly came up in conversation with staff during the course 
of our research. Dyck asserts that sponsorship can promote 
“mutually transformative relationships.”79 Although the term 
defies definition, it is clear that the ideal of transformative 
relationships as an objective of sponsorship emphasizes 
relationships over belief and goes beyond the utilitarian 
roles and expectations commonly associated with newcomer 
integration. Whereas MCCC may mark “successful” sponsor-
ship with economic independence of the refugee newcomer 
family, a hope for long-term reciprocal relationships is an 
additional and equally valued ideal, producing a split in the 
habitus in Mennonite sponsoring relationships. 
MCC Refugee Sponsorship: An Arena of Contest and 
Struggle 
From a relational and reflexive point of view, the dynamics of 
social exclusion and inclusion produced in the private spon-
sorship of refugees are directly tied to the nested social fields, 
their operating structures of capital, and associated positions 
and dispositions of the sponsor in relation to the Other. The 
conflicting structures of capital of the Mennonite/MCC and 
market-state social fields introduce complexities, tensions, 
contradictions, and possibilities for a range of positions and 
dispositions in the sponsoring relationship and practices 
that both promote and obstruct social inclusion.
The Divided Habitus of Mennonite Sponsorship
The identities and roles afforded refugee newcomers in the 
sponsorship relationship and beyond have recently been 
examined. For example, Kyriakides et al. draw on Said’s 
theory of Orientalism to argue that the refugee, as “non-
Western other,” is constructed as “uncivilised, unruly, and 
lacking in cultural sophistication,”80 thus rendering “‘our’ 
Western morality and civilization.”81 Alternatively, humani-
tarian views of the refugee subject emphasize the suffering 
and hardship experienced by “undifferentiated masses” of 
refugees and asylum seekers, framing the character of the 
refugee in a positive light, but without agency.82 Similarly, 
Kyriakides et al. focus attention on “representations of pas-
sivity and infantilization which must be negotiated as part 
of the resettlement experience.”83 The refugee as deviant, 
ascribed low power and low value,84 is easily turned to threat. 
In contrast, the refugee as passive victim is deemed a worthy 
recipient of aid and support. 
In the context of the sponsorship relationship, the 
ascribed identities of the refugee newcomer have everything 
to do with the disposition, posture, and (imagined) identity 
taken up by the sponsor. A focus on the Other as the object 
of study and site of intervention constructs certain configu-
rations of “them,” but more importantly, assembles an ideal-
ized “us.” The refugee as threat, which Winter and colleagues 
point out is common in social and news media, feeds a col-
lective illusion of vulnerability, even victimization by the 
undefined Other.85 In the sponsoring relationship, this dual-
ity is unlikely, as the undeserving refugee justifies avoidance 
of engagement, withholding of support, or even punish-
ment and retaliation. In contrast, however, the constructed 
identities of humanitarian discourse fit nicely within the 
sponsorship relationship, as the “passive ‘them’” positions 
the sponsor as the “agentic ‘us.’”86 The natural disposition 
of the sponsor in relation to the refugee newcomer in need 
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of a humanitarian response is one of “helper” or “protector,” 
which, as Kyriakides et al. imply, reinforces a good deal of 
social distance and a hierarchical order of things. The helper 
habitus is inclined toward a person-change approach to refu-
gee newcomer integration.
These positions and dispositions—commanding helper 
and passive victim—seem natural, especially in the early 
days of settlement. The sponsoring relationship was reported 
by both sponsors and refugee newcomers to be primarily 
utilitarian for the first six to eight months, assisting new-
comers with the basics of everyday life as outlined by MCCO, 
such as financial, health, housing, education, shopping, and 
transportation.87 
Humanitarianism also encourages sponsors to “‘put 
themselves in the shoes’ of people coping with difficult 
situations.”88 This position and disposition, contrasting the 
helper habitus, brings the self into full view. Mennonite 
sponsors were particularly inclined toward this “alongside” 
position. One sponsor illustrated how the refugee history 
had been absorbed into his own identity as a Mennonite and 
how the story of “the refugee” had become his own story: 
“Many of us came from refugee families ourselves, as Russian 
Mennonites, and that story resonates especially strongly with 
me. My parents were both victims of violence and [witnesses 
to] murder in Russia and then came here as refugees, and 
their story became my story.”89 Similarly, one respondent 
felt connected to the past work of MCC and believed he was 
continuing a tradition of helping others: “[MCC] is still there, 
and I can tell this Muslim family, ‘The same organization 
that helped my ancestors come to Canada, now helps you, 
and it has been around a long time.’”90 For these individuals, 
sponsorship offers a means to engage in the work of MCC to 
give back to an organization from which they themselves, or 
their ancestors, had personally benefited. Even though still 
rooted in humanitarianism, this sponsor disposition is dis-
tinct from both the masterful “helper” and the compassion-
ate “protector,” as the identification of the self with the Other 
collapses social distance. The pretence of sameness suggests 
an ambivalent disposition and position in relation to the 
refugee newcomer, because only the sponsor is afforded the 
capacity to take on and discard “refugeeness” and the associ-
ated symbolic power at will. 
Sponsoring relationships evolve, often moving from 
more immediate and practical concerns to emotional and 
social supports. Imposing the helper disposition into more 
personal aspects of life, some sponsors aspired to direct the 
decisions of newcomers, “to make them good, Canadian 
citizens.”91 Ideas of citizenship were associated with learning 
English, finding employment, and becoming “contributing 
members of Canadian society.”92 
Both sponsors and former refugee newcomers related 
encountering uncertainty, disappointment, and frustration. 
Revealing some coherence with the dominant market-state 
social field, sponsors’ efforts toward person-change integra-
tion—defined for and practised to the refugee newcomer93—
sometimes backfired. For example, sponsors described using 
their time and social resources to find potential employment 
options for newcomers, efforts that were ignored or rejected. 
One respondent lamented, “Part of this makes me angry, like 
they’re milking the system—this bothers me…. We’re trying 
to be helpful and they’re not really willing to do their end of 
the bargain.”94 Shifting the locus of control, the newcomers 
who reported having a sustained job and were satisfied in 
their line of work had ultimately settled on employment that 
they had sought and secured on their own accord. For many 
newcomers, the “survival jobs” available to them could not 
replace the livelihoods they left behind. Nicolas commented 
that his occupational background was “useless” in Canada 
and explained how he was struggling with finances: “I can’t 
stop. There are no savings, no safety net.” As commonly 
reported in previous research, our data indicate that new-
comers continue to encounter barriers to dignified employ-
ment, even years after resettlement.
The complicated nature of sponsorship relationships was 
defined by one sponsor as a “tension between wanting to 
help and wanting to not help too much.”95 Most sponsors 
asserted that newcomers should become independent, and 
many noted certain times when they felt newcomers should 
“make their own way in life.”96 Revealing an ambivalent 
disposition, or divided habitus, many sponsors expressed a 
desire or expectation for their relationships with the refugee 
newcomer to extend beyond the sponsorship year, noting 
that “successful [sponsorships] are the ones where there have 
been positive relationships established and maintained.”97 In 
some instances, the objective of “independence” was over-
shadowed by the desire to maintain close relationships. For 
example, sponsors recognized their involvement might do 
newcomers a “disservice”98 and have direct impact on their 
independence. To enable newcomers to learn and make 
decisions themselves required sponsors to back off: “I think 
for some committees, they [refugees] almost become like 
children and so they’re very happy when the sponsorship 
groups make decisions for them, [but] for me, the goal was 
independence—to make myself redundant as quickly as 
possible.”99 Extending the helper-helped dispositions well 
beyond the sponsoring year, sponsors reflected the need 
to strategically position themselves in the relationship so 
they do not abandon the newcomer, but also do not cre-
ate new relationships of dependence. This framing largely 
assumes that sponsors are the ones who are both providing 
Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
18
independence and standing in the way of it—that they alone 
bear this responsibility.
Encouraging an alternative sponsor position and disposi-
tion, a valuable role identified by former refugee newcomers 
was that of simply listening—as Tiffany said, to “listen to the 
needs of the person they’re taking care of ” and “be patient,” 
because newcomers “know things” but may find it difficult 
to express themselves, or as Ayah said, “to talk to us, to feel 
comfortable.” Although sponsors readily fulfilled their utili-
tarian responsibilities, few recognized this more passive role 
and disposition, to simply visit with the family and to learn 
“what’s important to them…. We think that we know what is 
the best way to do things, but sometimes you really have to 
listen to them and let them do what they think they have to 
do.”100 
Staying with the helper-helped dyad, yet expressing a 
shift in the sponsor disposition, it was noted that a certain 
amount of advocacy is necessary for the utilitarian responsi-
bilities of sponsors, such as facilitating access to medical and 
education systems. The objective of advocacy was often iden-
tified as negotiating adjustment in the interaction between 
the individual and institution rather than individual-level 
change, thus bringing the social context into view. Adopting 
a reflexive point of view and extending the line of vision even 
further to include the self in social relations, sponsors also 
described recognizing and using their personal privilege and 
influence to challenge the institution itself. Indeed, sponsors 
noted advocating for change within their own congregations 
and larger communities in order to shift the narrative on 
refugee issues and dispel myths that fed xenophobia: “Peo-
ple have this notion that refugees are given tons and tons of 
money, more than anybody else…. When I see something 
like that and I say, ‘This isn’t true, check your facts—don’t 
go spreading false rumours about what’s happening…. You 
gotta give your head a shake and speak up.”101 This recogni-
tion of relative privilege—not by virtue of personal merit but 
due to uneven social relations in Canadian institutions and 
communities—shifts the emphasis from person change to 
system change. 
As responsibilities officially end come “month 13,” there is 
a need to redefine and reshape the sponsorship relationship. 
The majority of sponsors and newcomers described their 
ongoing relationships in familial terms, and in some respects, 
the use of familial words legitimizes the continuation of the 
sponsorship relationship. With an average age of sixty-five 
among the sample’s sponsors, many noted that they consid-
ered themselves parents to many of the newcomers. Nearly 
all newcomers at some point referred to sponsorship mem-
bers in relation to family. Hassan commented, “The sponsor-
ship group is my family. All of them, because they help me 
to understand the future.” Omar explained, “Until today, we 
still communicate and we still get together every once in a 
while, and we just became a small family. Or, I should say, we 
added to their big family.” Omar’s self-correction highlights 
contradictory meanings of these familial relationships, as 
sponsors incorporate new members into their existing fami-
lies and lives, while newcomers are forced to begin their lives 
in Canada from experiences of loss. As Dhalia said, “They 
were our family, we had nobody here.” 
MCC encourages “mutually transformative” relationships 
that continue beyond sponsorship, facilitating the shift “from 
sponsorship to [interpersonal-change] integration.”102 Navi-
gating this transition from an uneven relationship bound 
within the duties of one year to that of “mutual transforma-
tion” post-sponsorship, is paradoxical, introducing tensions 
and conflicts—and possibilities—in practice. The divided 
habitus, an expression of congruence to multiple positions 
and the divided self, allows for paradox to be contained 
dividing practices in the market-state field to be subvert-
ed.103 The cleft habitus—“to step into one’s authority while 
remaining ever mindful of its limits and offences”104—opens 
the possibility to look beyond person-change integration, to 
interpersonal change, place change, and perhaps even sys-
tem change. 
Institutional Tensions, Contradictions, and Possibilities
Distinctions between MCC’s international and domestic pro-
grams (especially the refugee sponsorship program), par-
ticularly vis-à-vis the ideal of mutually transformative rela-
tionships in practice, highlight tensions and contradictions 
in the Mennonite/MCC social field. Specifically, MCC’s operat-
ing principles and institutional theory of change, articulated 
in a brief internal document, “encapsulate MCC’s conviction 
that lasting change often requires long-term commitment 
and happens when all members of a community connect 
across lines of difference to actively participate in shaping 
and implementing visions for just social, environmental, 
and economic structures.”105 Following the example of Jesus, 
and working in partnership with local organizations and 
communities, “unjust systems that oppress and exclude” are 
transformed to “just economic relationships,” “conflict” into 
“relief and development work,” and “structures of injustice 
and their legacies” to “a just peace.”106 
In its more prominent international relief and develop-
ment work, MCC does not enter into agreements with foreign 
governments as is required for the refugee sponsorship pro-
gram in Canada. As a result, MCC is freer in its overseas work 
to contest governments, policies, and local practices, and “to 
engage in community-based efforts and public policy advo-
cacy at local, national, and international levels that build 
durable peace.”107 Unlike the international contexts in which 
MCC engages, little emphasis is placed on transformation of 
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unjust social relations in Canada, suggesting an institutional 
bifurcation between the need for transformation of com-
munities, institutions, and economic systems at home and 
abroad. Further, despite MCC’s focus on “the radical trans-
formation of unjust systems” in its international programs, 
MCC staff and sponsors rarely identity or address refugee 
newcomer experiences of social exclusion in Canada. A 
personal and institutional reluctance to recognize uneven 
power relationships in our own backyard is revealed. Ironi-
cally, reflexivity—to see the self and the Other in social and 
historical relations of power—is resisted in refugee sponsor-
ship. Yet the shared principles of relationship-building and 
practical engagement are given expression and reinforced 
through MCCC’s refugee sponsorship program. 
Conclusions
We return to our guiding research objective: to examine the 
ways in which MCCC’s private sponsorship program invig-
orates or frustrates dynamics of social inclusion. The settle-
ment experiences articulated by former refugee newcomers 
in our study expose stubborn dynamics of social exclusion, 
mingled with genuine experiences of social inclusion. This 
is the paradox—the simultaneous gain and loss—of forced 
migration and settlement. Former refugee newcomers 
expressed their appreciation for the hands-on, practical 
support they received from sponsors: Nicolas commented, 
“People who arrive with the help of the Mennonite [church] 
or with churches with programs like that arrive with a huge 
blessing. It’s a big help.” Other newcomers recalled being 
pleasantly surprised by how they were received. Fatimah 
stated, “I did not expect such treatment. I had never seen 
that kind of kindness and hospitality before.” 
However, the everyday lives of refugee newcomers con-
tinue into “month 13” and beyond, long after the contrived 
relationships of sponsorship end. Even the sustained rela-
tionships of some sponsorships could not shield the ways in 
which communities and institutions function to keep people 
marginalized. The persisting and intersecting dynamics of 
social exclusion experienced by former refugee newcomers 
included economic exclusion, or loss of livelihood and mean-
ingful work that is commensurate with acquired education 
and skills; spatial exclusion, or isolation and loneliness com-
pounded by segregation in one neighbourhood, apartment 
building, or high school; socio-political exclusion, or barri-
ers to accessing informal and formal social supports, such as 
health care, education, even friends beyond the sponsorship 
group; and subjective exclusion, or discounted classification, 
to find oneself “boxed up,” defined by and for others as only 
refugees, as only vulnerable, as only needy.108 The system-
atic devaluation of education, knowledge, and expertise for 
newcomers—even when they are no longer newcomers—in 
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(Mis)Trusted Contact:  
Resettlement Knowledge Assets and the  
Third Space of Refugee Reception
Christopher Kyriakides, Arthur McLuhan, Karen Anderson,  
Lubna Bajjali, and Noheir Elgendy
Abstract
Drawing on interviews with 204 participants in two stud-
ies of privately sponsored refugee resettlement in Ontario, 
Canada, we explore the resettlement effects of pre-arrival 
contact on the interactional dynamics between private spon-
sors and privately sponsored Syrian refugees. Those who 
had regular pre-arrival contact via digital applications such 
as Facebook, Skype, and Whatsapp reported more positive, 
“successful” resettlement experiences than those who had not. 
This pre-arrival interactive dynamic has theoretical/concep-
tual implications beyond an understanding of the benefits 
of “information exchange.” Pre-arrival sponsor-sponsored 
interaction is not bound by the contexts of displacement 
or resettlement, but constitutes a “third space” of reception, 
co-created through trusted contact. We develop the concept 
of “resettlement knowledge assets” and report on how these 
assets emerge through pre-arrival trust building, modify the 
resettlement expectations of both sponsors and sponsored, 
and reduce resettlement uncertainty.
Résumé
À partir d’entrevues avec 204 participants à deux études sur 
la réinstallation de réfugiés parrainée de façon privée en 
Ontario, Canada, nous explorons les effet sur la réinstal-
lation que les contacts avant l’arrivée ont sur la dynamique 
interactionnelle entre les parrains privés et les réfugiés par-
rainés de façon privée. Ceux qui ont entretenu des contacts 
réguliers avant l’arrivée à travers des applications digitales 
telles que Facebook, Skype et Whatsapp ont rapporté des 
expériences de réinstallation plus positives et réussies que 
ceux qui n’en ont pas eu. Cette dynamique interactive avant 
l’arrivée a des implications théoriques et conceptuelles au-
delà d’une compréhension des bénéfices de l’échange d’infor-
mation. L’interaction avant l’arrivée entre les parrains et les 
parrainés n’est pas limitée aux contextes de déplacement et 
de réinstallation, mais constitue un espace tiers de réception, 
co-créé à travers un rapport de confiance. Nous développons 
le concept d’atouts de connaissance liées à la réinstallation 
et rapportons comment ces atouts émergent à travers le 
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développement d’un rapport de confiance avant l’arrivée, 
modifient les attentes liées à la réinstallation des parrains et 
des parrainés, et réduisent l’incertitude de la réinstallation.
Introduction
This article reports on findings from two studies that examined the inclusion and exclusion of privately sponsored Syrian refugees in Ontario, Canada. In late 
2016 and early 2017, we carried out a qualitative study of the 
Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program in the 
rural reception context of Northumberland County. We 
interviewed 109 participants from private sponsor groups, 
public agencies, and privately sponsored Syrian refugees dur-
ing their first twelve months of resettlement. Our follow-up 
urban comparative study in late 2017 and early 2018 included 
ninety-five participants from private sponsor groups and 
privately sponsored Syrian refugees in the Greater Toronto 
Area, some of whom had completed their twelve months of 
sponsored resettlement. An unexpected finding emerged 
from the first study: those who had engaged in regular pre-
arrival contact via digital applications such as Facebook, 
Skype, and Whatsapp reported more positive, “successful” 
resettlement experiences than those who had not. Our follow- 
up comparative study confirmed our original findings.
In this article we report on, and offer an analysis of, the 
findings from both studies. In analyzing the effects of pre-
arrival, digitally supported, sponsor-sponsored contact on 
refugees’ subjective experiences of resettlement success, 
we turned to Mollering’s tripartite theory of trust-building, 
Horst and Grabska’s work on uncertainty and refugeeness, 
and Sharratt and Usoro’s observations on the role of trust in 
distinguishing between information and knowledge. Their 
work helped us to develop two concepts: the “digital third 
space of refugee reception” and “resettlement knowledge 
assets.” We demonstrate that when pre-arrival, sponsor-
sponsored exchanges occur in co-created, digital “third 
spaces of reception,” trust can flourish and information can 
become “resettlement knowledge assets” that modify the 
resettlement expectations of both sponsors and sponsored, 
reduce resettlement uncertainty, and enhance subjective 
experiences of resettlement success.
Trust, Refuge, and Communication 
The study of trust is a key area of social scientific enquiry.1 
Trust generally exhibits situational characteristics in which 
two or more parties engage in a mutually accepted relation-
ship where the future outcomes of their transactions are 
unknown. The uncertainty of future outcomes connotes 
the degree of risk associated with the condition of reliance 
between the parties involved. As a potential influence on, 
and outcome of, individual interaction, social group engage-
ment, and as a generalized state of a given society, trust is an 
asset. 
National citizens who place greater trust in one another 
have more efficient public institutions and experience higher 
rates of economic growth.2 Trust is involved in starting a 
business and performing voluntary work.3 Trusting indi-
viduals are healthier and happier.4 Ljunije has demonstrated 
that the “inherited trust” of second-generation immigrants 
is positively correlated with economic and educational suc-
cess, significant even after controlling for additional first-
generation influences such as income per capita and insti-
tutions.5 Trust has profound implications for understanding 
forced migration and is fundamental to the experiences of 
refugees.6 The dissolution and restoration of trust lies at the 
core of conflict-induced displacement.7 While a “trust defi-
cit” cannot be generalized to all refugees, a shortage of social 
trust is embedded in the experience of conflict-induced 
displacement.8 
Recent work draws attention to the trust involved in refugee 
institution interactions;9 the relationship between the 
sociocultural context of countries of origin and the degree 
of social trust in exile;10 the role of displacement/conflict 
events in establishing fear and trust in exile;11 and the effect 
of conflict-induced trauma on refugees’ social trust, sense 
of belonging, and community integration in exile.12 Hynes’s 
study of asylum seekers in England notes that refugees “mis-
trust and are mistrusted at many levels in both industrialized 
and developing countries,” and that once lost, trust is dif-
ficult to restore.13 Of the four forms of trust—social, political, 
institutional and restorative— that Hynes identifies, restora-
tive trust—“the process by which an individual regains social, 
political, or institutional trust”—is particularly difficult to 
achieve.14 There are important considerations related to trust 
with respect to differences between refugees and migrants 
and their descendants. In both cases, third-country resettle-
ment often entails entry into host cultures of mistrust.15 But, 
especially in the case of refugees who flee conflict, mistrust 
is often an appropriate response that can enhance the feeling 
of security.16
While there is an informative body of academic research 
on private sponsorship,17 there is a significant lack of in-depth 
work on how the complexity of sponsor-sponsored interac-
tion—especially with regard to restorative trust—might posi-
tively or negatively affect resettlement. The Canadian Private 
Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSRP) provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate the dynamic of trust/mistrust in 
refugee-host relations. PSRP formalizes a state-sanctioned 
“private” relationship between “sponsors” and “sponsored” 
who interact regularly during the first twelve months of 
resettlement. Sponsor group “hosts” are expected to help 
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sponsored “refugees” attain self-sufficiency within one year 
of sponsorship. Both refugee and host are placed in direct, 
formalized, interactive relationships. In the refugee-host 
dynamic of PSRP-initiated resettlement, citizen hosts have not 
been party to the initial trust-eroding conflict that refugees 
experience. The refugee–host relationship is not reconcilia-
tory in the strict definition adhered to by scholars of conflict-
resolution. Nevertheless, it is a relationship in which one party 
(arguably) has greater power than the other. Given that trust 
entails cooperation,18 the power dynamic occasioned by the 
charitable responses of Canadians with full citizenship rights 
towards non-citizen refugees has the potential to undermine 
or even erode restorative trust. The interactive sponsor–spon-
sored relationship therefore offers a micro-level lens into the 
dynamic of trust-building in refugee-host relations. 
Mollering’s tripartite theory of trust-building, including 
interpretation, expectation, and suspension, is instructive.19 
Expectation is derived from a combination of interpreta-
tion and the suspension of the unknowable: “Bracketing the 
unknowable” makes “interpretative knowledge momentarily 
knowable.”20 A trust-control duality is important in drawing 
out how the contingency of future outcomes, which can lead 
to a state of dependency between unequal actors, is coun-
tered by trust.21 Mollering’s theory resonates with sponsor-
sponsored pre-arrival communication in three ways. First, 
“uncertainty” is a basic feature of displacement and exile. 
As Horst and Grabska note, “Uncertainty, in its meaning of 
imperfect knowledge and the unpredictability of the future, 
is central to studies that theorize conflict-induced displace-
ment, transit, and refugeeness.”22 Uncertainty related to the 
unknowable outcome of future events conveys precarity, but 
in relation to resettlement it also suggests the impossibility of 
knowing where one will end up. What are the socio-cultural 
conditions, economic opportunities, and political climate 
of reception? What characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes do 
sponsors display? Pre-arrival communication has the poten-
tial to reduce or even suspend uncertainty by making the 
conditions of resettlement knowable in advance of arrival.
Second, in most instances, digital communications via 
Facebook, Skype, and Whatsapp facilitate pre-arrival contact 
and provide the pre-arrival reception context of many sponsor- 
sponsored interactions. A useful cue can be taken from 
knowledge management scholars who conceptualize infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) as collabora-
tive tools that underpin online communities. Trust figures 
prominently in the literature on ICT communities, especially 
regarding the important difference between information 
and knowledge.23 Sharratt and Usoro explain: “Both infor-
mation and knowledge are grounded on data. The two can 
be differentiated if we consider interpretation and meaning. 
Information by definition is informative and, therefore, tells 
us something. It is data from which we can derive meaning. 
Knowledge is directly related to understanding and is gained 
through the interpretation of information. Knowledge ena-
bles us to interpret information, i.e., derive meaning from 
data. The interpretation of meaning is framed by the perceiv-
er’s knowledge. So what one person perceives as information 
can equate to meaningless data to another.”24
In the co-created pre-arrival digital space, resettlement 
information is interpreted and made meaningful by both 
hosts and sponsored. Information becomes knowledge when 
it is deemed of direct relevance to the parties engaged in com-
municative exchange. Resettlement information is readily 
available, but any given piece of information may have little 
connection to the realities of resettlement. Consider the 2015 
and 2016 media broadcasts of Prime Minister Trudeau wel-
coming refugees at Toronto’s Pearson Airport, with gifts of 
winter clothing.25 This is an example of resettlement informa-
tion, accessed and then interpreted by viewers. But it is not 
resettlement knowledge derived from the mutual recognition 
of needs exchanged between sponsors and sponsors. By con-
trast, pre-arrival sponsor-sponsored exchanges conducted 
via social media have the potential to translate resettlement 
information into resettlement knowledge assets, reducing 
uncertainty by bridging the gap between interpretation and 
expectation, and the actual conditions encountered in the 
resettlement context. Anyone expecting Justin Trudeau to 
greet them at Pearson Airport is likely to be disappointed. 
Third, pre-arrival communication conducted in a co- 
created digital space potentially breaks through the condi-
tion of refugeeness. As we have demonstrated elsewhere,26 
paternalistic approaches by sponsors are often a conse-
quence of a latent orientalism—“the sponsored” are defined 
as objects to be rescued—laying the groundwork for future 
conflict between sponsors and sponsored. In some cases, the 
sponsor–sponsored relationship breaks down completely. As 
Malkki notes, the “refugee” label often connotes the absence 
of sociocultural history.27 Processes and practices of recep-
tion and resettlement can homogenize persons whose indi-
vidual hopes, fears, aspirations, and resignations are shaped 
through different ethnic, cultural, religious, class, gender, 
sexuality, and familial affiliations. Pre-conflict identities 
are not erased by the experience of war, persecution, and 
displacement; they are integral to how such experiences are 
negotiated, contested, accepted, and lived every day.28 Nor 
are experiences of third-country resettlement automatically 
determined by the definitional forces of host-reception.29 
We have already written about how sponsored persons 
aspire to move beyond “refugeeness,” to confirm their eligi-
bility to exist and authority to act in pursuit of a life beyond 
refuge.30 But in analyzing the pre-arrival context delimited 
by “refugee-host” interaction we must go beyond what is 
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permitted by identity-based approaches to resettlement. In 
social identity approaches to trust, scholars focus on group-
based stereotypes or in-group favouring behaviours based 
on salient group memberships.31 Trusted interactions with 
strangers, or out-group members, are generally thought 
to be weaker. However, in the case of the conflict-induced 
dispersal referred to as “the Syrian refugee crisis,” a popula-
tion of gendered and classed, rural-urban, Sunni and Shia 
Muslims, Assyrian Christians, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, 
Druze, Kurds, Turkmen, atheists and secularists, often pitted 
against each other, do not reformulate as a socio-culturally 
constituted “Syrian refugee group” on resettlement. 
A limitation arises if a single group identity is assumed for 
all Syrian refugees and another is assumed for all hosts. Just as 
there is no single refugee voice or experience but voices and 
experiences of refugees, there is no single host voice or experi-
ence.32 Consequently, communication-based trusted contact 
does not fit neatly with acculturation, cross-cultural adapta-
tion, or coordinated management of meaning approaches,33 
where trust is assumed to be a condition of interacting socio-
culturally constituted in-groups versus out-groups. While 
socio-cultural factors must be considered in any analysis sen-
sitive to the condition of refugeeness, they cannot be the start-
ing point for understanding how trusted relationships emerge 
between those defined as refugees and those defined as hosts.
In this article we demonstrate that, through digitally medi-
ated, pre-arrival, trusted exchanges in co-created “third spaces 
of refugee resettlement,” sponsored and sponsors transform 
resettlement information into “resettlement knowledge assets.” 
These interactions not only facilitate the choice-centred, 
pre-settlement sharing of information, but also build trust 
between sponsored and sponsors and enhance the subjective 
experience (and reporting) of resettlement success. 
Data and Methods 
The data for this article are drawn from two studies on the 
PSRP. The first study examined the multi-perspectival nature 
of “resettlement success” in the rural reception context of 
Northumberland County, Ontario. Partnering with the Office 
of the Federal Member of Parliament and of the Director of 
Northumberland’s Department of Economic Development, 
Land Use Planning and Tourism to facilitate introductions 
to the local sponsorship community, we interviewed 109 
participants between December 2016 and March 2017. The 
sample included thirteen one-to-one interviews with repre-
sentatives from public sector agencies; thirteen focus group 
interviews with private sponsor groups (N = 47 individuals); 
and in-depth interviews with forty-nine private sponsored 
refugees during their first twelve months of resettlement. 
Our data collection and analysis followed a grounded 
theory approach, with the research team comparing data, 
refining concepts, and discussing theoretical implications 
throughout the study. A grounded theory approach—involv-
ing analytic inductive, deductive, and abductive modes of 
reasoning about empirical instances, cases, and the con-
nections thereof (Charmaz 2014; Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Timmermans and Tavory 2012)—is well suited for not only 
discovering novel social processes and patterns, but also—
when and where the emerging data fit—integrating, extend-
ing, and revising existing theory and research. While the 
orientalism thesis and broader forced migration literature 
served as an analytical reference point in approaching the 
research setting, the analytical focus of the data collection 
and analysis was on the under-studied and under-theorized 
phenomenon of “resettlement success”; specifically, we 
focused on when and how sponsors and sponsored tended 
to experience resettlement in positive terms. A significant 
finding of the first study was that “resettlement success,” as 
defined by the participants, was often tied to the quality of 
sponsor-sponsored pre-arrival contact.
In the second study, we pursued this analytical lead in a 
more focused and detailed way, identifying specific instances, 
types, processes, and patterns of pre-arrival contact in urban 
resettlement. We partnered with two Ontario-based NGOs—
the Al-Qazzaz Foundation for Education and Development 
and the Syrian Canadian Foundation—to facilitate inter-
views with sponsors and sponsored refugees in the Greater 
Toronto Area. Between January and March 2018 we inter-
viewed ninety-five participants from private sponsor groups 
(N = 45) and privately sponsored Syrian refugees (N = 50). 
Drawing on the insights of the first study and referencing 
the trust, refuge, and communication literatures, our data 
collection and analysis followed a semi-structured, in-depth 
interview approach, focusing on sponsor-sponsored, pre-
arrival contact experiences and perspectives. 
All private sponsor group and public agency interviews 
were conducted in English. All refugee interviews were con-
ducted in Arabic. Consent forms and research descriptions 
were provided in both Arabic and English as appropriate. All 
interviews were voice-recorded and transcribed. All names 
used in this article are pseudonyms.
In what follows, we draw on the private sponsor group and 
refugee data from both studies to illustrate how digitally sup-
ported, pre-arrival contact between sponsor and sponsored 
contributed to and enhanced refugees’ resettlement experi-
ences. We conclude by discussing the implications of our 
findings.
The Pre-Arrival Reception Context
“We love this city and we do not want to go away from our sponsors, 
as we consider them like family.”
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“The sponsor does not know our needs. I did not expect that my 
sponsorship program would be so bad. If I knew that in advance, I 
would have preferred to stay in Lebanon. I will not advise anyone 
to come here.”
These contrasting responses from two privately sponsored 
refugees—the first from someone who had experienced pre-
arrival digitally mediated contact with sponsors, the sec-
ond from someone who did not—capture the polarity that 
emerged in our two studies. Both respondents quoted above 
were resettled in the same geographical area in Ontario. 
Both experienced and interpreted successful resettlement 
in ways that link their resettlement outcomes to their rela-
tionships and experiences with sponsors. In both cases, an 
understanding of what constituted their resettlement “needs” 
was underpinned by the level of interpersonal trust that had 
developed between them and their sponsors, and by the 
extent to which their expectations were congruent with those 
of their sponsors. We found examples of the same polarized 
outcomes in both studies, confirming that the congruence of 
sponsored-sponsor expectations was affected by the quality 
of trust obtained and the type of resettlement knowledge devel-
oped in advance of arrival. Elsewhere we more fully explore 
the nature and dynamic of sponsor-sponsored interpersonal 
trust after arrival.34 Here we focus on the role of “third space 
interactions” in the dynamics of pre-arrival (mis)trust build-
ing, on the role played by pre-settlement digital contact in 
the acquisition of resettlement knowledge assets, and on 
subsequent reporting about resettlement success (or lack of 
success).
Resettlement (Mis)information
The majority of refugees in both studies had been exposed 
to four sources of information about Canadian resettlement: 
(1) media representations of resettlement, (2) online resettle-
ment “facts,” which sometimes overlapped with (3) diasporic 
resettlement rumour, and (4) Canadian government pre-
arrival orientation sessions. Those who had not experienced 
significant pre-arrival contact with their sponsors arrived 
with resettlement expectations (as informed by these four 
sources of information) that often went unmet after arrival. 
This heightened rather than reduced resettlement uncer-
tainty and negatively affected the already precarious experi-
ence of resettlement.
One interviewee who had no contact with his spon-
sors prior to arriving in Canada illustrated how his reset-
tlement expectations were influenced by global media 
representations:
When we came to Canada, we were supposed to live a life of leisure 
until we get the citizenship, so we feel in harmony with the society. 
It was supposed that the prime minister would receive us at the 
airport, or that he would come to visit the refugees to assure himself 
of their condition. No one from the government visits us and we 
cannot communicate with them.
His expectations (fuelled by media reports of the prime 
minister greeting Syrian refugees at Pearson Airport in 
Toronto) went unchallenged and thus were unmet. He was 
bitterly disappointed, and his social and institutional mis-
trust increased. 
For others who hadn’t experienced any sustained pre-
arrival contact with their sponsors, expectations about what 
they would find in Canada were a product of diasporic 
rumour:
In Lebanon, forty families received approval to travel to Canada. 
Some of them who travelled before us contacted us and told us that 
their situation is much better. All of them told me that their homes 
are beautiful with new furniture. Except me, my situation is very 
bad and the furniture is shameful. The laid carpet would not be laid 
in refugee camps in Lebanon. The computer they brought was not 
good and broke down.
This respondent’s expectations of what awaited him in 
Canada were not out of proportion to the life he and his 
family had enjoyed prior to the conflict. But with diasporic 
rumours as his only source of information, his aspiration to 
attain a life beyond refuge had become conflated with the 
(false) expectation that his pre-conflict status and role as 
breadwinner and father, and the material goods his family 
had enjoyed, would be attainable on resettlement. 
Diasporic rumours about what to expect in Canada also 
could be negative:
Saher: I read about it on the internet. I would check the Facebook 
pages for information about resettlement. They would write that 
the Western governments will take our children and that if you go 
to such countries you will be forced to leave your faith. They wrote 
such things to scare people. 
Institutional and social mistrust among refugees who 
went without pre-arrival contact with sponsors was further 
fuelled by false information, which keyed into fears related 
to threatened sociocultural history (faith) and social roles 
(parent-child). This kind of misinformation was effectively 
countered through sponsor-sponsored, pre-arrival contact: 
Zina: [Pre-arrival, social media contact with sponsors] was useful, 
provided relief, and helped me feel less worried. I knew that there 
were people waiting for me, ready to help. I trusted them. People in 
Amman told me that we will be living in camps here in Canada, but 
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I told them that I have people who will prepare a house for me. I 
trusted them, but I was afraid of bad luck.
The development of a trusted relationship with sponsors, 
achieved over time via regular interactions in co-created dig-
ital spaces reduced anxiety by rendering knowable what was 
previously unknowable. And while uncertainty remained, as 
Zina’s interview attests, trusted contact was enough to coun-
ter misinformation spread by rumour. Key to trust-building 
were social-media-facilitated conversations with sponsors 
during which pre-conflict social roles, such as parent, father, 
and breadwinner were explicitly recognized and affirmed. 
Bashir: Yes, it made me feel relieved every time. I knew that eve-
rything was prepared and that they would support us. I told my 
friends that there was someone in Canada who prepared a house 
for me and will help put my children in school. 
The recognition of pre-conflict social roles helped to estab-
lish communication that went beyond language barriers.
Rasha: We felt more confident as he talked to us. Some people told 
us that we will be shocked as soon as we arrive. They said you won’t 
be able to communicate with others, but as the sponsor talked to us 
we trusted him, and we felt it will be OK. 
While socio-cultural histories have an influence on how 
resettlement is interpreted and negotiated, recognition 
of pre-conflict social roles such as “parent-child,” “home 
maker,” “breadwinner,” and the material resources sustained 
through these roles created a bridge between conflict loss 
and the aspiration to attain a life beyond refuge. Central to 
trusted sponsor-sponsored contact was the co-creation of a 
shared interpretative framework through which resettlement 
information that addressed the concerns of refugees could 
become a resettlement knowledge asset, reduce uncertainty, 
and provide a mutual understanding of realistic resettlement 
expectations. This has significant implications when we con-
sider an important means through which institutional trust 
could be built: government pre-arrival orientation programs.
(Mis)trusted Contact
Since 1998 the government of Canada has offered Canadian 
Orientation Abroad pre-arrival orientation sessions to help 
newcomers adapt to life in Canada by providing skills and 
information about what to expect upon arrival. Research has 
provided a mixed review of pre-arrival orientation sessions.35 
Our findings indicate that limitations of the sessions are not 
related to the veracity of the information they provide. Some 
respondents, for example, were satisfied:
Fayrouz: It was an introductory seminar on Canada, its laws, how to 
live there, its weather and nationalities that live there. It contained a lot 
of information and they even explained to us about the air travel and 
how many kilos we are allowed to carry. All of us attended the seminar, 
including my younger child (ten years old). It was very useful for us.
However, the majority of our respondents were left with 
the impression that the information offered was patronising, 
paternalistic, and premised on a one-sided understanding of 
resettlement from the host perspective. As one couple told us,
Um Halil: The information we obtained was that we should not 
expect that we are going to paradise. That the air we breathe there 
costs money, and that life in Canada is not easy and we must work 
to be able to live. 
Abu Halil: The course was not useful because they did not give us 
any information that would help us to survive. In my opinion, the 
course aimed to make the refugee understand that we should not 
be a burden on the Canadian government and we should work hard 
to be able to survive. 
Institutional mistrust increased, as did uncertainty, and 
so information made available in pre-arrival institutional 
reception did not translate into knowledge assets that could 
facilitate realistic expectations of resettlement. Institutional 
mistrust increased when resettlement information was inter-
preted as biased by cultural status beliefs, which undermined 
attendees’ pre-conflict sociocultural history and social roles:
Saher: They gave us a brief background about Canada and they told 
us not to hit our children when we arrive in Canada. We have left 
Syria and the war to be able to raise our children in a better way, not 
to hit them. There are a thousand ways that you can raise a child 
without hitting, but this is their idea about the Middle East. They 
think that the women and the children are hit and oppressed. But 
our religion keeps us from doing so. 
By contrast, for those who developed pre-arrival trusted 
contact with sponsors, resettlement mistrust was reduced:
Lana: For us, if we didn’t have those calls with our sponsors, we 
wouldn’t have come to Canada. When they talked to us, we started 
to accept the idea of moving to Canada. 
The perceived threat of sociocultural alienation 
de-escalated: 
Samira: I didn’t want to come to Canada. I didn’t want to leave the 
Arab countries and come here to live among the foreigners. The 
sponsor’s calls made me feel comfortable to come.
Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
30
We have laid out the pre-arrival terrain of resettlement 
information in order to demonstrate that imparting infor-
mation, whether factually correct or not, can increase reset-
tlement uncertainty. Information in and of itself cannot be 
thought of as an asset to inclusive resettlement. But, as our 
studies also show, resettlement information can be trans-
formed into resettlement knowledge assets in the pre-arrival 
sponsor-sponsored relation of trusted contact. 
Resettlement Knowledge Assets and the Third Space 
of Refugee Reception
It is important to note that there are instances in which 
pre-arrival sponsor-sponsored contact does not result in a 
common interpretative framework through which resettle-
ment uncertainty can be sufficiently reduced. This occurred 
when pre-settlement engagement was premised solely on 
the exchange of impersonal information about the status of 
the sponsored’s resettlement application. As one couple and 
their son told us,
Um Fuad: We received a phone call from the sponsor who said 
that our application was approved, and we should start preparing 
ourselves to travel to Canada. She kept calling me all the time to 
inform me about the progress of our application and the travel 
arrangements. 
While contact was appreciated, procedural-based com-
munication, even when frequent, did not establish a trusted 
relationship:
Abu Fuad: It would have been better if we got to know the sponsors 
pre-arrival. It would have given us the feeling of security. Having a 
relation with the sponsors before arrival would have helped us to 
feel more confident about our decision to go to a country we don’t 
know anything about and we don’t speak their language. 
Um Fuad: It’s not about getting information from the sponsors, it’s 
about building a friendly relation with the people who will support 
us. 
Their insights were confirmed by sponsor groups:
Alison: They [the refugees we were sponsoring] told me on Skype 
that they were living and surviving in that extreme and dangerous 
situation because they knew that there were people on this side of 
the world in Canada who love them. That made a whole difference 
in their lives. I think the communication is important, not only for 
the matter of filling out the paperwork, but also through Skype to 
talk to them and be their friend, be their listener and support. That 
helped them to keep on going through the one year almost of wait-
ing for their application to be approved.
Pre-arrival sponsor-sponsored contact in and of itself is 
not experienced as a knowledge asset for either party. Reset-
tlement information becomes a resettlement knowledge asset 
when trust grows and uncertainty is reduced empathically. 
The reflections of some sponsors provide further insight into 
the relationship between trusted contact and the reduction 
of uncertainty.
Gerard: Through Whatsapp texting and voice we called [the father] 
and started talking to him, trying to give him an idea of what to 
expect. It was challenging because they were really scared. They had 
no clue what was going on, like who are these people and why are 
they doing this? Why would anyone do this? So there was a lot of 
conversation between us. We tried to paint a picture of what is actu-
ally happening here, like, we are getting an apartment for you guys. 
It was really tough for them to grasp that level of participation from 
everyone, the cooperation and willingness to take them in as family. 
For this sponsor group, the resettlement expectations of 
the sponsored were formed through reassurance and trust-
building communications that reduced the unknown. By 
imparting information about sponsorship activities (such as 
the preparation of housing), concerns about significant ele-
ments of pre-conflict life that had been lost were mitigated. 
Through the sponsors’ recognition of the challenges of dis-
placement loss, resettlement fears were reduced. There was 
cooperation in support of resettlement between people who 
had never met. Other sponsor groups’ experiences illustrate 
how interpersonal trust, social trust, and institutional trust 
developed through pre-arrival contact.
Alice: They really didn’t know what they were signing up for. They 
went through all of the interviews and just thought they were going 
to come whenever…. I think it is natural for it to take time to build 
trust, right? These are strangers who are bringing us to a strange 
country, different language, so there was a lot of building of trust. 
We explained basically who the group was, what we are doing as a 
group, what the government is doing, so we explained the entire 
system on several occasions. 
From the perspective of sponsors, pre-arrival contact ena-
bled them to develop a better understanding of how their 
expectations and those of the sponsored could influence and 
be influenced by incongruent perspectives. Insights devel-
oped before arrival became assets during resettlement.
Janice: There is sometimes a lack of understanding from each 
other’s perspectives. For example, the experience of finding their 
new home or encouraging them to get a new job. From the spon-
sors’ side, we’ve been in Canada for twenty years or fifteen years 
and we know how challenging the job market is. So when we were 
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communicating, I needed to adjust how I conveyed this. They just 
came out of three years or longer of disastrous environment with 
no hope whatsoever for their lives, future, or dreams. Now they are 
in a new country, we can’t just go and tell them, “No, it is a depress-
ing job market. Canada will be harder to live in.” Emotionally they 
weren’t ready for that.
Familiarity, established through pre-arrival contact, 
merged with the practical matters of everyday life; seem-
ingly insignificant gestures keyed into “normal” needs, the 
unquestioned activities of pre-conflict life:
Andrew: Each person involved in the sponsorship submitted a 
photo. Here’s a photo of us. Here’s what you’re coming to, our fam-
ily history, two boys, this and that, what do we like to do. So we sort 
of did those once every week or two so that there was some content 
going out, work it like a blog with content going out. They did the 
same for us. The father has an incredible backstory, which he sent 
over Whatsapp before they got here. Then as things went on, our 
communication went to more logistical things, you know, what’s 
your shoe size and clothing size, so that as we collected things 
within the community for them, we knew what would work. So it 
became a very functional kind of thing. 
Through trusted contact facilitated by digital communica-
tions, sponsors and sponsored engaged and developed trust, 
and the resettlement knowledge assets that resulted. The pre-
arrival space in which they interacted is not determined by 
the context of displacement or that of resettlement. Rather, 
it is a neutral space in which the resettlement needs of the 
sponsored and those of their sponsors could achieve greater 
congruence. Sponsors and sponsored co-create a third space 
of refugee reception. This was confirmed by refugees:
Fayez: There was one sponsor in particular, she supported me, 
every single day when I was in Turkey. She knew how stressful it 
was and she supported me every day. I actually don’t consider them 
sponsors, they are my friends. When I came they gave me so many 
books, because they know I lost my entire library when I left Syria. 
Familiarity, trust, and knowledge created in this third 
space of refuge prepared the terrain for sponsorship actions 
that connected pre-conflict histories with post-refuge reset-
tlement. Choice, discerned through sponsor/sponsored 
interactions in this third space, was significant in that it sup-
ported deliberative actions and agency:
Yasser: They were very nice to us. Gloria was the leader of the group 
and she is the one who was contacting us. She gave us the option to 
choose. She said they could either find a house for us or we would 
stay twenty days in Toronto in a temporary and choose the house 
we like and the area we would prefer to live in. 
Refugees gave estimates of how frequent pre-arrival con-
tact should be, providing insights into the effect it had on 
their resettlement experience. During the sponsorship appli-
cation stage, hosts are generally in the position of selecting 
whom they sponsor. They have access to biographical and 
some demographic information about the sponsored. The 
same is not true for those being sponsored. But, as one 
respondent explained, the potential for a power imbalance, 
where hosts are accorded a greater sense of control over 
resettlement, can be countered by the reciprocal exchange of 
“refugee-host” information, which builds trust:
Saher: At least once per week. Every week we could have a thirty-
minute chat, and this would help me understand how the life is here 
and if I will be able to live here or not. The sponsors know a lot about 
us; we should also be able to know about them too, to be prepared.
As trusted contact built, resettlement information 
exchanges became resettlement knowledge assets, with an 
impact on “lost time,” a major effect of displacement. As 
trust developed, information became knowledge, providing 
continuity during long pre-arrival wait periods and helping 
to make up for lost time after arrival:
Yara: If possible, two or three times a month. This would at 
least build a relationship between the sponsors and the refugees. 
Through the phone calls or the video calls, a relationship will start. 
I personally prefer video calls. This relationship will make them 
comfortable, and although this might not seem that important at 
that time, it helps a lot and saves hours and days afterwards dur-
ing the sponsorship process. It gives them the trust they need. The 
refugees are in a miserable state and they need this type of trust 
and support.
The resettlement effects of trusted pre-arrival contact, 
where information exchange is premised on mutual recog-
nition, also became knowledge assets for sponsors, merging 
before and after reception, and creating online a third space 
of reception that was time sensitive:
Rex: It was just a whole level of comfort with them…. I would go as 
far as saying that if we didn’t have that earlier communication over 
the long wait time, then we would have started to consider this a dead 
program in our lives and that we were not even engaged with anything.
Alfred: We all arrived at the airport. A few of us came back to 
the apartment to show them around. I remember that night [the 
Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
32
husband] sitting down in the chair and talking with us, “I’m just 
curious, where do we go from here because I already feel like you’re 
family.” We would not have had that connection if it was not for the 
earlier communication. Without that, we would have been starting 
from scratch. 
Pre-arrival trusted contact was co-created in the digital 
third space of refugee reception, not limited to the temporal 
and spatial boundaries of displacement or resettlement. In 
the building of resettlement knowledge assets, neither party 
is rendered dependent on the other; rather, their respective 
needs merge to form “community-like” solidarities forged 
through the reduction of resettlement uncertainty. Unknow-
able future outcomes are made more knowable. 
Discussion
In this article, we developed an understanding of the reset-
tlement benefits of pre-arrival contact, by exploring what 
we conceptualize as resettlement knowledge assets and 
third-space resettlement contexts. Those who had engaged 
in digitally facilitated pre-arrival contact were able to mutu-
ally reduce the uncertainty of resettlement. The reduction 
of uncertainty was established in two senses related to trust 
building. First, sponsors keyed into the experience of precar-
ity during displacement. They were made sensitive to experi-
ence in which the pre-conflict social roles of the displaced 
had assumed significance in providing a sense of continuity 
between what had been lost and what they aspired to regain 
post-conflict. Second, by engaging one-to-one pre-arrival, 
sponsors and sponsored orientated the exchange of resettle-
ment information towards a recognition of needs that cor-
responded with their respective social roles. The sponsored 
could be recognized in their pre-conflict social roles as par-
ents, spouses, and heads of family, while sponsors appeared 
in the roles they normally occupied in their daily lives. Infor-
mation exchange premised on mutual need recognition was 
transformed into resettlement knowledge. The reduction of 
uncertainty through trust building modified the resettlement 
expectations of both sponsors and sponsored to the extent 
that resettlement knowledge became an asset after arrival.
The data included in this article pertain only to sponsor-
ship participants, previously strangers to each other, some of 
whom engaged spontaneously in direct, digitally mediated, 
pre-arrival contact. There were other instances in which pre-
arrival contact was facilitated indirectly by a Canada-based 
family member who was known to, but not part of, the spon-
sor group. And there were instances in which some sponsor 
group members were extended family members or acquaint-
ances of the sponsored refugees. In such cases, resettlement 
knowledge assets did not always develop. Further research 
is required in order to better understand why this was the 
case. In all cases, longitudinal research would help to chart 
the relationship between resettlement knowledge assets and 
social, cultural, economic, and other well-being indicators 
during and after the first twelve months of resettlement.
All pre-arrival contact experiences detailed here are 
post-arrival recollections recorded with the benefit of hind-
sight. This can give the impression that pre-arrival contact 
was planned. In the majority of cases, pre-arrival contact 
occurred out of necessity and was not pre-meditated by 
sponsors or sponsored. This becomes more relevant when 
we consider the responses (developed in this article only by 
contrast) of sponsors and sponsored who did not have the 
opportunity to engage in pre-arrival contact, and whom we 
asked to gauge the extent to which they felt doing so would 
have been beneficial. Their responses could easily be the 
subject of an additional article. All of the sponsored refu-
gees who had not experienced pre-arrival contact felt they 
would have benefitted, but when asked to imagine why this 
would be, tended to envisage the opportunity to ask proce-
dural questions about the status of their applications. In the 
absence of trusted contact they could not imagine nor see the 
relevance of trust. Similarly, some sponsor group members 
who had not engaged in pre-arrival contact felt it would be 
useful to keep refugees apprised of the status of their applica-
tions. Others felt that pre-arrival contact could run the risk 
of placing refugees in a position of emotional dependency, 
and that contact should be limited to matters of procedural 
information-exchange. In the absence of trusted contact 
they could not envisage how establishing mutual reliance 
has beneficial effects on the unknowable future outcomes of 
resettlement. To those who had not co-created a third space 
of reception, resettlement knowledge assets were elusive.
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Abstract
There is little longitudinal research that directly compares 
the effectiveness of Canada’s Government-Assisted Refugee 
(GAR) and Privately Sponsored Refugee (PSR) Programs 
that takes into account possible socio-demographic differ-
ences between them. This article reports findings from 1,921 
newly arrived adult Syrian refugees in British Columbia, 
Ontario, and Quebec. GARs and PSRs differed widely on 
several demographic characteristics, including length of 
time displaced. Furthermore, PSRs sponsored by Groups of 
5 resembled GARs more than other PSR sponsorship types on 
many of these characteristics. PSRs also had broader social 
networks than GARs. Sociodemographic differences and city 
of residence influenced integration outcomes, emphasizing 
the importance of considering differences between refugee 
groups when comparing the impact of these programs.
Résumé
Il existe peu de recherches longitudinales comparant direc-
tement l’efficacité des programmes gouvernemental (RPG) et 
privé (PPR) de parrainage des réfugiés au Canada qui tiennent 
compte de possibles différences socio-démographique 
entre eux. Cet article rend compte des résultats de 1921 nou-
veaux arrivants syriens adultes en Colombie-Britannique, 
en Ontario et au Québec. Les RPG et PPR diffèrent large-
ment sur plusieurs caractéristiques démographiques, dont 
le temps du déplacement. De plus, les PPR parrainés par 
groupes de cinq ressemblaient davantage aux RPG que les 
autres types de parrainage PPR sur plusieurs de ces carac-
téristiques. Les PPR avaient aussi des réseaux sociaux plus 
larges que les RPG. Les différences sociodémographiques et 
la ville de résidence influent sur l’intégration, ce qui fait res-
sortir l’importance de tenir compte des différences entre les 
groupes de réfugiés dans la comparaison de l’impact de ces 
programmes.
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Introduction
The number of people displaced worldwide has increased dramatically to 68.5 million over the last ten years.1 More than two thirds of refugees face protracted 
displacement, with the average length of exile at around ten 
years, and over a third of refugees in situations lasting twenty 
years or longer.2 Durable solutions have not kept pace with 
demands for protection. In 2017 only 3% of the more than 
25.4 million people forcibly displaced across international 
borders were repatriated, locally integrated in host states, 
or resettled.3 The international community has been seek-
ing new solutions to forced migration, and Canada’s unique 
private sponsorship model has garnered significant interest.4 
The Private Refugee Sponsorship Program allows non-profit 
organizations and groups of citizens to financially and per-
sonally support people through their first year in Canada,5 
one small additional way to contribute to the successful 
resettlement of refugees worldwide.
Between 4 November 2015 and 30 June 2018, Canada 
resettled 56,260 Syrian refugees, with almost equal num-
bers coming through privately sponsored and government 
assisted pathways.6 The ability of the Canadian government 
to meet its increased targets reflects one of the intended 
benefits of the PSR Program: it allows rapid responses to 
exceptional situations.7 This article addresses the question 
of whether early integration benefits observed among GARs 
and PSRs can be attributed to pre-migration differences, or 
to the anticipated benefits of private settlement—specifically, 
potential differences in social capital between GARs and PSRs.
Refugee Resettlement in Canada 
Canada provides protection to resettled refugees through 
three different programs. Government assisted refugees 
(GARs) are provided financial and settlement support for the 
first year of settlement through government resettlement 
agencies. Privately sponsored refugees (PSRs) receive finan-
cial and settlement support from non-profit organizations 
and volunteer groups. In the third program, Blended Visa 
Office–Referred (BVOR), financial support is divided between 
government and private sponsors, while the latter provide 
settlement support.8 In all categories, refugees should be 
offered reception, orientation, and focused assistance with 
housing, physical and mental health, language training, edu-
cation, employment, referrals to essential federal/provincial 
programs and settlement programs, and financial assistance.
Private sponsors are citizens or residents who volunteer 
their time and money to support a refugee family or indi-
vidual for one year. There are various types. Sponsorship 
agreement holders (SAHs) are incorporated organizations 
who have ongoing contractual agreements with the federal 
government to resettle refugees. They are frequently faith-
based organizations, though they may contain subgroups 
that are faith or non-faith-based groups. Community spon-
sors are any organizations in a community that form an 
agreement with the government to settle refugees into their 
community. The program that has received the greatest 
attention in discussions of private sponsorship is the Group 
of Five (G5) sponsorship, where five or more private citizens 
or permanent residents (or as few as two in Quebec)9 over 
the age of eighteen form a sponsorship group and undertake 
to sponsor a refugee. 
Private sponsorship has been promoted as benefitting 
Canada and refugees.10 More Canadian citizens have the 
opportunity to interact with refugee newcomers, which 
may promote better or broader intergroup relationships.11 
In addition, refugee newcomers could achieve better settle-
ment through private sponsorship because of the increased 
social capital available through their relationships with their 
sponsors.12 However, there is little longitudinal research that 
directly compares the effectiveness of the gar and PSR Pro-
grams in supporting the integration of refugees into society.13 
Research identifies stronger employment outcomes for 
PSRs in general.14 PSRs outperform gars in the early years, 
but this relative advantage decreases over time.15 However, 
there are significant differences between gars and PSRs. PSRs 
and GARs are selected differently: gars on the basis of their 
vulnerability according to UNHCR criteria, whereas psrs may 
be named by family members resident in Canada or faith-
based institutions. PSRs tend to have stronger English- or 
French-language skills and higher levels of education, often 
mirroring the populations already in Canada with which 
they have pre-existing family or social network connec-
tions.16 They are also more likely to be single adults (57% 
vs. 47%) and thus have more mobility to pursue economic 
and integration activities.17 As a result, it is not clear whether 
better employment outcomes for PSRs can be attributed to 
the category and the care of sponsors or whether their reset-
tlement outcomes are more a reflection of the very differ-
ent socio-demographic profiles of two groups of sponsored 
refugees.18
Research Design and Methods 
This article reports on the data collected in the first year of a 
longitudinal study on Syrian refugee integration in Canada 
(SyRIA.Ith). SyRIA.lth is a four-year, CIHR-funded study that 
compares integration outcomes for government assisted and 
privately sponsored refugees resettled into Canada as part of 
Canada’s response to the Syrian conflict. The purpose of this 
longitudinal mixed-methods study is to compare how GAR 
and PSR resettlement programs in three different provinces 
support long-term social integration pathways for refugees 
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and the impact of these pathways on physical and mental 
health. Ethics approval was obtained from a university-
affiliated ethics board at each research site. 
Theoretical Underpinning
The theoretical underpinning of this research study and the 
guiding principle for the quantitative longitudinal survey 
reported here is the holistic integration model19 (see figure 
1). The holistic integration model (HIM) is derived from the 
Ager and Strang model of integration20 and was developed 
to emphasize key issues in integration theory. These include 
the interrelatedness of different integration elements and the 
moderating effects of refugees’ past experiences and social 
identities. A central motivation for the development of this 
model was also the importance of considering the larger 
sociopolitical context in which refugees settle. Focusing 
only on changes in refugee newcomers fails to acknowledge 
how policies, institutions, and social environments create 
social and structural barriers to integration.21 In emphasiz-
ing the importance of social and structural processes in the 
HIM, we echo calls from feminist and post-colonial scholars 
that concepts such as integration can result in “strategic 
integration” of refugees and immigrants from racialized 
backgrounds into “bare life” existence.22 Resettlement for 
racialized refugees is often marked by persistent poverty, un/
underemployment, and overrepresentation in low-income 
underserved neighbourhoods, conditions that mirror and 
deepen colonial/racialized and gendered inequalities. In the 
HIM the onus to integrate, adjust, and change does not fall 
on just refugees/immigrants but also on the dominant host 
society. Holistic and equitable integration requires policies 
and public education campaigns to help overcome colonial/
racist and xenophobic world views, policies, and socio-
economic conditions. Although our quantitative measures 
do not allow us to measure the more structural elements of 
the HIM, our analysis and discussion places the elements we 




Research sites include six urban centres of varying sizes 
in three of the largest immigrant-receiving provinces in 
Canada. The aim was to enrol at least 10% of the anticipated 
18,000 adult PSR and GAR arrivals between January 2016 and 
June 2017. A total of 1921 adult Syrian refugees represent-
ing 856 households participated in Year 1. A small number 
of BVORs were also included, not through purposive sam-
pling, but because they resided in households with GARs 
or PSRs. Recruitment was through snowball sampling, and 
announcements, flyers, and direct requests at settlement 
agencies, community agencies, community events, food 
banks, and in buildings and neighbourhoods with high con-
centrations of Syrian refugees between April and July 2017. 
We interviewed a maximum of six participants from each 
household. 
Measures
The national research team represented multiple sectors, 
including settlement, health care, mental health, and aca-
demia, and from a number of different disciplines, including 
social work, geography, psychology, family medicine, nurs-
ing, and psychiatry. Consistent with our commitment to an 
interdisciplinary community-based approach, peer research-
ers from the Syrian refugee community were involved from 
the beginning and throughout the project, including editing, 
revising, translating, and pilot testing survey materials, data 
collection, and data analysis. 
Survey questions were developed collectively from cat-
egories identified in the holistic integration model. Priority 
was given to standardized scales that had validated Arabic 
versions. Professional English to Arabic translation was 
obtained for additional measures, followed by back transla-
tion by two bilingual Syrian Canadians to confirm accuracy. 
Surveys were discussed question by question with recently 
arrived Syrian newcomers, and unclear or discrepant terms 
were reviewed and modified. The project’s (bilingual) 
research assistants conducted a final check to resolve any 
remaining issues with the translation and to ensure local rel-
evance. The modified surveys were then piloted with twenty-
four recent Syrian refugees, with changes again discussed 
Figure 1. Holistic integration model
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and finalized with the national research team. The final 
version of the survey contained 245 questions.23 Only the 
measures being reported in this article are described below.
Sociodemographic and migration variables: These included 
questions about age, gender, religious affiliation, languages 
spoken at the time of interview, ethnicity, pre-migration 
occupation, marital status, number of children under eight-
een years of age who are in Canada, and education. 
Social-level variables: Measures of social networks were 
derived from the General Social Survey (GSS)24 and included 
questions about number of friends, closeness to friends, 
frequency of socializing, having friends from other ethnic 
communities, and closeness to friends from other com-
munities. We added questions about number of relatives in 
Canada, friends from the Syrian community who had been 
in Canada for more than five years, and where they had met 
friends from other communities. 
Interactional-level variables: These questions addressed 
self-assessed language skills, including how frequently they 
needed an interpreter for appointments and their self-rated 
ability to speak, understand, read, and write in English or 
French.25 Detailed questions were asked about the charac-
teristics of employment, housing, health-care access, and 
educational access, which were modified from the Social 
Integration Inventory.26 For this article, we will focus on 
whether or not participants were employed, how they found 
employment, whether they had a family doctor, and satisfac-
tion with their current housing, rated on a five-point scale.
Subjective variables: Questions about sense of belonging 
were also taken from the GSS, including belonging to one’s 
neighbourhood, city, co-ethnic community in the city, and 
Canada.27 For brevity we focus here on sense of belonging 
to one’s neighbourhood and sense of belonging to Canada. 
Responses were rated on a 1 to 5 scale, with higher scores 
indicating greater sense of belonging. Participants who were 
privately sponsored were also asked about how much they 
relied on their sponsors for information and help. Security 
was assessed through financial security; participants were 
asked if they ever had trouble making ends meet at the end 
of the month and had to ask for help.
Additional measures: Additional measures were included 
but will not be addressed here, for the sake of brevity. These 
include which social, health, and settlement services were 
used and satisfaction and comfort with these services, and 
self-rated health and mental health measures, including 
health behaviours, post-traumatic stress symptoms, depres-
sion, stress, and perceived control.
A coding table for all of these measures is available in 
appendix A.
Procedures
All participants provided informed consent prior to the 
interview and were paid for their participation. Surveys 
were collected using Quicktapsurvey on iPads through face-
to-face interviews in Arabic. These took approximately sixty 
to ninety minutes each and were done primarily in partici-
pants’ homes. Additional field notes documented researcher 
observations. 
Analysis
All analyses were conducted using SPSS v. 24. All analyses 
were conducted using hierarchical linear modelling (HLM), 
with individuals nested within households, thereby clus-
tering all results by family. A complete list of variables and 
coding is provided in appendix A. P values are reported 
to facilitate interpretation of the models. However, these 
should not be taken to indicate significance of patterns in 
the population of Syrian refugees as a whole because the 
sample is not randomly selected; the p values are being used 
descriptively.28 There were three levels of variables. Level 
1 included the variables of sponsorship, city, and length of 
time in Canada, which reflect the general context of the par-
ticipants and are likely to determine their social networks 
but also, because of the nature of refugee selection process, 
determine their socio-demographic characteristics. Level 2 
included socio-demographic variables that are characteris-
tics of the individual: namely age, gender, religious affiliation, 
education, length of time displaced, and self-assessed lan-
guage knowledge at the time of testing—variables that can 
affect the ability to develop social networks. Level 3 variables 
reflected social networks: namely having relatives in Canada, 
number of friends from the established Syrian community, 
and having friends from other ethnic communities. 
To describe the predictors of social networks, two models 
were tested. The first model included the Level 1 context vari-
ables. The second model included the Level 1 variables plus the 
Level 2 socio-demographic variables. Predictors of Relatives in 
Canada was an exception, as it was explored only in terms of 
the context variables. For integration outcome variables, three 
compounded models were tested: Models 1 and 2 as indicated, 
and Model 3, which included the Level 1 and Level 2 variables 
plus Level 3 social network variables. Models were compared 
using deviance statistics, with results reported only for the 
highest model showing an improved fit associated with a p 
value of .05 or less, with the p value indicating relative strength 
of improvement rather than inferential significance.
Results
The breakdown by type of sponsorship was: in British 
Columbia, Vancouver (N = 245; 186 GAR, 48 PSR, 11 BVOR) 
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and Okanagan Valley (N = 67; 24 GAR, 22 PSR, 21 BVOR); in 
Ontario, Kitchener/Waterloo (N  =  139; 86 GAR, 48 PSR, 5 
BVOR), Toronto (N  =  531; 315 GAR, 187 PSR, 39 BVOR), and 
Windsor (N = 235; 185 GAR, 45 PSR, 5 BVOR); and in Quebec, 
Montreal (N = 694; 67 GAR, 626 PSR, 1 BVOR). These numbers 
are equal to approximately 31% of the adult (eighteen and 
over) GARs and 8% of the adult PSRs who were intended to 
settle between 4 November 2015 and 31 July 2017 in the three 
cities in Ontario; 16% of the adult GARs and 18% of the adult 
PSRs destined to settle in Montreal, Quebec; and 41.6% of the 
adult GARs and 26% of the adult PSRs destined to Vancouver 
and the Okanagan (Kelowna, Vernon, and Kamloops) in 
British Columbia.29 The proportions suggest that PSRs were 
under-sampled relative to GARs in Ontario and BC.
Just under half of the participants were male (48.8%) and 
over half were female (51.1%). Participants ranged in age from 
eighteen to ninety and had been in Canada for up to thirty-
five months. A one-way ANOVA on each variable showed that 
PSRs were significantly older and had been in Canada on aver-
age one month longer than GARs or BVORs (see table 1). This 
is consistent with differences reported in the population of 
Syrian refugees arriving in the first wave of the Syrian initia-
tive. According to IRCC, among those arriving in the first six 
months, 54% of GARs but 59% of PSRs were fifty years of age 
or older. Because BVORs were not part of our intended sample, 
they were represented in numbers too small to make mean-
ingful comparisons and thus the BVORs are excluded from 
subsequent analyses, leaving a sample of 1,837.
Are There Differences by Type of Private 
Sponsorship?
Among the privately sponsored participants in our national 
sample, more than two thirds 68.6% (n  =  659) were spon-
sored by faith organizations, 16.8% (n = 161) were sponsored 
by family, and 9.7% (n = 93) were sponsored by community 
organizations. Only 5% (n  =  48) of the sample were spon-
sored by a Group of Five (G5 or Groupes 2-5 or G2-5 in Que-
bec). In Vancouver, 95.7% (n = 45) were sponsored by faith 
organizations, whereas the remaining 5.2% (n  <  10) were 
sponsored by family or community organizations. In the 
Okanagan, 81.8% (n = 18) were sponsored by faith organiza-
tions, whereas the remaining 18.2% (n < 10) were sponsored 
by G5s. In Kitchener/Waterloo, 68.1% (n  =  32) were spon-
sored by faith organizations, whereas the remaining 31.9% 
(n = 15) were sponsored by family, community organizations, 
or G5s. In Windsor, 86.7% (n = 39) were sponsored by faith 
organizations, whereas the remaining 13.3% (n  <  10) were 
sponsored by family or community organizations. The pat-
tern of sponsorship was more evenly distributed in Toronto, 
with 47% (n = 85) sponsored by faith organizations, 26.5% 
(n  =  48) sponsored by community organizations, 15.5% 
(n = 28) sponsored by family, and 11% (n = 20) sponsored by 
G5s. Finally, in Montreal, 71.1% (n = 440) were sponsored by 
faith organizations, 19.9% (n = 123) were sponsored by family, 
5.7% (n = 35) were sponsored by community organizations, 
and 3.4% (n = 21) were sponsored by G2-5s. 
The characteristics of privately sponsored refugees dif-
fered by type of sponsorship, with G5s in particular showing 
differences from other sponsorship types (see table 2). This 
includes differences on characteristics that past research sug-
gests are particularly relevant to integration outcomes such 
as employment (language ability, number of children),30 
health (months displaced, months in a refugee camp),31 and 
community welcome (religion, particularly in light of the 
current wave of anti-Islamic attitudes)32 but not in terms of 
education and urban residence. Table 2 provides the means 
and frequencies for these characteristics for GARs, for PSRs 
overall, and then for the different types of PSRs. Comparison 
to the characteristics of the population in the first six months 
of the Syrian initiative suggests similar differences between 
GARs and PSRs overall. Namely, as in our own sample, IRCC 
data show much higher rates of university education among 
PSRs (31.6%) than GARs (5.3%), and higher self-reported 
knowledge of either English or French, with 18.2% of PSRs 
and 83.6% of GARs nationally reporting no knowledge of 
either of Canada’s official languages.33
Social Networks
Social networks play an important role in refugee integra-
tion.34 The engagement of civic society is expected to pro-
mote integration for newcomers by increasing social support 
and access to social capital through sponsors.35 We therefore 
examine whether PSRs and GARs differ in the breadth of their 
social networks, in terms of relationships to (a) family; (b) 
established co-ethnic community members; (c) members of 
other communities; and (d) closeness of these relationships 
to other community members. 
Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of 
Syrian refugee sample, by migration pathway
GAR PSR BVOR
Mean age 35.9a 41.0ab 35.2b
SD (12.13) (14.7) (12.4)
Mean time in Canada 
(months)
12.7a 13.9ab 13.2b
SD (5.3) (5.6) (5.7)
Note: Means with shared superscripts differ significantly at 
the .05 level.
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Relatives in Canada: For relatives in Canada, only the 
model with Level 1 variables was tested (see table 3). Not 
surprisingly, PSRs (80.3%) were more likely to report having 
relatives in Canada than GARs (52.0%). Percentage of GARs 
with relatives in Canada was particularly low in Okanagan 
(29.2%) and then Windsor (41.6%), but otherwise over half 
reported relatives in Canada (52% to 59.7%). Among PSRs, 
those in Vancouver were least likely to have relatives in 
Canada (63.8%), followed by Okanagan (72.7%) and Toronto 
(77.5%). In the other cities, about 80% reported Canadian 
relatives (from 80.3% to 82.4%).
Three variables measured friendship: friends in the estab-
lished Syrian community, having friends from other com-
munities, and closeness to friends from other communities. 
Friends from the established Syrian community: The model 
with both Level 1 (city and sponsorship) and Level 2 (socio-
demographic variables) predicted having more friends 
from the established Syrian community. PSRs reported 
more established Syrian friends (61.6% reported at least one 
or more) than GARs (39.1% reported at least one or more). 
Having a greater number of established Syrian friends was 
also positively predicted by greater length of stay in Canada, 
older age, being male, having a higher level of education, and 
better fluency in one of the official languages. 
New friends in other ethnic communities: The model with 
both Level 1 and Level 2 was retained for new friends from 
other communities. Friends from other ethnic communities 
were reported by 55.5% of the sample overall and were more 
likely for those in Canada longer, who were younger, more 
highly educated, male, more fluent in self-assessed English/
French, and Muslim. Sponsorship did not predict friend-
ships with people outside the Syrian community.
Closeness to friends from other ethnic communities: The 
higher order model with 2 Levels was retained for closeness 
Table 2. Socio-demographic characteristics by sponsorship
Private sponsorship by type
GAR
PSR 




























































Mean English/French knowledge at 
testing*
3.5 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.9






























Mean time in refugee camp (months) 3.3 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.0
Mean time displaced (months) 38.0 19.5 29.4 18.6 19.6 20.1
*1–none to 6–excellent. This measure is self-assessed.
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Table 3. Hierarchical models predicting social network variables
b SE p
Improvement in fit of  
highest model
Relatives in Canada     
City -0.023 0.009 0.014  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) 0.250 0.030 0.000  
Length of time in Canada -0.000 0.002 0.967  
Number of friends from the established Syrian community    χ²(6) = 86.78, p < .001
City -0.009 0.101 0.398  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) 0.153 0.043 0.000  
Length of time in Canada 0.008 0.003 0.003  
Age 0.005 0.001 0.000  
Gender (female 0 / male 1) 0.080 0.022 0.000  
Education 0.049 0.010 0.000  
Official language fluency 0.028 0.011 0.015  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) -0.065 0.046 0.153  
Length of displacement -0.000 0.001 0.760  
Have new friends from other ethnic communities    χ²(6) = 219.31, p < .001
City -0.006 0.010 0.524  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) 0.055 0.040 0.168  
Length of time in Canada 0.011 0.002 0.000  
Age -0.004 0.001 0.000  
Gender (female 0 / male 1) 0.076 0.020 0.000  
Education 0.030 0.010 0.002  
Official language fluency 0.074 0.011 0.000  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) -0.201 0.043 0.000  
Length of displacement  0.000  0.001 0.779  
Closeness to friends from other ethnic communities    χ²(6) = 81.352, p < .001
City 0.036 0.021 0.088  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) 0.178 0.086 0.038  
Length of time in Canada 0.012 0.006 0.036  
Age -0.002 0.002 0.395  
Gender (female 0 / male 1) 0.050 0.052 0.350  
Education -0.046 0.023 0.050  
Official language fluency 0.031 0.030 0.261  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) -0.190 0.093 0.043  
Length of displacement 0.003 0.002 0.060  
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to friends from other ethnic communities. Participants 
were somewhat close to friends from other communities 
(M = 2.5 on a 4-point scale). PSRs reported being closer to 
these friends than did GARs. Participants were also closer to 
friends from other communities if they had been in Canada 
longer, had lower levels of education and were Muslim. 
How Useful Are Sponsors and Social Networks for 
Achieving Integration Goals?
If sponsorship processes determine integration outcomes, 
then sponsorship and social networks should predict integra-
tion outcomes, even after pre-migration socio-demographic 
differences are taken into account. The impact of sponsorship 
and social networks on integration outcomes was addressed 
in two ways: (a) self-reported usefulness of sponsors, and (b) 
the extent to which integration outcomes related to employ-
ment, housing, health-care access, economic security, and 
sense of belonging are predicted by sponsorship category, 
socio-demographic variables, and social network variables.
How much did private sponsors help? Participants who 
were privately sponsored were asked how much they relied 
on their sponsors for information or help (not at all / a little 
/ very much). Given that in some cities PSRs were sponsored 
almost exclusively by faith groups, cities were combined. As 
can be seen in figure 2, the majority (57.4%) of those spon-
sored by G5s reported relying on their sponsors a great deal. 
In contrast, those sponsored through the other paths varied 
in their reliance on their sponsors, with approximately equal 
numbers reporting relying on their sponsors very much, a 
little, or not at all. 
Although resettled refugees can start working earlier, by 
month 13 in Canada, they are expected to find employment or 
move on to social assistance. A total of 64.3% of the GARs and 
74.5% of the PSRs had been in Canada for thirteen months 
or longer. Among GARs, 11.4% had some form of employ-
ment at the time of the interview; for PSRs the proportion 
was 33.8%. Among those employed, both groups identified 
co-ethnic friends as the most likely to have helped them 
find their job, with about one fifth having found their job on 
their own. Very few GARs (6.7%) or PSRs (4.9%) found jobs 
through employment agencies; community agencies were 
somewhat more helpful (GARs, 17.8%; PSRs, 11.2%). Sponsors 
were reported as the source of employment for only 12% of 
those PSRs who had found jobs (see figure 3).
Employment: The highest level model including Levels 
1 and 2 plus the Level 3 social network variables fit better 
than either of the lower models with a p of less than .05 and 
thus was retained. Current employment was predicted by 
sponsorship, such that PSRs were more likely to be employed 
than GARs, even when socio-demographic variables were in 
the model. Employment was also more likely for those who 
had been in Canada longer, were younger, male, Christian, 
or had relatives in Canada and friends in other ethnic com-
munities (see table 4). 
Trouble making ends meet: Model 3 with all variables was 
the best fit for having trouble making ends meet. In Model 
3, older age and less language fluency were associated with 
having trouble making ends meet. Sponsorship did not 
predict this measure of financial difficulty when these other 
variables were taken into account.
Family doctor: Model 3 with all variables showed improved 
fit. Most participants reported having a family doctor, but 
this varied by city. In Vancouver only 79.4% had a family 
doctor, compared to 90.3% in Kitchener/Waterloo, 98.2% in 
Toronto and 100% in Okanagan. In Montreal only 54.9% of 
participants had a family doctor. Given the dominance of 
PSRs in this city, we looked at GARs and PSRs separately; only 
33.3% GARs and 57.2% of PSRs had a family doctor. Having a 
doctor was also more likely for those who were older and 
were in Canada longer (see table 5).
Satisfaction with housing: Respondents were moder-
ately satisfied with their housing. On a 5-point scale, with 
1 representing not at all satisfied and 5 being very satisfied, 
both GARs and PSRs rated their satisfaction at 3.6. Although 
Model 3 was a better fit than either Model 1 or Model 2, no 
variables were significant predictors in this model suggest-
ing relatively weak relationships. Model 2, which included 
only Levels 1 and 2, is therefore presented here. City was the 
only predictor of housing satisfaction achieving a p  <  .05. 
Participants were most satisfied in Windsor (M = 3.8) and 
Toronto (M = 3.7) and least satisfied in Vancouver (M = 3.4) 
and Kitchener/Waterloo (M = 3.3). 
Sense of belonging: For sense of belonging to one’s neigh-
bourhood, Model 3 was retained. GARs reported a higher sense 
of belonging to their neighbourhood (M = 2.8) compared to 
PSRs (M = 2.6), and those in Windsor (M = 3.0) and Toronto 
(M  = 2.9) reported higher sense of belonging to neighbour-
hood than those in other cities, where scores ranged between 
2.5 and 2.7. Sense of belonging to neighbourhood was also 
somewhat higher among men (M = 2.3) than women (M = 2.2) 
and among those who were older (see table 6).
For overall sense of belonging to Canada, the model with 
all three levels was retained. Sense of belonging to Canada 
differed by city. It was lower among those in Montreal 
(M = 3.1) than the other cities, which ranged between 3.3 and 
3.4. Sense of belonging to Canada was also higher among 
those with lower levels of education, who were male, and 
who had friends from other ethnic communities.
Discussion
As mentioned above, this study is guided by the holistic 
integration model.36 Here in our discussion we aim to place 
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Table 4. Hierarchical models predicting employment and financial security
 
b SE p
Improvement in fit of  
highest model
Employment    χ²(3) = 152.61, p < .001
City 0.024 0.008 0.002  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) 0.162 0.032 0.000  
Length of time in Canada 0.011 0.002 0.000  
Age -0.006 0.001 0.000  
Gender (Female 0 / Male1) 0.2339 0.018 0.000  
Education -0.009 0.008 0.261  
Official language fluency -0.006 0.009 0.486  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) 0.219 0.035 0.000  
Length of displacement 0.001 0.001 0.062  
Relatives in Canada (No 0 / Yes 1) 0.046 0.022 0.034  
Number of established Syrian friends 0.011 0.020 0.593  
Friends from other ethnic communities  
(No 0 / Yes 1)
0 .068 0.020 0.001  
Trouble making ends meet    χ²(3) = 348.77, p < .001
City  0.022 0.016 0.166  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) -0.028 0.064 0.662  
Length of time in Canada 0.006 0.004 0.106  
Age 0.003 0.001 0.005  
Gender (Female 0 / Male 1) 0.002 0.022 0.942  
Education 0.008 0.012 0.480  
Official language fluency -0.027 0.013 0.040  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) -0.021 0.067 0.759  
Length of displacement 0.002 0.001 0.058  
Relatives in Canada (No 0 / Yes 1) -0.056 0.032 0.083  
Number of established Syrian friends 0.009 0.028 0.738  
Friends from other ethnic communities  
(No 0/ Yes 1)
0.028 0.029 0.328  
our results on the differences between Syrian PSRs and GARs 
within the socio-political context in which they are reset-
tling. Specifically, we discuss how Canadian refugee reset-
tlement policy and the composition and political mobiliza-
tion of earlier Syrian immigrant communities shaped the 
characteristics of refugees coming to Canada. We then look 
at how these characteristics (length of time displaced, reli-
gion, for example) may be influencing settlement outcomes, 
keeping in mind the local context (for example, local health 
or housing markets). Using the HIM allows us to go beyond 
individual outcomes to consider structural issues that may 
be addressed by changes in policy or practice.
Historically, private sponsorship in Canada has had two 
important elements. The first is the principle of additional-
ity: refugees accepted into Canada as privately sponsored are 
in addition to at least the same number of refugees supported 
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Table 5. Hierarchical models predicting health care and housing outcomes
 
b SE p
Improvement in fit 
of highest model
Have a family doctor    χ²(3) = 113.37, 
p < 0.001
City 0.075 0.010 0.000  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) -0.033 0.039 0.392  
Length of time in Canada 0.008 0.002 0.000  
Age 0.002 0.000 0.000  
Gender (Female 0 / Male 1) -0.008 0.009 0.380  
Education -0.008 0.0050 0.139  
Official language fluency 0.004 0.005 0.429  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) -0.029 0.040 0.477  
Length of displacement 0.001 0.000 0.228  
Relatives in Canada (No 0 / Yes 1) 0.011 0.014 0.415  
Number of established Syrian friends 0.002 0.012 0.885  
Friends from other ethnic communities (No 0 / Yes 1) 0 .015 0.012 0.213  
Satisfaction with housing    χ²(6) = 98.52, 
p < 0.001
City 0.045 0.023 0.051  
Sponsorship category (GAR 0 / PSR 1) 0.106 0.093 0.253  
Length of time in Canada 0.002 0.005 0.703  
Age 0.002 0.002 0.121  
Gender (Female 0 / Male 1) 0.006 0.036 0.859  
Education -0.013 0.019 0.484  
Official language fluency 0.018 0.021 0.390  
Religion (Muslim 0 / Christian 1) -0.095 0.099 0.338  
Length of displacement 0.000 0.001 0.965  
by the federal government for resettlement. It is this princi-
ple that allowed Canada to respond so quickly to the Syrian 
situation, exceeding its initial targets, and holding promise 
as a way to increase opportunities for the durable solution 
of resettlement. And yet the current Canadian government 
has set refugee resettlement targets for 2020 that defy the 
principle of additionality: 10,000 GARs versus 20,000 PSRs.37 
The second principle of private sponsorship is that sponsors 
can name a specific person or family whom they wish to set-
tle.38 Family members already in Canada often use private 
sponsorship as a means of family reunification through 
renewed support from their own sponsors or the SAH they 
know. They may also create a SAH or constituent group to 
become sponsors themselves. An evaluation study commis-
sioned by IRCC found that 62% of PSRs surveyed reported 
that they were sponsored by a family member.39 Known col-
loquially as “the echo effect,”40 this decision to sponsor fam-
ily members left behind clearly shapes the characteristics of 
those who are sponsored and the nature of their settlement 
experience by shaping the social context, as described in the 
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HIM, but that may also ultimately have a strong influence on 
the newly arrived refugees’ settlement outcomes through 
their moderating influence on other levels of integration.41
Canada had a small community of Syrian immigrants 
prior to the Syrian conflict. In 2011, 40,840 Canadian resi-
dents identified as having Syrian ethnicity. They lived pri-
marily in Montreal (40%) and Toronto (20%); 57% identified 
as Christian, 31% as Muslim, and 10% reported no religious 
affiliation. They were also highly educated, with 48% univer-
sity graduates.42 As the Syrian conflict escalated and became 
protracted, private sponsorship became a pathway for some 
residents of Syrian origin to bring relatives to Canada. The 
characteristics of the PSRs in our sample mirrored those of 
the more established Syrian Canadian community living in 
Canada prior to the war. Given that the population living in 
Canada was more likely to be Christian and highly educated 
than the average Syrian refugee, and given Syrian Canadi-
ans’ active participation in private sponsorship, this partially 
explains the more pronounced differences between GARs 
and PSRs (along the lines of religious affiliation, language 
ability, and level of education) than normally observed.
The Canadian government actively sought to resettle 
those identified as the most vulnerable refugees through the 
GAR Program, further amplifying the differences between 
GARs and PSRs in this cohort. Families with disabilities, acute 
medical conditions, and single mothers with young children 
were among those who met the criteria for “vulnerability.” 
Early results from the Canadian government’s Rapid Impact 
Evaluation of the Syrian resettlement initiative support 
these assumptions.43 In the first wave of resettlement, the 
Syrian GARs had lower levels of education, less knowledge 
of official languages, and larger families than other cohorts 
of GARs. These differences between GARs and PSRs are seen 
in other refugee cohorts also, thus the importance of tak-
ing pre-migration differences into account when comparing 
integration outcomes between GARs and PSRs,44 but espe-
cially so with the Syrian cohort. Caution is also important in 
comparing this cohort to others, given the unique nature of 
this initiative.
Our study identified other differences that to our knowl-
edge have not been previously noted. GARs were displaced 
in a first country of asylum almost twice as long as PSRs, 38 
months versus 19.5 months, suggesting longer exposure to 
the psychological and physical hardships of asylum. In this 
cohort there was also a large difference in the religion of 
GARs and PSRs, with almost all GARs being Muslim while 
three-quarters of the PSR sample was Christian, explained 
above as possibly being related to the presence of a relatively 
large and well-organized community of Christian Syrians in 
Montreal and Toronto. In the current climate of anti-Islamic 
discourse and attitudes, these differences may contribute to 
integration outcomes. Religion did contribute to some of 
the integration outcomes in this study; Muslim respondents 
were more likely to have friends from other ethnic commu-
nities and be closer to those friends, but less likely to have 
found employment. It will be important to explore further 
how religious identity is intersecting with other aspects of 
identity, social context, and migration pathways in shaping 
Syrian refugees’ integration pathways. 
This research also shows that privately sponsored refugees 
are not homogenous and need to be considered more closely 
in terms of types of sponsorship. While only 5% of our PSR 
population were sponsored by Groups of Five, there are dis-
tinctive features of this group compared to the other PSRs 
sponsored by faith, family, and community groups. During 
the Syrian resettlement, Groups of Five may have been less 
likely to be named than other privately sponsored refugees, 
although many are now trying to bring in family members 
of the first families they sponsored.45 Their post-migration 
experiences also seemed to differ. Those sponsored by 
Groups of Five reported relying on their sponsors to a much 
greater extent than did the other types of PSRs. There is very 
limited research on the nature of private sponsors them-
selves, a recent paper by Macklin and colleagues being a 
notable exception.45 It suggests that these new sponsors were 
highly committed and motivated. More work is needed to 
understand this pattern and determine if it is replicated in 
other samples.
The breadth of our participants’ social networks varied 
widely. Having friends in either the established Syrian com-
munity or among other communities was related to having 
spent more time in Canada but also to education, a better 
ability to speak one of the official languages, and being male. 
These findings are consistent with work on social exclusion 
among immigrants that finds women and those with lower 
language skills are more likely to be socially excluded.46 The 
importance of social inclusion for health and well-being is 
well established. This research contributes to the body of 
work that argues that additional steps need to be taken to 
ensure all members of newcomer communities can build 
community here.
The primary impact of social networks in this analysis 
emerged in the context of employment. Having employment 
was predicted both by having relatives in Canada and having 
friends from other ethnic communities. Similarly, co-ethnic 
friends were the most frequently mentioned pathway to 
finding employment. These findings underline the impor-
tance of social networks to accessing early employment 
and are consistent with qualitative reports on how refugees 
access employment in Canada.47 It also suggests the need to 
mobilize social networks to overcome social and structural 
barriers to employment.48 PSRs had more family and friends 
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from the established Syrian community than did GARs, so 
this aspect of private sponsorship may help support the early 
advantage typically observed for PSRs in employment rates. 
Nonetheless, although previous research has shown that pri-
vate sponsors can be key resources in finding employment 
through social connections,49 in our study, only a small pro-
portion of our sample reported relying on their sponsors to 
find employment. 
The second place where social networks had an impact 
was in a sense of belonging; having friends from other ethnic 
communities also predicted a sense of belonging to Canada, 
although not to one’s immediate neighbourhood. This latter 
finding underscores the relationship identified in the HIM 
between a welcoming community, building social bridges, 
and a subjective sense of integration. Sense of belonging to 
one’s neighbourhood, however, was predicted by the city one 
lives in, older age, being female, and being a GAR. The differ-
ence between these two forms of belonging may contrast an 
abstract sense of belonging with the strength of one’s local 
social networks. Interestingly, sense of belonging to one’s 
neighbourhood was also related to one’s satisfaction with 
their housing, r(1813) =  .22, p <  .001, suggesting that physi-
cal and social environment may contribute to this sense of 
belonging. 
Indeed, this study also illustrates the impact of the local 
context into which newcomers settle on key integration 
variables. Differences between cities include satisfaction 
with housing, sense of belonging to one’s neighbourhood, 
and access to a family physician. These differences likely 
reflect local differences that affect all residents. For example, 
health-care access differences mirror findings on regional 
differences in the availability of family physicians. Accord-
ing to the Canadian Community Health Survey, Canadians 
in Ontario were among the most likely to have a primary 
care provider (90%), whereas those in Quebec were the least 
likely (72.2%).50 It is therefore not surprising that the sample 
in Quebec was least likely to have access to a family physician. 
Health-care access may also reflect the extent to which spe-
cialized health-care services exist for recently arrived refu-
gees. A study of the impact of a dedicated health clinic for 
GARs showed improved referrals and decreased wait times 
consistent with the authors’ claims that the unique health-
care needs of recently arrived refugees are better addressed 
with specialized services.51 The findings on housing, how-
ever, are surprising, since Toronto is known to have a very 
difficult housing market, and yet participants there reported 
relatively positive views of their homes. 
A number of limitations must be taken into account. 
Although the sample is large, it is not randomly selected, and 
those Syrian refugees who are experiencing the most hard-
ship or isolation may be the most difficult to reach. Likewise, 
those who have had success in employment may have less 
time to participate in research, so it is unclear in what ways 
the sample might be biased relative to other Syrian refugees 
in these cities. The study also only recruited from six urban 
centres and thus cannot speak to resettlement experiences in 
rural regions.
In conclusion, the first wave of data for this project show 
that comparing GARs and PSRs is a fraught exercise, given the 
incommensurate profiles of each category. GARs are likely to 
be displaced almost twice as long as PSRs before emigrating 
to Canada. Furthermore, PSRs are not a homogeneous group: 
Groups of 5 resemble GARs more than other PSR sponsorship 
types. This article presents the first research we know that 
disaggregates private sponsorship into the various kinds of 
groups that exist. While family reunification is occurring 
because refugees can be specified by name, it is unclear how 
strong the echo effect is in terms of a kind of chain migration 
within the PSR Program. More research is needed to fill these 
gaps.
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Appendix A. Dummy coded variables for hierarchal linear modelling (HLM) 
Variable Coding 






Sponsorship category 1 = Government-assisted refugee (GAR)
 2 = Privately sponsored refugee (PSR)
Length of time in Canada Continuous variable
Friends from the established Syrian community 1 = Yes
0 = No
Friends from other ethnic communities 1 = Yes
0 = No
Closeness to friends from other communities 1 = Not at all
2 = A little close
3 = Mostly close
 4 = Very close
Age Continuous variable
Education level 1 = No education / very low education–elementary school
2 = Low education–middle school
3 = Moderate education–high school
4 = High education–university degree
5 = Very high education–postgraduate studies
Length of displacement Continuous variable
Gender 0 = Female 
1 = Male
Official language fluency Continuous variable: mean score from 1–6 (1 = Not at all; 
6 = Excellent) of current ability to speak and ability to  
understand French (Montreal) or English (all other sites) 
Religion Muslim = 0
Christian = 1
Relatives in Canada 1 = Yes
0 = No
Employment 1 = Yes
0 = No
Trouble making ends meet 1 = No, never had to get assistance 
2 = Yes, had to get assistance once or twice
 3 = Yes, had to get assistance several times
Have a family doctor 1 = Yes
0 = No




Satisfied with housing 1 = Very unsatisfied 
2 = Unsatisfied
 3 = Neither satisfied or unsatisfied
 4 = Satisfied
 5 = Very satisfied
Sense of belonging to neighbourhood 1 = Very weak
2 = Weak
3 = Strong
 4 = Very strong
Sense of belonging to Canada 1 = Very weak
2 = Weak
 3 = Strong
4 = Very strong
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and Integration of Syrian Refugees in Smaller 
and Rural Canadian Communities
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Abstract
Despite the media attention to Syrian refugee families being 
welcomed, finding work, and feeling at home in small towns 
across Canada, little is known about resettlement and inte-
gration in smaller and rural communities. Addressing this 
knowledge gap, this study visited four rural communities 
across four provinces in an effort to highlight the experi-
ences of smaller and rural communities and the refugees liv-
ing there. Based on interviews and conversations with rural 
refugee sponsors and community members, Syrian refugees, 
and service providers, the findings tell a story of refugees 
being welcomed into rural and smaller communities and 
of communities coming together to support the newcomers 
and find solutions to rural challenges. The article concludes 
that rural places can have a lot to offer refugees, some of 
whom settle permanently in these areas, and their experi-
ences should be included as part of the larger narrative of 
refugee resettlement in Canada. 
Résumé
Malgré l’attention médiatique portée envers l’accueil, l’em-
ploi et le sentiment de se sentir chez soi des familles de réfu-
giés Syriens dans de petites villes à travers le Canada, on sait 
peu de choses sur leur réinstallation et leur intégration dans 
les communautés rurales. Cette étude comble cette lacune 
en visitant quatre communautés rurales et les réfugiés qui 
y vivent. S’appuyant sur des entrevues et des conversations 
avec les parrains en région rurale et les membres de la 
communauté, les réfugiés syriens et les prestataires de ser-
vices, les résultats racontent l’histoire de réfugiés ayant été 
accueillis dans des communautés rurales et de petite taille, 
et de communautés qui se sont rassemblées pour soutenir 
les nouveaux arrivants et trouver des solutions aux défis 
ruraux. L’article conclut que les régions rurales ont beau-
coup à offrir aux réfugiés, dont certains s’y installent de 
façon permanente, et que leurs expériences devraient être 
incluses dans la narration plus large de la réinstallation des 
réfugiés au Canada. 
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Introduction
“We feel like we’re home,” is what Boushra Albik told the Globe and Mail in 2016 about her new home in Claresholm, a small town with a pop-
ulation of 3,758 in southern Alberta. Boushra, her husband, 
Ziad, and their young son, Elyas, are Syrian refugees who 
fled to Lebanon in 2015 and were privately sponsored into 
their new Canadian community by the Faith Community 
Baptist Church. The article goes on to say that Ziad is hoping 
to work as a barber in the small community, since the previ-
ous barber has retired, and members of the church are help-
ing the family run errands, as there is no public transporta-
tion in the area. Boushra and Ziad also comment that they 
“feel loved” in the small community and miss their new home 
when they travel to Calgary to visit friends or run errands.1 
Across the country in Nova Scotia, Assam Hadhad, a suc-
cessful chocolate maker from Damascus, Syria, and his fam-
ily were settling into their new home in Antigonish, a small 
community of 5,000. They opened the now famous choco-
late factory, Peace by Chocolate, in 2016 and are expanding 
their business and employing other Syrian refugees across 
the country. Tareq Hadhad told CBC that his family has been 
overwhelmed by the support of the small community, and 
that “without being in Antigonish, without being in this 
lovely community, really none of that could happen.”2
These are only two examples of Syrian refugees finding a 
new home in smaller and rural communities across Canada. 
Other media articles from numerous sources including the 
CBC, Global News, and the Globe and Mail speak of Syrian 
refugees settling in rural Canada and being welcomed into 
their new communities.3 However, despite the media inter-
est, very little is known about the processes of resettlement 
and integration outside of urban Canada. With funding from 
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), this 
study begins to address this knowledge gap and asks, What 
does refugee resettlement and integration look like in rural 
Canada? And, in the context of a global refugee crisis, are 
smaller and rural Canadian communities being under-uti-
lized as sites for refugee resettlement? 
This article makes a positive claim for the value of smaller 
communities and rural resettlement. My findings support 
the argument that many rural communities provide good 
integration opportunities for refugees, who are learning 
English, finding work, buying homes, and feeling welcomed 
in rural Canada. Before diving deeper into the challenges, 
innovations, and benefits of rural resettlement, the arti-
cle will provide background on the resettlement system 
in Canada and a discussion of what is meant by the term 
rural Canada. Despite the challenges that refugees face in 
rural communities, including lack of public transportation 
and access to specialized services, this is overwhelmingly a 
positive story, and the experiences of community members 
and refugees in rural areas must be included in the broader 
narrative of refugee resettlement in Canada. 
Background
Refugees can be resettled into Canada through government 
assistance or the private sponsorship program. Through 
the Government Assisted Refugee (GAR) Program refu-
gees are referred to Canada for resettlement by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and 
refugees receive support for one year from the govern-
ment of Canada (or province of Quebec).4 The majority of 
government-assisted refugees are resettled in urban centres 
across the country, such as Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa, and 
Edmonton,5 and are supported by service-provider organi-
zations that are funded by Immigration, Refugees, and Citi-
zenship Canada (IRCC). 
The government of Canada works with provinces and ter-
ritories, service-provider organizations, and other partners 
and stakeholders to deliver services and provide resources 
to refugees. Services available through this network include, 
but are not limited to, language training, career supports, 
and help accessing support services such as child care 
and interpretation services.6 A limited number of service-
provider organizations have a signed agreement with the 
IRCC designating them as Resettlement Assistance Program 
(RAP) centres.7 Under RAP, the Canadian government or 
province of Quebec provides government-assisted refugees 
with essential services and income support.8 RAP service-
provider organizations exist throughout the country, with 
the majority, but not all, located in large cities.9
Private sponsorship across the country occurs through 
two streams of sponsorship. The first is strictly private spon-
sorship, in which sponsors can name the individual(s) they 
want to sponsor into their community or be matched with a 
refugee through an inventory of visa office-referred cases. In 
this stream, sponsors pay the full cost of resettlement, which 
is laid out by the government of Canada and includes a start-
up allowance for refugees and monthly stipend based on 
family size. Sponsoring groups agree to provide the refugees 
with care, lodging, settlement assistance, and support for 
twelve months or until the refugee becomes self-sufficient.10 
The second stream is called the Blended Visa Office–Referred 
(BVOR) Program. The government of Canada provides up to 
six months of RAP income support, and the sponsors provide 
another six months of financial support and up to a year of 
social and emotional support.11 Refugees sponsored through 
the private sponsorship program can be resettled anywhere 
across Canada that a sponsorship group has formed, includ-
ing in rural and smaller communities.
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Much of the research that has been conducted on refugee 
resettlement and integration in Canada has neglected to study 
private sponsorship and the unique experiences of smaller 
communities and the refugees who settle there. In 2017 the 
Refugee Research Network and Centre for Refugee Studies at 
York University submitted a policy brief to the government 
of Canada on the state of private refugee sponsorship. The 
brief identified this rural knowledge gap and recognized the 
need for further research, stating that “it would also be pro-
ductive to discover how PSRs [privately sponsored refugees] 
fare in cities compared to smaller centres or rural areas.”12 In 
2011 the Canadian Council for Refugees published a report 
entitled “Refugee Integration: Key Concerns and Areas for 
Further Research.” Regarding access to settlement services, 
private sponsors, academics, and settlement practitioners 
felt more research was needed on access to settlement ser-
vices in different provincial jurisdictions, how experiences 
differ between smaller communities and larger cities, and 
if the centralization of settlement agencies and services in 
urban centres affects integration.13 
What is understood as rural is a highly debated and con-
tested topic. For many analysts and researchers, the term is a 
reflection of distance and population density, while for oth-
ers it is a social construction that reflects a specific history, 
lifestyle, and local knowledge.14 While the concept is fluid 
and changes, depending on the community and the context, 
“there is a general understanding that rural areas are places 
that generally have smaller populations, are distant from 
urban areas and have distinct identities and cultural ties.”15 
Rural Canada is extremely diverse, and the economic, social, 
cultural, ecological, physical, and linguistic characteristics 
of rural communities vary from province to province, and 
from community to community.16 For example, rural econo-
mies can range from single-industry communities, such as 
those that depend solely on fishing or tourism, to mixed 
economies. While some rural areas may boast vibrant and 
growing economies, others lack job opportunities and have 
a high rate of unemployment.17 
Rural communities in Canada today are facing numerous 
obstacles and many are struggling to survive. Globalization 
and the liberalization of markets have changed rural areas 
and placed added stressors on communities.18 For example, 
as youth migrate to urban centres in search of jobs, rural 
populations decline and businesses and local services begin 
to disappear. This process is cyclical, as without local ser-
vices it becomes very hard to keep and attract new residents, 
and the population continues to decline.19 Challenges fac-
ing rural communities, including aging populations, lack of 
adequate infrastructure, and environmental concerns, are 
compounded by the global reality of climate change and 
international economic development.20 
When refugees settle into rural communities they face 
challenges that are characteristic of living in a rural commu-
nity. Population decline in rural areas means fewer local ser-
vices that many refugees need, including medical, education, 
and translation services. A lack of infrastructure and dis-
persed population results in no public transportation, which 
can be crucial for newcomers who may not have a driver’s 
licence or access to a vehicle. The Rural Development Insti-
tute (RDI) found that refugees face these and other challenges 
when setting into rural communities. During a case study of 
five rural Manitoba communities where refugees had been 
resettled, the RDI spoke with refugee sponsorship groups and 
service-provider organizations. From these interviews the 
RDI found that rural resettlement challenges included “dif-
ficulty finding work, followed by affordable housing, volun-
teer fatigue, availability of food that meets newcomers’ reli-
gious needs (e.g., halal meat) and access to post-secondary 
education. Overall, though participants indicated that there 
are strong supports, some of the challenges of settlement are 
simply inherent with living in a rural area (e.g., lack of public 
transportation, meeting specific food requirements, limited 
access to higher education).”21 The Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities also recognizes the hurdles that newcomers 
face in rural Canada, including a lack of multilingual health-
care professionals, rental housing, and advanced language 
training.22 
While these challenges present barriers for refugees in 
rural areas, rural citizens work to address and overcome 
adversity through the strength of community networks and 
social connections. When conducting their study in rural 
Manitoba, the RDI head from rural service providers and 
refugee sponsorship groups spoke not only of the challenges 
of rural resettlement, but also about the strong volunteer and 
community networks that mobilized to support the refugees 
in their communities.23 In her book Stacey Wilson-Forsberg 
discusses the informal community networks involved in the 
integration of immigrant adolescents in a small city and rural 
town in New Brunswick. She states that the purpose of her 
book is “to examine how engaged citizens in New Brunswick 
set in motion social capital and social networks to create the 
necessary conditions to support an important aspect of the 
adaption and integration of immigrant adolescents: sense of 
belonging.”24
Rural communities can utilize social capital and com-
munity networks to address adversity and create sustainable, 
welcoming communities, and refugee newcomers can be a 
part of this process. Because of smaller populations and dis-
tance from urban areas, small communities generally have 
enhanced social capital, understood as the “relationships 
between people characterized by trust and norms of reci-
procity that can be used to achieve individual and collective 
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goals,” when compared to metropolitan areas.25 Building 
social capital is an important way that smaller communi-
ties can improve their resilience in the face of increasing 
challenges and stressors. When a community increases its 
connections and interactions with diverse groups on a local, 
national and global scale, it builds “enduring social capital” 
through strengthened relationships and knowledge shar-
ing and increases “community initiative, responsibility, and 
adaptability,” which is needed to ensure sustainable commu-
nities.26 Diversity is thus an asset to smaller communities, as 
newcomers bring new resources, skills, and innovative ideas 
into the community.27
The presence of social capital and social support networks 
in a community are also an important resource for resettled 
refugees. Social ties and support networks are vital to success-
ful resettlement, as refugees use these ties as “mechanisms 
for support and integration.”28 Social connections, within 
and outside the newcomers’ ethnic groups, are central to ref-
ugee integration and are important for refugees’ emotional 
support, confidence, language skills, and sense of safety and 
security.29 In addition, resettled refugees can have a lot to 
offer smaller communities looking to build social capital, as 
“refugees are for the most part resilient and resourceful, and 
often come from societies that place a higher value on inter-
personal relationships than most Western societies, making 
them quite adept at developing effective social networks.”30
Research Design 
In an effort to further understand these informal social and 
community processes of resettlement and integration in rural 
Canada, I embedded myself in four communities across four 
provinces. I chose these communities because they illustrate 
the diverse nature of rural Canada and have varying popula-
tion sizes, economies, and geographies. Despite their differ-
ences, all the communities face similar rural challenges, as 
they are not metropolitan centres and each struggles with 
a lack of public transportation and other available services, 
as discussed previously. Prior to my fieldwork visits, I spoke 
with refugee sponsors over the phone and via email. I made 
preliminary, short visits to three of the four communities, 
before returning and immersing myself in each community 
for about a week in May and June 2017. While in each com-
munity, I interacted with community members and refugees 
at informal social events and conducted semi-structured 
interviews. I attended community functions, met diverse sets 
of community members, and visited with refugee families 
and sponsors multiple times. I conducted formal interviews 
with ten Syrian refugees and forty-five private sponsors, 
community members, service providers, and/or resettle-
ment experts, but also met and spoke informally with other 
refugees and community members in the areas during my 
visits. Many of the individuals with whom I spoke had mul-
tiple roles in their community. For example, one individual 
could be both a private sponsor and a local service provider, 
and thus the roles and responsibilities of those involved in 
the sponsorship process were not often clearly defined. 
In all four communities, most of the individuals involved 
in the sponsorship group, as well as in other volunteer roles, 
were women. Thus, the majority of the individuals whom I 
spoke with were women, and groups stated that the majority 
of volunteers and people who had day-to-day contact with 
the refugee families were women. Each group also expressed 
a concern that the male refugees may not be getting as much 
male support or making as many male friendships as the 
women because of the lack of men involved in the process.
Of the sponsored refugee families that I visited, one is 
a government-sponsored family that moved out of the city, 
three are privately sponsored families, and two are Blended 
Visa Office–Referred families. The refugees had been in Can-
ada for differing time periods. Three of the families arrived 
in Canada in the winter of 2016, and the other three families 
arrived in the fall of 2016. 
• Community A is a community of 8,000 people in 
southwestern Ontario that is about 150 kilometres 
from the nearest metropolitan centre. This refugee 
sponsorship group sponsored a Syrian family. I spent 
seven days visiting in this community.
• Community B is a rural region in Nova Scotia. Here 
I visited three Syrian refugee families in two neigh-
bouring communities who were sponsored by a 
coalition of individuals living in the area. Two of the 
Syrian families live in a community of 3,000 people 
that is about twenty kilometres from the nearest met-
ropolitan centre, and the other Syrian family lives in 
another community of 500 people that is about fifty 
kilometres from the nearest urban centre. I spent 
eight days in this rural area.
• Community C has a population of 800 and is in 
southern Alberta. It is about 100 kilometres from the 
nearest urban centre. One intergenerational Syrian 
family was sponsored into this community, where I 
spent five days. 
• Community D is a community in central Saskatch-
ewan of 6,000 people that is about 110 kilometres 
from the nearest urban centre. One Syrian family was 
sponsored here. I spent six days in this community. 
Research Findings
The collected data were analyzed in accordance with the 
research questions guiding the study. I identified com-
mon themes across the four communities and compared 
the similarities and differences between the experiences of 
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participants. Thus the findings below are organized into 
three common themes that each community experienced 
and had to address. The first theme is how communities dealt 
with and understood the common assumption that rural 
Canada is unwelcoming and intolerant towards immigrant 
or refugee newcomers; the second involves communities 
addressing and finding solutions to rural challenges; and the 
last theme looks at how communities and refugees utilized 
and enhanced their social capital through the resettlement 
and integration process. While the four communities faced 
many of the same resettlement challenges and opportunities, 
some findings were unique to each community, and I have 
disaggregated some of these examples within my discussion 
of the three themes. 
Common Assumptions of Prejudice and Intolerance in 
Rural Canada
The assumptions made about rural communities manifest 
in how smaller communities perceive themselves and the 
actions that the four communities took to welcome the refu-
gee newcomers. Rural communities are often viewed as being 
“more white and less tolerant,”31 and in all four communities 
each sponsorship group expressed initial concerns about 
prejudicial or unwelcoming attitudes towards refugee new-
comers within their communities. They were all aware that 
their communities were largely white, Christian communities 
and that people in their community may not have had a lot 
of experience with other ethnicities or religions. With this 
in mind, every group took steps to inform and involve the 
wider community in the private sponsorship process through 
some or all of the following activities: community meetings, 
community fundraising, presentations to the town council, 
community-wide requests for volunteers and donations, etc. 
Throughout this process, the sponsors and other involved 
community members stated that intolerant or unwelcoming 
attitudes were not overt in their communities and overall the 
communities were very supportive. One sponsor stated, “The 
whole response was a lot more positive at least than I specifi-
cally thought it would be, and I think we as a group were really 
pumped by how excited the whole community seemed to be 
… and overall people were really just excited to help.” Another 
sponsor stated, “People were asking us regularly when they 
were going to get here,” and another, “The response of the 
community was overwhelming.” One refugee commented 
that the people were very nice in his community and “every-
body in the community wants to help.”
The unwelcoming attitudes that were mentioned by spon-
sors or community members included negative Facebook 
rhetoric about immigration or refugees in general, and 
personal conversations with people who were opposed to 
the sponsorship or had concerns about the process. One 
sponsorship member stated, “I haven’t noticed it a whole 
lot, but I do know it’s there. Sometimes it’s just ignorance. 
People don’t understand … people are afraid of what they 
don’t know.” Another community member said, “Once they 
saw the family and got to know them, and their kids are in 
our schools … most people feel like it’s quite silly now to be 
afraid or anything like that.” 
However, there is religious bias in these communities, 
even if it wasn’t overt. In at least three of the four communi-
ties, the subject of religion and how well some community 
members think the refugee family “fits” into the community 
came up during my fieldwork. For example, in one commu-
nity a few sponsors reflected that some community members 
seemed more willing to embrace a refugee family because 
they were Christian. In one community discussions around 
the ability of a Christian family to “fit in” faster, and integrate 
more easily into the rural community than a Muslim family 
was a dividing point between some sponsorship members. 
This community ended up specifically choosing to sponsor 
a Christian family because they thought they would “fit in” 
better than a Muslim family.
Everyone said that since the refugees have arrived in their 
communities they have not heard any intolerant or negative 
comments directed at the families in person or otherwise. 
When asked, none of the refugees said they had experienced 
unwelcoming attitudes when out in the community. How-
ever, some refugees may have been reluctant to disclose any-
thing negative about their communities. 
Addressing Rural Challenges through Community 
Connections and Networks
When speaking with refugees and private sponsorship 
groups, the most pervasive and articulated challenges for 
refugee families centred upon acclimatizing to new social 
and cultural norms and dealing with a lack of available ser-
vices. The most commonly mentioned challenge, other than 
the language barrier, was access to transportation. A vehicle 
of one’s own is the only constant mode of transport in the 
four rural communities I visited. Thus, transporting refugee 
families to the grocery store, or appointments in the city, 
involved a lot of volunteer driving. If the refugee family was 
large, transportation involved multiple volunteer drivers at 
one time or the need to rent a bus. Because rural communi-
ties are small, some of the families could walk to services in 
town. However, walking was not always an option, as some 
families lived a considerable distance from services, and 
the cold and snow didn’t encourage walking long distances. 
To overcome this challenge, groups worked hard to get the 
adults their driver’s licence. This process could involve pay-
ing for a driving test or extra lessons, helping to look for an 
inexpensive vehicle, and/or helping to pay for a vehicle.
Volume 35 Refuge Number 2
58
Another common challenge mentioned by all sponsorship 
groups was the lack of an Arab and/or Muslim community 
in the rural area. This lack of Arab community meant that 
most families must drive to the city to access the mosque and 
obtain ethnic foods, including halal meats, and Arabic trans-
lators are often hard to find. Some families also must travel 
to the city to buy cultural-specific attire and other items of 
clothing. Sponsorship groups and communities worked to 
address this lack of community by driving families to the 
city for mosque or other cultural events, connecting them 
to other Arab or Muslim people in surrounding rural areas, 
using personal networks to find translators who were will-
ing to drive or translate over the phone, and asking the local 
grocery to bring in specific foods. 
Another challenge was a lack of newcomer services 
in rural areas. The availability of local services depended 
largely on the province and the size of the community. In the 
absence of formal newcomer service centres, rural sponsors 
and community members spent hours trying to find and 
access services for their newcomers. Even when sponsorship 
groups had members who were trained professionals, such 
as social workers, people working within the immigration 
system, English teachers, and doctors, figuring out how to 
navigate services was difficult for many. The system is com-
plex, and service providers don’t necessarily know of the 
sponsorship program or the benefits, such as the interim 
federal health plan, that refugees have access to. One sponsor 
commented, “As much as you know about it [service provi-
sions and programs] you still don’t know, because service 
providers themselves don’t necessarily know about it.”
For housing, only one group in Community D was able 
to access government subsidized housing, while the others 
found private rental homes or townhouses in the commu-
nity. Every group was able to find a physician in the area who 
could see the refugee family (and in some cases they were 
able to find Arabic-speaking physicians). However, finding 
and accessing affordable dental care was a challenge for every 
group, and every refugee family needed extensive dental care. 
To deal with the costs, some groups were able to find dentists 
in the area who would do some work pro bono. 
At least two groups explored professional counselling 
options for their families. However, the services available 
were offered in English only and not necessarily accessible. 
In one case, a sponsorship group considered driving the 
refugees into the city to access services but couldn’t find an 
appropriate service there either. In most cases the sponsor-
ship groups addressed mental health concerns more infor-
mally. For example, when one group became aware that a 
young refugee woman appeared to be very lonely and isolated 
within her home during the winter months, the group made 
an effort to stop by the home more often and take the woman 
out for coffee or other activities. Another group mentioned 
that some mental health concerns remedied themselves once 
the refugee family was able to purchase a vehicle and gain 
some independence.
Each group also accessed English-language services dif-
ferently. In some cases, access to English classes was limited, 
and sponsorship groups informally organized volunteers 
who were often retired teachers who would go into the 
family’s home during the week to teach English. For formal 
instruction, Community C accessed a non-profit service 
in their community and also drove one young adult to a 
government-funded class in the city, while Community A 
accessed a unique volunteer-run service in a neighbouring 
community. Community B found a university scholarship 
program for one refugee, and Community D accessed classes 
offered through their local college. Three groups had to 
organize volunteers to drive refugees to language classes in 
neighbouring communities weekly or daily. While this com-
mitment decreases somewhat after the family has acquired 
a vehicle and driving licences, it doesn’t necessarily disap-
pear, as the vehicle may be needed by one family member for 
work, and the others had to continue to rely on volunteers to 
attend classes.
Many of the refugees said that they liked the mix of formal 
and informal English instruction. During our conversations, 
many spoke of Syrian friends or acquaintances who lived 
in big cities who were not learning English as fast as they 
were. Some said that their friends didn’t need to learn Eng-
lish because they lived in an Arabic-speaking community, or 
that they had trouble accessing language services because of 
long wait lists. The refugees I spoke with were eager to learn 
English, and one refugee stated that “language was the big-
gest barrier” when they first arrived. 
Utilizing and Enhancing Social Capital
Across all the communities I visited, community members 
and refugees were quick to point to the positive attributes 
of rural places, which were often linked to the enhanced 
social capital in rural areas. Many comments were made to 
this effect including, “In a smaller community you can get to 
know people a lot easier,” “We’re a very close, very support-
ive community,” and “It’s a really helpful community here.” 
Refugees commented that their communities were welcom-
ing, and one said, “It’s a special area.” Everyone pointed to 
the close sense of community, where everyone knows every-
one, in rural areas as a benefit to refugee resettlement. Each 
sponsorship group included individuals from different parts 
of the community who often held many different roles and 
had access to different resources and parts of the community. 
For example, one sponsor commented, “It feels especially, in 
a community this size, like a very arbitrary, made up division, 
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especially if you look at me, I am both a [sponsorship] mem-
ber and an employee of the ––– so when am I volunteering 
and when am I working? I don’t even know, so it kind of feels 
silly sometimes to enforce a division that’s really not there.… 
It’s a small community, and everyone overlaps in their vari-
ous roles.” Thus, even if the sponsorship group didn’t have a 
specific connection, someone within the group would know 
someone who could help in a specific area. 
For example, personal connections were often used to 
help the refugees access employment opportunities. Because 
everyone knows who the refugees are, many of the refugees 
were offered jobs by local business owners. Older youth and 
adults were offered part-time jobs from local businesses, 
including restaurants, industrial plants, and grocery stores. 
Further, through the communities’ social connections, some 
refugees also found jobs within their trained professions. 
When I spoke to the refugees specifically about what they 
liked about the communities in which they are living, they 
spoke about similar things. Many of them stated that they 
liked that their community is quiet, the people are friendly 
and everyone knows them and says “Hi,” it is safe and their 
children can go outside, everything is close by, they are close 
to their sponsors (the people who care about them and help 
them), and they can live in a house and have a garden. Some 
said that they liked going to the city for shopping, but they 
really liked coming back “home” afterward. Everyone spoke 
about the warm welcome they received when they first 
arrived and at community events, such as church potlucks 
or concerts. Others spoke of their ability to access certain 
services close to home. 
Other commonly identified benefits of rural communities, 
by both sponsors and refugees, included the fact that every-
one in the community embraced the families and is invested 
in their success (because the whole community worked 
together to bring them here), the community is safe, there is 
no traffic, the cost of living is lower in comparison to urban 
centres, large families can afford appropriate housing, the 
available services are close by and everything is easy to get to, 
and the refugees learn English faster, because there are few, 
if any, other Arabic-speaking individuals. Some sponsorship 
members also mentioned that retired people and seniors are 
a rich resource in rural communities, as they have a lot of 
time to volunteer and spend time with the newcomers. 
Community members and sponsors also recognized the 
social capital that the newcomers brought to, and fostered 
within, their communities. Many commented that the 
refugee family brought diversity into their community and 
exposed the community to a new culture. Individuals also 
mentioned that it was great to have the community work 
together and rally around a common goal. One sponsor said 
that the sponsorship had “pulled people together for different 
events that might not [otherwise] come together.” Refugee 
sponsorship also offered the community an opportunity to 
be part of something bigger and do something concrete in 
response to an international crisis. When speaking about 
private sponsorship one sponsor said, “It’s like the intersec-
tion of local community building and international relief 
work, and it’s so rare that you actually have those two things 
come together in one.”
The community bonds and connections present in these 
communities influenced the decisions of refugee families to 
stay in their new communities. Many of the private sponsors 
and service providers I spoke with assumed that the refugees 
would want to move to a city once their year of sponsorship 
was over in order to be closer to an Arabic-speaking commu-
nity, a broader range of newcomer services, and other ethnic 
and cultural services. However, while this is true for some, 
many of the refugees I spoke with have decided to stay and 
make a home for themselves and their families in their small 
community. The decision of families to stay surprised many 
community members. One service provider commented, “I 
don’t think anybody expected them to want to stay here.”
Of the refugee families with whom I spoke, some have 
bought homes in their new communities, while others 
are renting. One family in Community A bought a house 
in their new community just after their year of sponsor-
ship ended. They commented that Community A is “home” 
and they don’t want to leave. They said that the people are 
friendly, and everyone knows who they are, because they 
are the only Syrian refugee family, which makes them feel 
special. Another family, living in Community B, who have 
now finished their one year of support, are renting a house in 
the centre of their small community. While they did live in 
an urban centre in Canada for a brief period, they didn’t like 
living in an apartment and say that they are much happier 
with their house and large yard. They like having the abil-
ity to garden, they would miss their friends and sponsors if 
they moved, and the children do not want to leave the small 
community school. The family in Community D have also 
chosen to remain in their community.
Another family in Community C stated that they can’t 
imagine moving to a bigger centre and they have also bought 
a house in their community. They feel safe where they are 
and like the quiet. They go shopping in the city and always 
like coming back “home.” Earlier this year, the family wel-
comed some of their other family members into the com-
munity, who were also sponsored by the same group. In this 
instance, family reunification, or the “echo effect,” is bring-
ing another Syrian family to this small community. However, 
two families from Community B moved to the nearest urban 
centre, with the support and help of their sponsorship group. 
They are both young families and are moving in order to be 
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closer to the university, more job opportunities, and a larger 
Arab community. 
Conclusion
Despite the very real challenges in rural places, communi-
ties are finding unique solutions, and many refugees have 
decided to stay and rebuild their lives there. Refugees are 
finding quality jobs, accessing service, and buying homes 
in rural Canada, while small centres are becoming more 
diverse and welcoming new members into the area. While 
I am confident in the identified findings of this project, it 
is important to note the limitations of this study, as it was 
not a longitudinal research project and consisted of a small 
sample size. This is an initial look into rural resettlement and 
my findings are not meant to be generalizable or conclusive. 
Much more research is needed on this topic in order to 
expand our understanding of rural resettlement and integra-
tion. In this conclusion, I will expand on this story of rural 
resettlement through a discussion of community-led solu-
tions to rural challenges, economic opportunities for new-
comers, and recommendations for policy change.
Rural challenges, such as a lack of newcomer services, 
have led communities to develop their own creative solu-
tions. Despite the fact that refugees can be resettled any-
where in Canada through the private sponsorship program, 
the current system does not offer expanded services outside 
of urban centres. For example, the growing number of spon-
sored Syrian refugees in one region in southwestern Ontario 
resulted in the community-led creation of an English- 
language school, which is accessed by the refugee family 
from Community A. The school began when an Arabic-
speaking couple with backgrounds in non-governmental 
organizations in the Middle East, and one with official 
English as a Second Language (ESL) training, started teach-
ing two refugees who were sponsored through their church 
in 2015. In a few months, they went from teaching four to 
thirty students in January 2016, as more and more private 
sponsorship groups requested to access this unique program. 
The school now runs five days a week in a church basement. 
Most of the students are refugees, but some immigrants and 
other newcomers are also accessing the centre. Over forty 
volunteers help run the program. There are students who are 
just learning to read and write, and others who are university 
graduates. While transportation has been the biggest chal-
lenge for refugees to access the school, sponsors either drive 
their students or helped the refugees with vehicle costs. The 
refugees not only learn English, they are also able to meet 
with other refugees and integrate into the community and 
meet new people. 
Another example comes from Camrose, Alberta, a city 
of 18,000 where three churches came together to open the 
Camrose Refugee Centre in November 2017. While churches 
in the area have been sponsoring refugees for decades, this 
is the first unified effort to help newcomers in the commu-
nity. Community members saw a need for a service to help 
newcomers and they worked together to find a solution. The 
centre, which is mostly run by volunteers, assists churches 
and organizations sponsoring refugees and helps newcom-
ers adjust to life in Canada and meet other newcomers in the 
area. Erhard Pinno, chairman of the Refugee Centre, com-
mented, “I consider it a very historic day in the life of this 
community. It’s another important step, I think in terms of 
being a real welcoming community … letting refugees from 
all over the world know we are here to help you as much as 
we can.”32 
These creative solutions are just some examples of how 
rural communities use their social capital to address rural 
challenges. When private sponsors were concerned that 
their community may not be welcoming to newcomers, they 
held community meetings, sat in local grocery stores, and 
spoke with local community organizations. In the absence 
of public transportation, private sponsors rallied commu-
nity members and organized carpooling. Without formal 
language classes, community members with a background 
in education volunteered their time and organized classes. 
Despite the challenges, rural communities lean on their 
social connections and use community networks to find 
solutions. This social capital is strengthened by diversity and 
is an important asset in rural communities that often lack 
the more formal, government-funded newcomer services 
that exist in urban places. 
Social connections in rural communities offer some 
refugees the chance to find and keep good employment, and 
rural Canada can be a place of economic opportunity. For 
example, in Community C a Syrian man found a job work-
ing in a tire shop, which made used of his extensive experi-
ence. A man in Community B found a job as a pastry chef in 
his rural community, while another family started catering 
in Community A. Michael J. Molloy (a former civil servant 
who worked on the refugee provisions of the 1976 immigra-
tion act and helped coordinate resettlement of Indochinese 
refugees into Canada from 1979 to 1980) stated that knowl-
edge of previous employment could be used before placing 
some refugees in rural communities. Matching some rural 
communities with refugees could help bring new people and 
services into their communities, and refugees with relevant 
skills could find good employment, affordable housing, and 
available services. 
The relative affordability of housing in smaller communi-
ties can benefit refugees and their families, as refugees who 
resettle in large metropolitan Canadian cities, such as Van-
couver, often struggle to find an inexpensive and appropriate 
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place to live.33 A report from the Standing Senate Committee 
on Human Rights contends that Syrian refugees have had 
difficulties finding affordable housing in Canada’s major 
urban centres: “Many GARs [government-assisted refugees] 
who arrived between 4 November 2015 and 29 February 2016, 
for instance, were accommodated in hotels for longer peri-
ods than usual because they had difficulty finding housing. 
For some, the arrangement lasted months. During this time, 
families were confined to small hotel rooms designed for 
short stays.”34 Smaller communities with low-cost housing 
options could be utilized by the government to house newly 
arrived refugees so that families avoid living in hotel rooms 
for long periods of time. Finding long-term, appropriate 
housing for large families in Vancouver and Toronto is dif-
ficult and costly, and smaller and rural communities could 
be used to find sustainable housing options for refugees. As 
stated earlier, some of the families that I spoke with have 
been able to purchase homes in their new communities, but 
that would have proven more difficult if they lived in a large 
urban centre. 
Moving forward, it is crucial that we share the positive 
stories coming out of rural Canada and begin to utilize 
smaller and rural communities more effectively for refugee 
resettlement. Refugees can benefit from the social capital, 
economic opportunities, and affordable housing options 
that rural communities can offer. In some cases, refugees 
can readily access services in rural communities that have 
become stretched in the cities. Because multiple levels of 
government are involved in newcomer services, select rural 
communities have government services in their communi-
ties. Community D in Saskatchewan has access to formal 
English-language courses through their local college, avail-
able public housing, and an immigrant services centre. One 
sponsor from the community in Saskatchewan stated, “We 
have so many services here, we have housing here, why aren’t 
they settling some of these people here? If they can help us 
with the money part … we could probably bring a whole 
community in if we could afford to find a benefactor who 
could pay for it, the housing is sitting here, the services are 
here.” In an effort to further consider rural communities 
for resettlement, the government could expand the RAP to 
include more rural and smaller communities. If a commu-
nity has services for resettlement and integration, it is worth 
examining ways in which they can be used more effectively. 
This point has been made by others in small commu-
nities seeking to help refugees. Joseph McMorrow and 
Catherine Caufield wrote about the benefits of rural reset-
tlement: “Why did large numbers of government sponsored 
Canadian Syrian refugees recently spend weeks isolated in 
urban hotels awaiting a permanent residence when there 
were small towns in Canada lining up asking to be allowed 
to provide them with a welcome, a residence and friendly 
personal support?”35 Despite the extensive experience that 
smaller communities have had with refugee resettlement, 
and the success of these communities to support newcomers, 
despite a lack of formal services, the IRCC continues to con-
centrate resettlement services in urban centres. McMorrow 
and Caufield saw this first hand in Camrose: “The Camrose 
Refugee Coordinating Committee recently asked that Cam-
rose be named as a welcoming community for government-
sponsored Syrian refugees. This offer included the complete 
provision of initial housing and meals. No formal reply was 
ever received because Camrose could not meet the settle-
ment criteria—criteria that suspiciously look as though they 
were created to ensure that smaller communities would not 
be considered.”36
The evidence and information above tells a positive story 
of rural refugee resettlement. Even though this is a small 
research study and much more research is needed on the 
benefits and challenges of rural resettlement, these stories 
give us a place to start. Many rural and smaller communities 
are working to create welcoming spaces for refugees, many 
of whom have decided to build a new life in rural Canada. 
These stories need to become part of the resettlement narra-
tive in Canada, and communities with positive resettlement 
stories need to be considered by the government as potential 
destinations for refugees. As more and more people become 
displaced around the globe, rural resettlement is an oppor-
tunity that we can’t afford to ignore. 
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How Do Sponsors Think about “Month 13”?
Patti Tamara Lenard
Abstract
There are many different ways in which one might describe 
the goal of Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees Pro-
gram. For sponsors, though, one goal is clear: to get “their” 
refugees ready to handle the rigors of “month 13.” The sup-
posed ideal is that, by month 13, newcomers are employed 
and living independently in Canada, as productive mem-
bers of society. The reality is messier. The objective in this 
article is to offer an account of how sponsors think of their 
job, in relation to month 13. Using data collected via inter-
views with nearly sixty private sponsors in Ottawa, it is 
shown that sponsors are motivated by securing stability for 
newcomers by the time month 13 arrives, but that sponsors 
differently flesh out the meaning of the stability they are 
seeking to achieve on behalf of newcomers. In particular, 
the data suggest, sponsors believe that newcomers’ attitude 
to integration is especially strongly related to their actual 
integration, and newcomers do especially well by month 13 
to the extent that sponsors are able to build and support a 
positive attitude towards it.
Résumé
Il y a plusieurs façons dont pourrait être décrit l’objectif du 
Programme de parrainage privé de réfugiés du Canada. 
Pour les parrains, toutefois, l’objectif est clair : il s’agit de 
préparer « leur » réfugié à gérer les rigueurs du « 13e mois ». 
L’idéal supposé est qu’à partir 13e mois, les réfugiés travaillent 
et vivent de façon indépendante en tant membres productifs 
de la société. La réalité est plus compliquée. Cet article a 
pour objectif de rendre compte de la façon dont les parrains 
envisagent leurs tâches en lien avec le 13e mois. S’appuyant 
sur des données recueilles auprès d’une soixantaine de par-
rains à Ottawa, cet article démontre que les parrains sont 
animés par le désir d’assurer la stabilité des réfugiées avant 
13e mois. Cependant, les parrains définissent de manière 
différente ce qu’ils entendent par stabilité. Notamment, les 
données indiquent que les parrains estiment que le niveau 
d’intégration des nouveaux arrivants est particulièrement 
relié à leur attitude envers l’intégration. Les parrains esti-
ment également que la réussite des nouveaux arrivants 
dépend de leur capacité à développer et soutenir chez eux 
une attitude positive envers l’intégration.
There are many different ways in which one might describe the goal of Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program:1 it gives Canadians with a commit-
ment to refugees a way to personally increase the number of 
resettlement spaces for them in Canada; it provides a highly 
personalized and robust welcoming team for newly arriving 
refugees; it involves the community in the larger Canadian 
project of welcoming refugees to our country. Refugees to 
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Canada are admitted in one of two ways: as government-
assisted refugees and as privately sponsored refugees. Gov-
ernment-assisted refugees are admitted with formal links to 
Canada’s extensive settlement services, which take charge of 
supporting them as they construct their new lives in Canada. 
Privately sponsored refugees are selected by Canadian citi-
zens and permanent residents for admission. In supporting 
their application to Canada, sponsors commit to a range 
of tasks with respect to “their” refugees, including finding 
them accommodation, health care, language classes, and so 
on, all of which are directed at facilitating their integration 
into Canadian society. This commitment is officially one year 
long, and the supposed ideal is that, by month 13, refugee 
arrivals are self-sufficient in a meaningful way. The reality is 
messier. Using data collected via interviews with nearly sixty 
private sponsors in Ottawa, this article offers an account of 
how sponsors think of their job, in relation to month 13.
In this article, Part 1 outlines the overarching theoreti-
cal questions that motivated this work, and elaborates the 
ways in which the terms integration, independence, agency, 
and self-sufficiency are understood across a range of fields in 
social science. Part 2 offers a summary of recent accounts of 
the objectives of month 13; this summary includes anecdotal 
accounts suggesting that not all refugees are prepared to be 
on their own when their sponsorship comes to an end. Part 
3 describes the methods deployed to carry out the research. 
Part 4 offers an account of how “independence,” and the 
related concepts listed above, is conceptualized by sponsors, 
to reveal that they describe it both in “hard” terms, i.e., with 
respect to whether refugees have jobs or competence in a 
national language, and in relatively “softer” terms, i.e., with 
respect to whether refugees arrive with attitudes towards 
their new lives that makes integration easier or more diffi-
cult. This part also offers an account of how sponsors worked 
to support refugees in achieving success in both dimensions. 
The results suggest, ultimately, that while many sponsors 
have a multidimensional understanding of what success at 
month 13 entails, a significant minority of sponsors continue 
to have narrow accounts of what counts as success at month 
13, understanding it only or mainly in terms of economic self-
sufficiency. These latter sponsors, in particular, expressed 
some disappointment with their sponsorship experience, 
in those cases where this objective was not reached. Yet it 
is well known among scholars and settlement workrs, as 
described below, that integration into Canadian society, and 
the labour market in particular, is gradual; the failure to 
attain it by month 13 means neither that the refugees have 
failed, nor that the sponsorship has failed. As the guidelines 
from the Refugee Sponsorship Training Program for Month 
13 note, “It is important for sponsors not to feel disheartened 
or discouraged if the refugee(s) they have sponsored are 
not self-sufficient by the end of Month 12 … integration is a 
long-term process.”2
What Is the Goal of Month 13?
Month 13 looms large, for both sponsors and refugees. As 
articulated above, sponsors agree to support refugees for one 
year, and the legal dimension of the relationship between 
sponsors and refugees concludes one year after the refugee 
arrives in Canada. The most concrete dimension of the 
cut-off is financial: whereas sponsors take on the financial 
responsibility for supporting refugees for their first year in 
Canada, on the first day of month 13 this financial respon-
sibility concludes. In a small number of cases, sponsors are 
willing and able to continue offering at least some financial 
support to refugees beyond month 13, but according to the 
data gathered from sponsors in Ottawa, that is not the norm. 
In a larger number of cases, strong affective ties have devel-
oped between sponsors and refugees, so the friendships con-
tinue beyond month 13.
Much of the commentary on the implications of month 13 
is anecdotal. Between November 2015 and January 2017, over 
40,000 Syrian refugees were admitted to Canada, over 18,000 
of whom were privately sponsored.3 In early 2017, after many 
of these refugees had been present for a year or more, jour-
nalists in Canada and the United States profiled many of 
these refugees, reporting on how their first year in Canada 
had gone.4 One central theme in these stories was that there 
was a lot of nervousness felt among all parties—refugees, 
sponsors, and settlement workers—about how the transition 
would go. The point is not that support is not available—all 
provinces have welfare systems that will support refugees, 
if they require it, and refugees continued to be permitted 
to access settlement services of all kinds, although some 
reports suggest that refugees are unaware that ongoing sup-
port, financial and otherwise, is available.5 But the precise 
mechanisms by which refugees would support themselves 
after the formal cut-off point, and how the relations among 
refugees and sponsors would be navigated, were all hazy in 
ways that generated anxiety for refugees and sponsors alike.
The Research Set-up
The data reported below were collected from interviews with 
nearly sixty sponsors in Ottawa, conducted as part of a Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant.6 The 
research design was approved by the University of Ottawa 
Research Ethics Board. We recruited sponsors by commu-
nicating with refugee settlement agencies in Ottawa as well 
as sponsorship agreement holders, across all major religious 
groups in Canada.7 These agencies forwarded our recruit-
ment email to the sponsors with whom they worked, asking 
them to be in touch with us if they were willing to speak with 
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our interviewer. Each of these sponsors reached out to the 
research team and an interview was scheduled, and it ran 
approximately ninety minutes. One interviewer conducted 
all of the interviews, between October 2017 and January 2018. 
The interviewer used a questionnaire8 to direct the interview, 
but followed the standards associated with semi-structured 
interviewing techniques, allowing her to ask follow-up ques-
tions when sponsors hinted that they had more of relevance 
to say on the areas of focus. Respondents came from every 
major religious group in Canada (Christian, Jewish, Muslim, 
and Hindu), and many were secular.9 They were mainly 
women, often retired, many from the Canadian public ser-
vice.10 With two exceptions, sponsors resided in Ottawa.11 All 
of the people interviewed had completed their sponsorship 
year. In many cases, interviewees were first-time sponsors 
who had responded to the call to support Syrian arrivals; in 
several others, interviewees had been participating in refu-
gee sponsorship for years, and even decades. The intention 
was to interview sponsors individually, but several sponsors 
early on indicated a strong preference to be interviewed in 
groups, and that preference was respected. As a result, while 
most interviews were one-on-one, a dozen were conducted 
in small group of between two and four sponsors.
Three main questions form the basis of the analysis:
1. One of the main jobs of a sponsor is to secure the inde-
pendence of newcomers. What do you think independ-
ence means?
2. What skills do you believe that newcomers need, in 
order to be independent?
3. At what point, if any, do you believe that the newcom-
ers with whom you worked became independent?
The interviewer asked these questions in order but had 
flexibility to pursue additional follow-up questions where 
she felt it was appropriate. 
A word about linguistic choice: the research was born 
from the observation that something is meant to be achieved 
for refugees by the time their first year in Canada comes to 
an end. This something was initially conceived as agency, a 
term familiar to philosophers, which designates the capac-
ity of an individual to formulate decisions among quality 
options and to be able to act on these decisions in mean-
ingful ways.12 Are refugees agents in their own lives, and do 
sponsors support refugees’ agency? The language of agency, 
it turns out, is familiar to scholars but not as familiar to spon-
sors. Correspondingly the language deployed in the research 
was shifted to focus on independence; questions focused on 
the nature of independence, and related terms were better 
able to capture quality data on the actions sponsors were 
taking to support the refugees with whom they worked. In 
particular, our research framework, and the specific ques-
tions selected to begin conversations, was derived from 
an analysis of labour market integration literature; from 
accounts of “self-sufficiency”; and from the philosophical 
literature focused on agency and empowerment.13 As with 
the entire research team, the interviewer was armed with the 
broad understanding of independence described here and 
so was cognizant that the simple questions reported above 
may not have been able to capture the nuance sought in this 
project. She was therefore able to probe further, shifting 
language in follow-up questions, towards self-sufficiency or 
agency, where appropriate. No doubt the language is imper-
fect, but these initial thoughts are intended to frame the 
readers’ understanding of the objectives and results reported 
here.
The theme of “economic independence” will prove 
especially relevant to the analysis below, but there is an 
important caveat: the research team does not believe that 
self-sufficiency, integration, or independence translates in 
any easy way to economic independence. Yet much of the 
rhetoric around immigration admission and settlement in 
general—and refugees are not excluded—is about the ways 
in which migrants of all kinds contribute to the Canadian 
economy. Moreover, attempts to mobilize support in favour 
of admitting refugees, by the government and often refu-
gee advocates themselves, emphasize the contribution that 
they will make to Canadian society. Admitted refugees may 
impose short-term costs, so the public discourse goes, but 
over the long term they become active contributors to our 
economy; indeed, there is considerable evidence suggesting 
that, overall, refugees do in time contribute as taxpayers to 
the Canadian economy, and that the work they do recoups 
the short-term costs their arrival and early integration gen-
erates.14 To take just one example, in a recent speech detail-
ing new pre-arrival services available for migrants to Canada, 
Minister of Immigration, Citizenship and Refugees Ahmed 
Hussen began by noting the ways in which immigrants sup-
port Canada’s economic success, and casually and repeatedly 
mentioned the “positive role that immigrants play in our 
economy and society.”15 
There is nothing striking or original about this quota-
tion, other than it is run-of-the-mill for immigration-related 
commentary from the Canadian government. Yet public 
statements of this kind sometimes implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly propose that, were Canadians to believe that refu-
gees imposed only, or mainly, costs on Canadian citizens, 
they would not be willing to support their admission. More 
worryingly, this emphasis on the economic contributions 
that refugees ultimately make suggests that, where they do 
not do so, or were they not to do so, they would be under-
stood as burdens on Canadian citizens. This view is particu-
larly problematic, since refugees ought to be admitted for 
resettlement because a commitment to humanitarianism 
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demands it; Canadian refugee policy recognizes this, moreo-
ver, and in general prioritizes the admission of refugees who 
are most in need, rather than (as historically had been the 
case) those who appear best able to make contributions to 
the Canadian economy.16
Three central findings that emerge from the data are out-
lined below. One finding is that sponsors offer two general 
accounts of how independence should be defined, and what 
skills are associated with it. One account emphasizes hard 
skills like education and linguistic competence; a second 
emphasizes softer skills, some of which are not straightfor-
wardly skills, including the capacity and willingness to shift 
habits and norms, and a willingness to “jump right in.” A 
second finding is that large numbers of sponsors focused 
explicitly on engaging with refugees in ways that they 
believed built independence; for many, something like inde-
pendence was at the top of their minds. Yet when and where 
they were able to support transitions to independence were 
not always clear, or were impeded by other considerations. 
A final and related finding is that month 13, though a cut-off 
of sorts, does not correspond neatly with the achievement 
of independence; rather, independence is gained gradually 
and imperfectly, over the course of sponsorships and beyond.
Findings: Defining and Supporting Independence
What Is Independence?
As noted above, sponsors were asked to consider what it 
means to be independent. Broadly, sponsors offered two 
kinds of responses: one focused on the development of skills 
(or accomplishment of certain tasks) and another focused on 
the possession (or development) of specific attitudes.
Among sponsors who focused on skills development, one 
group described independence straightforwardly in terms of 
gainful employment, as did these sponsors: “I think being 
employed or knowing how to access a source of income” is 
central to independence; “I think it means, ultimately to get 
working”; and “Financially independent: I guess this means 
they should be getting jobs or at least getting the skills to 
get jobs.”17 Sponsors who defined independence in employ-
ment terms expressed frustration with refugees who rejected 
what they viewed as perfectly good jobs. One sponsor noted 
a low-skilled refugee, with poor English skills, refusing to 
clean toilets, for example. Another expressed frustration 
with a refugee who insisted that he work as a barber, for 
whom an apprenticeship position was found, but who then 
refused to study for the additional qualifications that would 
have secured him more stable and lucrative employment.
Among those sponsors who immediately associated inde-
pendence with employment, there was a persistent worry 
about the danger of refugees accepting a life on social assis-
tance. One sponsor, when asked to consider the meaning 
of independence, immediately observed that “they have 
only to be not dependent on Canadian taxpayers’ money.”18 
Sponsors with this attitude described their job as, in part, to 
ensure that refugees did “not think that it’s OK to be on social 
assistance.”19 Another explained that they were very clear, in 
working with refugees, that “welfare is a way of life that you 
really don’t want to get addicted to.”20 One sponsor reported 
a conversation with refugees in which refugees were asking 
for support in sponsoring additional family members; the 
sponsor explained that sponsorships are expensive and can-
not be undertaken easily. The refugees responded that the 
additional money was not necessary, since their family mem-
bers could “get on welfare.” The sponsor noted, “Nobody had 
educated them that welfare isn’t a default way of life here…. 
You need to educate them that welfare is not an end state 
in Canada.”21 Some sponsors expressed the worry that “they” 
believed that social assistance was “a way of life” or theirs for 
the taking, and that sponsors thereby should count among 
their jobs ensuring as much as possible that refugees do not 
“go on welfare.” Regardless of whether sponsors believed that 
being financially self-sufficient was necessary to declaring 
the sponsorship a success, most advised against relying on 
social assistance unless it was essential, and, at least accord-
ing to the data, sponsors are generally successful in persuad-
ing refugees to avoid it. In the discussion section below, the 
reasons and implications of a sponsor focus on economic 
integration—and the pressure to encourage avoiding social 
assistance—will be considered in more detail.
In addition to employment, many sponsors connected 
independence to linguistic competence. One sponsor noted, 
“First of all language is a big thing, because obviously if they 
can’t communicate then they’ll never be independent.”22 
Another sponsor echoed this view: “To learn the language … 
that’s number one. That means they can become independent 
if they have the English language.” Every sponsor we spoke 
to understood that among their jobs was securing language 
education for refugees, noting its key role in securing self-suf-
ficiency among refugees. Some sponsor groups supported for-
mal language training by offering in-home additional tutoring, 
in one case by focusing specifically on language instruction 
appropriate to the employment desires and experiences of the 
refugees with whom they were working. The stories varied, 
but the motivation was the same: to encourage and support 
the learning of English (in our sample, only English) so that 
refugees could navigate Canadian life on their own.
Correspondingly, multiple sponsors reported anguish at 
navigating the challenges of month 13 precisely in terms of 
linguistic acquisition and competence. As sponsors reported, 
refugees overwhelmingly arrived with a desire to work as 
quickly as possible. These sponsors highlighted how often 
refugees worried about being burdens on Canada, since 
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the country had offered their family a new home in safety 
and security; they wanted to “repay” Canada as quickly as 
possible, and if not pay Canada back, at least not impose 
additional costs on Canada. Yet where refugees arrived with 
no competence in English, one year simply did not seem 
to be adequate to give them the base they needed to oper-
ate fully independently (of their sponsors) in Ottawa. In 
response, sponsors felt, refugees were forced into difficult 
choices. Many refugees who were able to access the labour 
market often preferred to abandon language classes, simply 
to ensure that they did not have to rely on social assistance. 
For many individuals—overwhelmingly but not exclusively 
men—after having secured safety for their families, after 
often traumatic and dangerous journeys, the thought of 
being unable to financially support families at month 13 was 
painful. In response, some sponsors focused on encouraging 
refugees to understand that they could make more and bet-
ter contributions if they chose to slow down and gain com-
petence in English before entering the labour market. Some 
sponsors, with additional capacity, opted for hybrid options 
in which they encouraged employment but continued offer-
ing (sometimes extensive) in-home tutoring in English.
Not all sponsors responded to questions about independ-
ence in terms of hard skills. Many others responded by point-
ing to attitudes or character traits that supported achieving 
self-sufficiency in new environments. Sponsors who answered 
questions about independence in this way were quick to point 
out that refugees had not only survived extensive trauma 
before arriving in Canada, but that they had survived this 
trauma without sponsor support. They described refugees 
as resilient in the face of significant trauma and change, and 
connected this resilience to the grace with which refugees 
responded to the challenges they faced in learning how to 
flourish in Canadian society. This approach was reflected in 
statements like the following: “We were very respectful of the 
fact that this family managed just fine in Syria without us.”23 
They were, said these sponsors, already independent in all the 
relevant ways, and described the sponsorship job in terms of 
guiding refugees towards understanding how to achieve their 
own objectives in Canada.
Some sponsors in this category referred to refugees who 
seemed to possess basic problem-solving skills that enabled 
them to confront and adapt to their new circumstances. Oth-
ers noted that the refugees they sponsored had an orientation 
that lent itself to coping with new circumstances—one noted 
with affection that the grandfather in the family simply went 
for extended walks, not worrying about whether he would 
get lost. One described this attitude as a “certain amount of 
get-up-and-go … you need to be motivated to go.”24 This sort 
of attitude facilitates the trajectory towards independence, 
explained many sponsors. Sponsors described refugees as 
“adaptable” or as willing to learn and incorporate the Cana-
dian “way of life.” Said one sponsor of the family she was 
working with, “They are the most resourceful, and adaptable, 
and flexible people imaginable. And I think they are going 
to do just fine.”25 Typically, sponsors who responded in this 
way noted that among the refugees with whom they worked, 
there was an orientation towards understanding how Cana-
dian society worked, and that this orientation propelled 
choices among them that would allow them to flourish in 
Canadian society specifically.
To take just one example: many sponsors appeared atten-
tive to gender norms and dynamics in operation in the 
families they had sponsored. Several sponsors noted the 
importance of encouraging both men and women to achieve 
linguistic competence, and especially highlighted the efforts 
they had made to ensure that especially mothers of young 
children were able to attend classes, detailing, for example, 
extensive cooperative babysitting they had provided until 
day-care spaces for young children became available. Many 
sponsors expressed the view that families in which men 
and women were willing to abandon relatively less egalitar-
ian gender relations in favour of integrating both women 
and men in a family, the better able the family seemed to 
be able to cope with the challenges of integration; sponsors 
understood this “abandonment” as evidence that refugees 
were taking on Canadian gender norms. One sponsoring 
group especially noted a new dad’s willingness to stay home 
with his baby while his wife attended language class; as they 
reminisced, they told a story of the panicked dad calling the 
sponsors to them the baby was crying, and to ask what he 
should do. The sponsors reassured him that the baby loved 
him, and that he should try various strategies for helping 
the baby to calm down. In their telling, as the baby’s mother 
was working to gain linguistic competence, a key element 
of independence, so too was the dad learning that he was 
capable of caring for his family in multiple ways.
Supporting the Development of Independence
When sponsors were asked how they supported the devel-
opment of independence among refugees, two consistent 
themes emerged. One theme centred upon how best to 
engage refugees in decision-making about critical issues, 
and another focused on how best to “help” refugees, when 
some ways of helping them were occasionally thought to 
threaten to undermine their own capacity-building in the 
longer term. Overshadowing these reflections is the obvi-
ous fact that sponsors simply do know more about how 
Canadian society operates, and what it takes to be success-
ful within it; moreover, it is of course the sponsors’ job to 
work towards securing the well-being of the refugees they 
have sponsored. This knowledge differential, along with the 
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felt pressure among sponsors to do their job well, can cre-
ate challenges as sponsors aim to support refugees who do 
need the information sponsors possess, but who often have 
distinct priorities about what is valuable and how to spend 
their time and money.
Correspondingly, one way in which sponsors supported 
the development of independence was via a focused attempt 
to involve refugees in as many major decisions as possible, 
such as about housing and educational trajectories. The for-
mer is especially meaningful, since there is some pressure 
on sponsors to ensure that accommodation is available upon 
the refugees’ arrival; yet many sponsors chose to offer tempo-
rary accommodation so that refugees could be more directly 
involved in selecting their “permanent” home.26 These 
sponsors thought of their job as providing refugees with the 
resources to make often complicated decisions among options 
available: “A lot of it is about your own decision-making—
having all the information that they need to be able to make 
the decisions they need for their lives.”27 Another sponsor 
noted of their sponsorship group, “We really tried to involve 
them in all the decision-making, everything we can.”28 The 
goal, as sponsors saw it, was to provide information about 
options, do what they could to ensure that information was 
adequately absorbed and understood, and then step back as 
refugees made decisions, such as to buy cars, to continue or 
halt language classes, to take or reject certain jobs.
Multiple sponsors noted distinct ways of supporting refu-
gees, hinting at a distinction between passive and active forms 
of support. Passive forms of support place refugees in the 
position of receiving help, at the whims of sponsors, whereas 
active forms of support involve sponsors attempting to create 
the conditions under which refugees could help themselves, 
in the present and also in the longer term.29 When, asked this 
sponsor, was it appropriate to respond to requests for “help” 
by refugees, such as with providing transportation to appoint-
ments, by saying, “OK, you’ve been to the doctor five times 
already, you know where it is,”30 or when just to stop offer-
ing transportation automatically? The answer is, of course, 
that sponsors must judge a range of factors, including the 
readiness of refugees to tackle day-to-day tasks like getting 
to appointments on their own, as well as the resources within 
the sponsor group to expend on such tasks.
One sponsor noted, for example, “I do think that it’s really 
important for the sponsors not to be too hands-on,”31 and 
another noted, “You are not doing them any favours by hold-
ing their hand too much.”32 The sentiment these statements 
reflect is that refugees were well served by sponsors who 
encouraged them to take on basic life tasks on their own, 
and quickly. One sponsor explicitly connected this orienta-
tion to independence: “From the outset, that was very much 
the goal, was for them to become independent. A lot of that 
for us meant not trying to do every little thing for them. 
Showing them how to do things rather than for them, and to 
help them find their way around with life in Canada.”33 Ulti-
mately, explained a sponsor, “at a certain point … you step 
away a little bit, so you can never let them feel lost and feel 
abandoned, but you step away in small bits and if you do it 
bit by bit…. You follow their lead, you check in with them.”34 
This approach can also backfire, as one sponsor explained, 
reflecting on their group’s decision to step back from the 
refugees they were supporting: “We just figured they would 
have to now step up and, you know, be more active in their 
own lives and in their decision-making. But unfortunately, 
they didn’t…. They felt as if our group had kind of aban-
doned them. And yet the intention of our group was to help 
them become more independent…. So that strategy didn’t 
work.”35
A frequently noted complication is that there are ways 
that sponsors can “help” refugees, which refugees would 
appreciate, but that according to some sponsors are better 
withheld; sometimes sponsors believed that the conscious 
choice to withhold certain forms of help that they could offer 
was more likely to support refugees in gaining independence 
in the longer term. This situation arose mainly with expendi-
tures, a complication that stems from the fact that, as spon-
sors repeatedly observed, they are often well-off financially, 
especially compared to the refugees they support.36 Add this 
to the general desire of sponsors to support refugees, and 
their genuine affection for them, and many sponsors felt that 
they were in the position to do favours for their refugees by 
buying them things they needed or wanted, and so on. But, 
noted many sponsors, this inclination can and sometimes 
did get in the way of refugees’ education about the real cost 
of living in Canada.
A single refugee’s income for one year is approximately 
$12,600, so careful budgeting is necessary.37 Sponsors noticed 
that refugees to Canada often had no experience with West-
ern banking systems and so were unfamiliar with bank 
accounts and machines, credit cards, the way interest works, 
and so on. For many, the fact that in Canada tax is added to 
the cost of items, at the cash register, is disconcerting. Addi-
tionally, as with any new arrival, the basic cost of items in 
Canada must be learned—for example, many were surprised 
that cellular service in Canada is much more expensive than 
in their countries of origin. Newly arrived refugees often 
appeared to feel overwhelmed by the choices that had to be 
made, relatively quickly after arrival. Correspondingly, many 
sponsors focused on making sure that refugees understood 
the cost of necessities. 
Yet, even as sponsors understood that their job was to 
provide information, many reported uncertainty and some-
times tension in describing how and when to intervene 
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where refugees deliberated options and made choices that to 
sponsors appeared financially irresponsible, especially in the 
choice to purchase cars, cigarettes, and other goods that they 
felt were unnecessary and perhaps frivolous. Car purchases 
was repeatedly mentioned as a tension point, focused upon 
how best to understand what does and does not support inde-
pendence in refugees. The frequent story was that a newly 
arrived family, generally with multiple children, expressed 
interest in buying a car. Overwhelmingly, sponsors expressed 
anxiety over this expression, citing what they viewed as the 
significant costs associated with such a purchase, suggesting 
that the family continue to make do with public transporta-
tion. Refugees’ budgets, they felt, could not accommodate the 
cost of a car; according to sponsors, the source of refugees’ 
inability to understand this was traced in part to their lack 
of financial literacy. Sponsors certainly recognized that these 
choices were the refugees’ choices to make, and correspond-
ingly that their job was to offer information and advice, some-
times strenuously, but nevertheless to support refugees even 
where their advice was not heeded. When asked about their 
felt need to encourage financial responsibility (according to 
their own understanding of it) in refugees, many sponsors 
pointed out that they had raised money from friends, col-
leagues, and (often) co-religionists, and felt an obligation 
to their donors to ensure that their donations were being 
used responsibly. Upon reflection, however, many spon-
sors acknowledged that the choice to purchase a car had in 
fact served refugees well; whereas the worry and hesitation 
stemmed from worries about financial stability, the result was 
relief on both sides of the equation, since refugees no longer 
needed to rely on sponsors to get around, and sponsors were 
free to use their valuable time to support refugees in other 
ways. What these reflections suggest is that the priorities of 
refugees and sponsors do not necessarily align, and moreover 
that (of course) refugees often have a better sense of what is in 
their best interests than do sponsors.
The Complexity of Attaining Independence
Multiple sponsors, prompted by questions about when refu-
gees achieved independence, noted that, even if it is in some 
sense the goal to achieve by month 13, it is gained gradually. 
Some explicitly, and others implicitly, rejected the idea that 
independence is achievable by month 13, saying something 
like “I wouldn’t see a natural association between sponsor-
ship and independence…. It could take years for a family to 
be fully independent, and sponsors can be an important part 
of supporting that. But I don’t think that is only sponsors 
who would have that role. And there are so many other ser-
vices, friends and other resources that play into that.”38 
When sponsors were asked to reflect on when (if at all) 
independence had been achieved, refugees were described in 
general as having made significant progress in getting by, day 
to day, and sponsors acknowledged that the sheer number 
of times that refugees called on them for support decreased 
over time. Many noticed that over the course of the sponsor-
ship year there was a gradual pulling away from sponsors 
(several noted that refugees returned to them regularly after 
the sponsorship year had completed for help in decipher-
ing government forms, including income taxes). Said one 
sponsor, “I think it’s like a bit of a scale.… In order to get 
there, there were so many different steps.”39 Another sponsor 
responded, “There were just many, many milestones. And 
there is no scale on 1 to 10. But they asked for help … less 
and less. They asked questions less and less.”40 Repeatedly 
sponsors noted that the first several months were intense, 
but that often things would start “rolling along” somewhere 
approximately half way through the sponsorship: “Certainly, 
we have seen them become more independent as the year 
went on.”41
Even so, several sponsors noted that, after all, one year 
had not been sufficient for the refugees with whom they 
worked to achieve full independence. One sponsor noted of 
independence at month 13, “It won’t mean necessarily that 
they can function entirely only their own. But one of the 
most basic things is that to promote independence is that 
they should be helped to know where to go if they need 
help.”42 Some noticed this as a matter of fact, as described 
above, that full integration into Canadian society for indi-
viduals who arrive with no competence in English simply is a 
longer-term venture than formal sponsorship timing admits. 
Others observed that even where refugees were financially 
self-sufficient, in the sense of employed adequately to cover 
their basic needs, this self-sufficiency did not seem adequate 
to declare that refugees were “flourishing.” One sponsor said 
of the refugees, “While I think they could stand on their own 
at the end of the year, I am not sure they would necessarily 
flourish.”43
Discussion
This research was conducted to gain some insight into how 
sponsors think of their objectives, especially in relation to 
“month 13.” Month 13 is the first month in which refugees are 
expected, in some sense, to be able to fend for themselves 
in Canadian society. As outlined in the introduction, the 
main change at month 13 is that, suddenly, sponsors are no 
longer responsible for supporting refugees financially. The 
strong implication, for sponsors and refugees alike, is that 
at this moment, refugees should be financially self-sufficient 
or on the road to financial self-sufficiency. This implication 
finds support in multiple sources, including in particular 
in the rhetoric invoked by government officials who aim to 
shore up support for refugee admissions and defend higher 
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admission numbers in terms of the financial contributions 
that refugees will ultimately make to Canadian society. 
Indeed, as outlined earlier, the economic contributions 
that immigrants of all kinds offer to Canada are repeatedly 
invoked as a justification for the high number of immigrants 
admitted, and are offered as an explanatory factor for why 
anti-immigrant sentiment has remained low in Canada even 
as immigration goes up.44
As a result, it is no surprise that sponsors are focused on 
achieving this objective, nor is it surprising to find that some 
sponsors express discomfort, and even disappointment, 
when refugees transition, not to financial self-sufficiency, 
but to social assistance. For some sponsors, certainly, a 
transition to social assistance felt like a kind of failure of the 
sponsorship venture: their job was to work with refugees to 
give them the tools they needed to be financially independ-
ent, but had not successfully done so. Some sponsors blamed 
refugees for failing to understand that being “dependent” 
on Canadian taxpayers was inappropriate or problematic 
in some way. Refugees, in this story, had somehow failed in 
their job to the Canadians who had supported them to find 
safety here; these refugees were portrayed as taking advan-
tage of Canadians and their generosity. Other sponsors took 
responsibility for the failure, saying that they had tried but 
failed to communicate that social assistance was a backup, 
which should be resorted to only in times of emergency. 
Some took responsibility partially, suggesting that there 
were cultural explanations for refugees’ preferences to rely 
on social assistance, so the failure was not that sponsors did 
not communicate the information, but that cultural biases 
among refugees remained so strong that they were not able 
to penetrate them. Even among those sponsors who noted 
that integration was gradual, the sense that financial inde-
pendence was the objective of sponsorship loomed large.
Only a handful of sponsors acknowledged familiarity 
with the normal trends that immigrants in general, and 
refugees specifically, follow during integration into Cana-
dian society.45 Data suggest that refugees are among the 
most likely to require social assistance support in the first 
several years after they arrive.46 Approximately 30 per cent 
of privately sponsored refugees do transition to social assis-
tance, either immediately at month 13 or later, and the mere 
fact of this transition to social assistance should not merit 
declaring the sponsorship a failure.47 Thus, the transition to 
social assistance should not be surprising or disappointing. 
Refugees are, first of all, not voluntary migrants, in the sense 
that they have been forced to flee and have not chosen to 
make their lives in a new and unfamiliar environment—in 
the Canadian case, the vast majority of migrants are entering 
to gain access to our robust labour market and the benefits it 
offers. Moreover, refugees have almost certainly experienced 
trauma that can reasonably be expected to affect their abil-
ity to attain self-sufficiency rapidly.48 Their objectives are 
not simply to get ahead as quickly as possible, but also to 
decompress in a safe and secure environment. Both factors, 
and undoubtedly more, explain why refugees may be slowed 
in their progress towards independence; that they have not 
achieved full “independence” in 13 months and are thereby 
more likely than other migrants (and Canadian citizens) to 
require social assistance support49 is neither unreasonable 
nor lamentable.
Space restrictions prohibit extensive consideration of the 
policy implications that flow from the research reported 
above. Moreover, the conclusions are one-sided, and with-
out corresponding contributions from sponsored refugees 
they are necessarily incomplete.50 Yet the results suggest 
that as the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citi-
zenship continues to search for ways to stimulate private 
sponsors to volunteer their time in support of refugees, it 
would do well to find ways to offer sponsors access to more 
nuanced information about trends among refugees and 
immigrants in gaining self-sufficiency. It is not that they 
should be counselled differently, away from encouraging 
refugees to focus on preparing to become self-sufficient; on 
the contrary, at least some evidence suggests one benefit of 
private sponsorship is that sponsored refugees are better 
(than their government-assisted counterparts) able to gain 
financial self-sufficiency.51 Yet no one is served if sponsors 
believe (mistakenly) that sponsorships are successful if and 
only if refugees are fully self-sufficient when it comes to its 
formal conclusion. Since their willingness to do this work is 
predicated, in part, on their belief that they can successfully 
support refugees, there is value in ensuring, among sponsors, 
that what “counts” as success is broadened. Although it is 
difficult for any individual sponsors to view their work as 
part of a larger Canadian resettlement project, the results of 
their individual labours of love suggest tremendous success 
that, if successfully mobilized, could be deployed to resettle 
even more refugees, and to support their transition to self-
sufficiency in Canada, than it has done in the past.
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Fostering Better Integration through  
Youth-Led Refugee Sponsorship
Carolyn McKee, Lee-Anne Lavell, Michelle Manks, and Ashley Korn
Abstract
World University Service of Canada (WUSC) participates 
in private sponsorship as a sponsorship agreement holder 
through its Student Refugee Program. More than ninety 
campus-based constituent groups known as WUSC Local 
Committees resettle approximately 130 refugee students to 
Canadian post-secondary institutions each year. This arti-
cle seeks to assess the effectiveness of the Student Refugee 
Program’s youth-to-youth sponsorship model in integrating 
former refugees into their receiving communities. We out-
line the impact of the Student Refugee Program upon its 
beneficiaries, the important role youth volunteers play in 
supporting their integration and building more welcoming 
communities for newcomers in Canada, and the effect of 
the program on receiving societies. We conclude with rec-
ommendations for scaling up the program in Canada and 
sharing the model internationally.
Résumé
Entraide universitaire mondiale du Canada prend part au 
parrainage privé en tant que Signataire d’entente de parrai-
nage à travers son Programme d’étudiantes et d’étudiants 
réfugiés. Plus de 90 comités locaux sur les campus réins-
tallent approximativement 130 étudiants réfugiés dans des 
institutions postsecondaires canadiennes chaque année. Cet 
article cherche à évaluer l’efficacité du modèle de parrai-
nage par et pour les jeunes du Programme d’étudiantes et 
d’étudiants réfugiés à intégrer d’anciens réfugiés dans leurs 
communautés de réception. Nous présentons l’impact du 
Programme d’étudiantes et d’étudiants réfugiés sur ses béné-
ficiaires, le rôle important que les jeunes bénévoles jouent 
afin de soutenir leur intégration et construire des commu-
nautés plus accueillantes pour les nouveaux arrivants au 
Canada, ainsi que l’effet du programme sur les universités 
d’accueil. En conclusion, nous présentons des recommanda-
tions pour améliorer le programme au Canada et partager 
le modèle à l’international.
Introduction
In recent years, the global refugee crisis has pushed public discourse on refugee and migrant issues into the spot-light in Canada and around the world. Since 2015, more 
than 107,245 refugees were resettled to Canada through dif-
ferent channels.1 Refugees are resettled to Canada directly 
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from overseas contexts2 through three programs: the 
Government Assisted Refugees Program, the Blended Visa 
Office–Referred Program, and the Private Sponsorship of 
Refugees Program (PSRP).3 This article will focus on the last.
The PSRP provides an opportunity for Canadians and per-
manent residents to become actively involved in the reset-
tlement of refugees. The program is a partnership between 
the government of Canada, the government of Quebec, and 
groups that decide to offer sponsorship to a refugee or refu-
gees. These groups include faith-based groups, groups of five 
or more individuals, or community associations. Under the 
PSRP, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) 
facilitates refugees’ arrival in Canada, and private sponsors 
provide the individuals with housing, financial support, and 
settlement assistance for their first year of residence in Can-
ada. Organizations can hold agreements with IRCC to allow 
other groups to sponsor on their behalf. These organiza-
tions are called sponsorship agreement holders (SAHs), and 
the subgroups are known as constituent groups. SAHs are 
responsible for selecting their constituent groups, submit-
ting immigration paperwork to IRCC, and guiding and sup-
porting their constituent groups to provide quality integra-
tion support to refugees. The SAH and constituent groups are 
jointly responsible for the emotional and financial support of 
the refugees resettled under their agreements. 
World University Service of Canada (WUSC) is a SAH that 
supports more than ninety campus-based constituent groups, 
known as WUSC Local Committees, to resettle approximately 
130 refugee students to Canadian post-secondary institu-
tions annually. Student members of local committees with 
support from faculty and staff (all referred to as local com-
mittee members) provide integration support to Student 
Refugee Program beneficiaries (the refugee students who are 
resettled to Canada through the program) and work to build 
more welcoming communities for newcomers by organizing 
public engagement activities on their campuses.
This article has a dual purpose: to assess the effectiveness 
of the Student Refugee Program’s youth-to-youth sponsorship 
model in integrating former refugees into their receiving com-
munities, and to share lessons learned and policy implications.4 
We outline the impact of the Student Refugee Program upon 
its beneficiaries, and the important role youth volunteers play 
in supporting the integration process and in helping to build 
more welcoming communities for newcomers in Canada. 
The evidence that supports this article’s conclusions is 
drawn from a case study on groups of Student Refugee Pro-
gram beneficiaries, local committee members, and alumni 
of both groups. Data were collected using a mixed methods 
approach: questionnaires, focus group discussions, and key 
informant interviews. This article will include a review of 
the literature on holistic newcomer integration and youth 
leadership in global issues, followed by a presentation of 
our methods and results. The discussion includes analysis 
of the results of the study in relation to the impact of the 
program on its beneficiaries and youth volunteers, as well as 
the broader community. Finally, we will share WUSC’s plans 
to scale up the program in Canada and recommendations for 
other countries and refugee resettlement programs regard-
ing youth involvement in supporting the integration of reset-
tled youth with a refugee background (herein referred to as 
refugee youth). 
Holistic Integration of Newcomers
While refugees resettled to Canada arrive in safer environ-
ments than their home contexts, they face challenges upon 
settlement and throughout the integration process in Can-
ada. Language proficiency in French or English is a primary 
challenge for newly arrived refugees, which is a barrier to 
obtaining appropriate employment, navigating the educa-
tion systems and accessing higher education, and building 
social bridges within Canadian communities. 
Holistic Integration Model
Over the past decade, researchers in Canada have focused 
primarily on the more traditional economic markers of “suc-
cessful” integration such as type of employment, income, 
and poverty levels; however, there is a growing need to 
demonstrate the importance and role of social and systemic 
factors that influence overall integration success of refugee 
populations. In addition, there is a need to better understand 
the role that receiving communities play in creating welcom-
ing and responsive communities to meet the needs of diverse 
refugee groups. Yu, Ouellet, and Warmington defined refu-
gee integration as a “dynamic, multi-faceted two-way pro-
cess which requires adaptation on the part of the newcomers, 
but also the society of the destination” on social, functional, 
and psychological levels.5 Ager and Strang built on this idea 
by developing the social integration model, which pushed 
the discourse beyond objective material markers to include 
other variables related to socio-economic context, such as 
language, culture and knowledge, and safety and security.6 
While this model further refined past theories of refugee 
integration, it was limited in that it did not include refugees’ 
sense of belonging to their new communities, institutional 
adaptation to refugee needs, or the holistic nature of the 
integration process. 
Hynie, Korn, and Tao refined Ager and Strang’s model to 
create the holistic integration model (figure 1).7 This model 
showcases how each of the factors relevant for strong inte-
gration found in Ager and Strang’s theory (i.e., citizenship, 
language and cultural knowledge, safety and stability, social 
bonds, bridges and links, housing, education, employment, 
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and health) are interdependent. These factors are grouped 
into three main categories: social identity (social con-
nections, community welcome, institutional adaptation); 
personal history (language, culture, functional); and socio-
economic context (sense of belonging, safety, and security). 
Hynie, Korn, and Tao emphasize the essential role of the 
receiving communities and explain the interdependence of 
these categories as “the extent to which agencies, institutions, 
and communities accommodate refugee needs … facilitate 
the functional aspects of integration [and] also create a feel-
ing of welcome, thus affecting the integration process at the 
social and subjective, as well as functional levels.”8 
The holistic integration model suggests that although ref-
ugees are required to build their skills and knowledge of the 
receiving community, such as language and socio-cultural 
practices, the receiving community must also support 
changes within institutions, systems, and social attitudes 
to accommodate refugee needs and experiences in order to 
achieve effective integration.9
The Role of Youth: Integrating Refugees and 
Building Welcoming Communities 
The Student Refugee Program (SRP) is the only known youth-
to-youth refugee sponsorship model, attracting global atten-
tion. As such, the effect of youth-to-youth sponsorship on 
both refugee integration and youth sponsors themselves is 
an emerging topic of study. Despite this gap in the litera-
ture, we can draw on the broader research conducted on the 
role that youth can play as leaders in their communities to 
effect change. From this research we know that youth can be 
agents of positive and constructive change for global issues. 
A United Nations subgroup states that youth can be innova-
tors and active citizens, and argues that their activities are 
integral to building peaceful communities for all.10
The SRP engages a particular segment of youth: post-sec-
ondary students. Although there is no research on student-
to-student refugee integration, the research on student-
to-student mentorship for international students provides 
relevant evidence to draw from, despite the differences in 
experiences between international students and students 
with a refugee background. International students have cho-
sen to leave their home country to study, may have social 
connections in their country of study, and have access to 
family networks and resources to fund their studies. Refugee 
experiences are grounded in fleeing conflict or persecution, 
and refugees often arrive in their country of resettlement 
with little to no financial capital and limited social networks. 
However, research on international students’ experiences in 
their adaptation to their places of study within the country 
and local communities is relevant. 
Shakya et al. found that newcomer students who have 
not received timely orientation and guidance can experi-
ence “confusion and misdirection” in their academic path.11 
According to the United Nations report on youth and 
migration, when international students are well oriented 
to their academic institutions, they can have more positive 
academic and integration experiences: “Research has shown 
that international students provided with an initial orienta-
tion by their educational institutions tend to be much bet-
ter prepared for their foreign academic experience and life 
abroad. Such support can make a critical difference to their 
adjustment to unfamiliar surroundings. A student migrant 
who feels disoriented or unwelcome is likely to have diffi-
culty learning and is more vulnerable to risks within a new 
community.”12
Not only are orientations important to international 
student success, but research has also shown that student-
to-student mentorship schemes are particularly effective. 
Such schemes “have been found to aid social adjustment or 
enhance social support, improve academic achievement, and 
increase utilization of university services including counsel-
ling services” for international students.13 Thomson and 
Esses found that their mentorship pilot program resulted in 
improved socio-cultural and psychological adaptation for 
international students.14 
WUSC’s Student Refugee Program: A Youth-to-
Youth Sponsorship Model
While many countries are developing community sponsor-
ship programs, education schemes, and other forms of com-
plementary pathways for refugees, WUSC’s SRP is the only 
program that combines resettlement with higher education. 
Figure 1. Holistic integration model
Volume 35 Refuge Number  2
77
WUSC Local Committees secure the funds required and 
support the integration of the refugee students upon their 
arrival. In addition to providing initial settlement and inte-
gration support to refugees on their campuses, local com-
mittee members also build more welcoming communities 
for newcomers by engaging their personal networks and the 
public on their campuses and in their communities through 
awareness-raising activities. 
The SRP has two ultimate objectives: to help refugee stu-
dents make meaningful contributions to their communities 
(locally and globally) and secure better lives for themselves 
and their families; and to build more welcoming communi-
ties for newcomers in Canada. For the SRP, more welcoming 
communities are aware of and responsive to refugee needs by 
adapting programs and policies to reduce barriers for refu-
gees and newcomers, and create a sense of safety and belong-
ing for newcomers. Students on local committees are par-
ticularly well placed to achieve these objectives. Their ability 
to provide comprehensive student-to-student academic and 
social support to SRP beneficiaries can help refugee students 
feel more welcome on campus and enable them to access the 
resources they need to improve their learning outcomes. 
The SRP’s student-to-student model provides a platform 
for engagement with other actors on campus, including 
administrators, faculty, and students outside the local com-
mittee. Local committees advocate for SRP beneficiaries’ 
admittance to their post-secondary institutions by working 
closely with institutions’ admissions offices and requesting 
flexibility on their admissibility requirements. By explaining 
the extenuating circumstances surrounding refugee students’ 
documentation and language test scores, for example, local 
committees expose admissions offices to the unique needs 
and experiences of refugee students. 
Another primary role of local committees is to engage the 
student body on their campuses on refugee issues, which 
in turn contributes to the financial sustainability of the 
program. Local committees leverage a sustainable funding 
mechanism unique to post-secondary institutions: the stu-
dent levy. Student levies are small fees applied to the tuition 
and administrative fees of each student who attends a given 
institution. The SRP on campuses collects a levy from over 
one million Canadian students per year at an average of three 
dollars per student per year. This indirectly engages all con-
tributing students in the SRP. Local committees also directly 
engage these students by running referendum campaigns to 
implement and increase the levy amounts and “thank you” 
campaigns for students’ levy contribution on their campuses, 
to raise awareness about the levy and its impact on the lives 
of refugee youth on campus, along with other awareness-
raising initiatives each school year.
Methods
In 2017 WUSC began to pursue an impact study as a follow-
up to a study that was completed in 2007. One survey was 
designed and disseminated by WUSC to SRP beneficiaries 
to collect information on their educational pursuits and 
experiences, as well as their social and economic outcomes 
following their participation in the sponsorship program. 
WUSC also surveyed local committee members and alumni 
about their experiences with WUSC and the SRP specifically, 
and whether their participation in the program affected their 
civic engagement, their academic or career paths, or their 
long-term engagement on refugee issues. The surveys com-
prised multiple choice and Likert scale questions. WUSC then 
contracted third party consultants to gain further insight on 
the findings through qualitative interviews (in the form of 
focus group discussions and key informant interviews) with 
program beneficiaries in February 2018.
The main objectives of the study were twofold: to assess 
the impact of the SRP on its beneficiaries with respect to their 
settlement and integration and what factors contribute to 
positive outcomes; and to assess the impact of the program 
on the local committee members and alumni on Canadian 
campuses, related to their role as private sponsors, and the 
impact their participation has had on their personal, profes-
sional, and academic paths and networks.
Phase I: Impact Surveys
The surveys gathered quantitative data on the impact of the 
program on SRP beneficiaries and local committee members 
and alumni. The survey study population comprised two 
groups. 
SRP beneficiaries were university students who arrived 
in 2013 or earlier, and college/CEGEP students who arrived 
in 2014 or earlier (N  =  192). The rationale for focusing on 
these respondents was that the majority of respondents who 
arrived in these years or earlier would have graduated at the 
time the survey was conducted in spring 2017. 
Approximately 770 people were contacted to fill out the 
survey. Respondents numbered 250 and 192 gave complete 
responses. The response rate was approximately 34%. More 
than 1,800 SRP students have participated in the program 
from its inception in 1978 until 2017, therefore about 10% of 
all program participants between 1978 and 2017 fully com-
pleted the survey.
Local committee members and alumni were students, staff, 
and faculty members who have been members of a local 
committee (N = 135). 
Approximately 4,100 people were contacted to fill out the 
survey. Respondents numbered 265 and 135 gave complete 
responses. The response rate was therefore approximately 6.6%.
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Participants from both populations were recruited for the 
study via the program database e-mail contact list, social 
media, and through word of mouth. The sample was not 
representative, as all prospective study participants were 
contacted based on the availability of their current contact 
information, and not according to a probability sampling 
technique. All alumni that fit the criteria of the study 
were asked to fill out the survey. Due to an incomplete list 
of alumni contact information in the program database, 
response rates were low. 
Phase II: Focus Groups and Key Informant Interviews
Qualitative approaches, including individual interviews and 
focus groups, were used to examine and better understand 
findings from the survey data analyses. A letter of invitation 
was emailed to all the SRP beneficiaries and local commit-
tee members and alumni that WUSC had on file. Twenty-one 
individual interviews and one focus group with four partici-
pants were conducted with SRP beneficiaries. Sampling cri-
teria included gender, university and college/CEGEP alumni, 
region of sponsorship, and current location. The majority of 
interview respondents had been in Canada for less than five 
years. 
Eight individual interviews and one focus group with four 
participants were conducted with local committee members 
and alumni. Efforts were made to select participants who 
reflected different roles on the committee, type/size of insti-
tution, language, and location. Of the twelve local commit-
tee members and alumni who participated in the interviews, 
eight participants were students and four were faculty or 
staff at the time of their involvement. 
Individuals took part in a semi-structured interview or 
a focus group. All interviews were conducted in English, 
except for one conducted in French. The interviews were 
conducted over the phone and were recorded. Each inter-
view lasted from forty-five to sixty minutes. The focus group 
was conducted using a teleconference line allowing for mul-
tiple participants. 
WUSC and the consultants developed an interview guide 
in keeping with a grounded theory approach. The interview 
guide questions highlighted the experiences of the SRP ben-
eficiaries and gathered information about their objective and 
subjective integration outcomes. A research assistant sup-
ported the coordination, delivery, and transcription of the 
interviews. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Axial coding was used to identify themes and codes related 
to participants’ experiences. 
Strengths and Limitations
A case study approach was used, which did not allow for the 
collection of data that could be extrapolated to a larger pop-
ulation. As discussed above, the survey response rates were 
low and the sample was not representative of the population 
of program participants. 
Response bias is another potential limitation of the study: 
for example, participants may have framed their experiences 
with the SRP in a positive light because the program helped 
them in the past. Alternatively, it is possible that participants 
felt they could share their experiences even if they were 
negative, as a result of their trust in and comfort with WUSC, 
and the amount of time that had passed for some individuals 
since taking part in the program.
The sample may have been biased because it may have not 
have included the population of SRP beneficiaries who are 
not doing as well. The study was conducted anonymously, 
and limited demographic information was collected, so it 
was difficult to uncover trends within the sample. The rea-
son for this approach was to ensure that participants felt 
comfortable providing feedback about the program while 
remaining anonymous, thus supporting the participation of 
as many respondents as possible. 
Despite these limitations, the strength of a case study 
approach is its ability to provide an in-depth exploration of 
a topic: in this case, participants’ experiences with the SRP. 
Although the data are not generalizable to a larger popula-
tion, they provide insight into the program’s impact on this 
Table 1. SRP respondent demographics
Gender breakdown 139 male, 52 female, 1 prefers 
not to say
Year of arrival in Canada 
by decade
1980s (9), 1990s (21), 2000s (87), 
2010–14 (75)
Province of sponsoring 
institution
BC (27), AB (6), SK (16), MB (13), 
ON (92), QC (13), NS (21), NB (1), 
PEI (1), NL (2)
Table 2. Local committee respondent 
demographics
Gender breakdown 94 female, 44 male, 3 prefer not 
to say
Year of participation 
on local committee by 
decade
Before 1980 (1), 1980s (1), 1990s 
(5), 2000s (40), 2010–17 (87), no 
answer (1)
Member type Student (102), staff/ faculty (31), 
no answer (2)
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small group of individuals. The study also highlights areas 
for further research on the integration experiences of reset-
tled refugees in Canada (discussed in the Conclusion). 
Results: SRP Beneficiaries
Completion of Education 
The results of the case study show that 94% of surveyed SRP 
beneficiaries completed a degree after their arrival in Canada, 
and 80% completed their degree at their original sponsoring 
institution. Few (11%) study participants experienced inter-
ruptions in their studies after arrival in Canada, with 64% of 
those who did experience an interruption returning to their 
studies later. Key barriers associated with interruptions to 
study included the cost of living, cost of studies, family obli-
gations, or illness. Among the survey respondents, 55% had 
pursued or are pursuing further education beyond their first 
studies completed in Canada. 
Access to Employment Opportunities and Skills 
Development
The interviews with SRP beneficiaries indicate there is a con-
nection between education and employment outcomes. 
Education … gives me the job I have now [and] the freedom and 
power and mindset to have everything that I have. In a big way. 
—SRP beneficiary, interview 
Two-thirds of respondents indicated they are satisfied 
with their jobs, with job satisfaction increasing in relation to 
the number of years spent in Canada. As seen in figure 2, the 
majority of SRP respondents who arrived in Canada ten or 
more years ago are satisfied with their jobs.
The case study also revealed, through the qualitative inter-
views, that local committee members were key to connecting 
SRP beneficiaries to job opportunities on and off campus, and 
thus contributed to their later employment outcomes: 
It was helpful. I was working at the library of the university. The 
members of WUSC were instrumental in helping me get that job. I 
told them that I wanted a job and they went around and basically 
got me a job at the library. It was very helpful, a lot of customer 
service helping students at the university. The skills that I got in that 
first job were transferable to all of my other jobs. —SRP beneficiary, 
interview
When I was at school the local committee found me my first job 
in Canada at the college library…. [From] second semester until 
graduation I worked there. I gained experience in all areas, espe-
cially language…. [My] English was not that good. So the more 
exposure to students, it boosted my language … I made so many 
connections through my campus job. I had a lot of friends, and I 
was making money. —SRP beneficiary, interview
A common theme among the SRP beneficiary interviews 
is the importance of networking and social and profes-
sional connections for their integration. Local committees 
connecting SRP beneficiaries with jobs on campus, helpful 
references from professors when applying to postgraduate 
education programs, and the sponsoring community’s role 
in contributing to a strong sense of belonging were some of 
the examples provided by interview respondents.
Sense of Belonging and Navigating Services 
Seventy per cent of SRP beneficiaries who responded to 
the survey reported a strong sense of belonging to Canada 
overall, as well as their family (87%), city (81%), ethnic com-
munity (69%), and neighbourhood (69%). 
I feel part of the general community. I am a citizen now. I feel … 
that I belong somewhere. It makes me feel proud. I feel real belong-
ing. —SRP beneficiary, interview
SRP was a foundation—having that first family that show you every-
thing you need to know…. That was my foundation. I had a family 
that loved me … [and] helped to get into bigger Canadian setting. 
—SRP beneficiary, interview
Interview participants indicated they feel “at home” where 
they live and are “proud Canadians”; many attributed this 
feeling to the support of their local committee when they 
first arrived, as well as connections to community. 
Students who were resettled in small communities felt a 
sense of belonging even where their ethnic community was 
largely absent. Overall, respondents reported that the social 
support of members of their ethnic community and former 
SRP students with a similar lived experience contributed 
to their safe and supportive transition to Canadian society. 
There was evidence of bridges and bonds built, as respond-
ents reported strong friendships both within and outside of 
their ethnic communities. SRP beneficiaries overwhelmingly 
(92%) describe Canadians as “welcoming and accepting.” 
While many SRP beneficiaries reported in interviews that 
they had experienced homesickness and missed their fami-
lies, many were also able to build family-like relationships in 
Canada with their sponsoring community. Some interview 
participants described long-term friendships with those 
they referred to as their “Canadian parents” (families who 
had supported them since their arrival in Canada). Even 
after moving across the country, some respondents make 
annual trips to their original city of residence in Canada to 
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Figure 2. SRP beneficiaries’ job satisfaction according to the number of years 
spent in Canada
Figure 3. SRP beneficiaries’ sense of belonging
visit their first friend and family networks. They expressed 
deep gratitude for the openness and support provided, par-
ticularly during their initial settlement: 
My initial contact was the local committee. Some of these people 
became friends throughout university.… The [local committee] 
coordinator became a main support.… In my third year I actually 
moved into her house. She became like a mother figure.… The last 
two years I stayed at her place.… I still stay in touch with her.… 
She’s Canadian white, we’re different in all aspects, but we’re still 
connected. There are some amazing people in a small town that 
you can connect with more than in a bigger city. —SRP beneficiary, 
interview
I feel like I absolutely belong. I do belong here. It’s my home.… I 
don’t think there is any freedom anywhere like in Canada.… WUSC 
connected me with two boys from [my country of asylum] in [my 
city of resettlement], and they were like brothers for me. They 
took me into the mosque. The local community takes you in and 
welcomes you. The community … feels like a different country. My 
friends are from all over the world. I met them through work and 
school. —SRP beneficiary, interview
The majority (87%) of SRP beneficiaries who responded 
to the survey feel that they have adapted to Canadian soci-
ety. A further 82% feel accepted and 80% feel respected in 
their community. However, approximately two-thirds of 
survey respondents indicated they have experienced and/or 
witnessed racism while in Canada. One-quarter of interview 
respondents reported experiences of discrimination due to 
their immigrant status, race, religion, name, accent, and in 
some cases gender. This was specifically related to experi-
ences searching for employment in their communities. The 
role of local committee members is to support students 
while they navigate and overcome these experiences and 
challenges during the sponsorship. The interview data illus-
trate that local committee members contribute to creating 
a welcoming environment, but this does not prevent SRP 
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beneficiaries from experiencing discrimination similar to 
other immigrant groups.
Interview participants overwhelmingly expressed a 
desire to “give back to the community” after their sponsor-
ship, either with time or financial contributions. Some are 
involved in charity work through their churches, and/or 
supported youth-serving or immigrant-centred agencies 
and NGOs. Other SRP beneficiaries are active in charity work 
within their ethnic communities, in Canada and back home, 
while still others are part of broader community engagement.
I spent last night watching Canadian women’s hockey and stayed 
awake until 1:30 a.m. I feel connected to the community and coun-
try. I feel connected to the politics at the provincial and federal level 
elections. I follow everything. I accepted that it is my home and 
to stay here and experience everything Canadians experience.… I 
voted and participated in elections—federal, provincial, munici-
pal.… If you want to change things, you can’t just ignore, you have 
to be heard to have an impact. I think after almost six years in [city 
of residence], I feel a connection. This is my city.”—SRP beneficiary, 
interview
When I was at university I used to volunteer at [the] hospital. I vol-
unteered at so many places.… I feel like I’m part of a community. 
—SRP beneficiary, interview
When I was a student I volunteered. It contributed to a sense of 
belonging.… I have the freedom to vote in an election. An incred-
ible experience to choose your leader.… You will learn to appreciate 
every single day you spend here. —SRP beneficiary, interview
The above examples show the diverse ways in which SRP 
beneficiaries have involved themselves in the community, 
from voting in elections to volunteering. Many prioritized 
volunteering even during their studies, and it made them 
feel a sense of belonging to their community. 
Results: Local Committee Members
Academic and Career Path
More than half (57%) of survey respondents who were stu-
dents when they were on a local committee indicated that 
they felt that being on the committee influenced their deci-
sion to pursue courses related to global issues. A further 
77% reported that their overall academic experience was 
improved by their involvement on a local committee. 
Ultimately it ignited my passion to pursue a career in immigration 
and newcomer settlement. I did a master’s in immigration settle-
ment. I am an English teacher. It has played a part in all areas of 
my life. It has lasting impact in what I do today. —Local committee 
alumnus
Not only did being part of a local committee affect their 
academic experience while on the committee; 40% also indi-
cated it influenced their decision to pursue additional studies. 
Involvement on a local committee also affected 57% of stu-
dents’ career paths. Local committee members demonstrate 
sustained engagement in refugee issues in their personal and 
professional lives, as is evident below.
Continued Involvement in Newcomer Issues
The majority (77%) of local committee members and alumni 
who responded to the survey remained connected with SRP 
students, indicating that strong relationships were built 
among the students during (or in some cases outside) the 
sponsorship. Local committee members and alumni have 
also been involved (29%) or somewhat involved (14%) in sup-
porting refugee and newcomer settlement and integration 
beyond their work with the SRP. Of survey respondents who 
voted in elections, 98% indicated that policies that promote 
the protection, inclusion, and integration of refugees inform 
how they vote. All local committee respondents indicated 
they have volunteered or worked at settlement agencies, 
community centres, libraries, and mentorship programs that 
connected them directly to newcomers. 
I am an advocate in immigrant/refugee issues [and] I am involved 
with the asylum seekers in Manitoba. —Local committee alumnus
Approximately 20% of local committee members who 
responded to the survey reported that they are or had been 
part of a group that participated in private sponsorship of 
refugees outside the SRP. For example, one interview partici-
pant was part of a Group of Five working to sponsor Syrian 
refugees. In addition, one in four respondents indicated that 
they have worked to support the inclusion of newcomers 
in the workplace or the broader labour market. More than 
twenty examples of these efforts were described by respond-
ents, including hiring former refugees or recommending 
them to their employers, providing language instruction, 
helping with résumés, creating clubs and social events aimed 
at inclusivity, and more. 
Results: Broader Canadian Community
Local committee members and alumni are having an impact 
on their community by voting in elections and volunteer-
ing in newcomer programs. They also work to influence 
their professional and social networks to be more aware 
and knowledgeable of refugee issues and needs. Local com-
mittee members and alumni reported increased awareness 
about forced migration issues from their efforts to engage 
their broader networks. This is evident in figure 4, where 
respondents indicated they had increased awareness of 
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forced migration in the networks of friends (81%), family 
(72%), classmates (54%), co-workers (47%), and faith groups 
(11%). 
As demonstrated in the holistic integration model (figure 
1), mutual adaptation to the needs and experiences of refugee 
populations by receiving communities is essential to building 
welcoming environments for refugee populations. Local com-
mittee members and alumni across Canada are strengthen-
ing public awareness of and engagement in forced migration 
issues among their personal and professional networks, thus 
contributing to building a mutually adaptive society. 
Discussion
Impact on Program Beneficiaries
The results of this study show that a youth-to-youth spon-
sorship model can effectively integrate refugees socially and 
economically into Canadian society. The findings illustrate 
that the program model contributes to the creation of more 
welcoming communities, through awareness-raising activi-
ties and the trickle-down effect from local committee mem-
bers’ broader networks.
Resettling refugee youth in Canadian post-secondary insti-
tutions reduces many barriers to integration faced by other 
refugee youth, such as providing access to education, language 
training, and employment opportunities. It is important to 
acknowledge that SRP beneficiaries begin their integration at 
a place different from other refugees arriving in Canada. To 
be eligible for the program they have strong language skills in 
English or French, have completed secondary education, have 
access to some academic documentation, and are immedi-
ately enrolled in Canadian post-secondary institutions as part 
of the program. As shown by the holistic integration model, 
this would affect their ability to integrate quickly.
The study results demonstrate the interconnectedness of 
integration outcomes for refugees that can lead to positive 
integration experiences, as illustrated in the holistic integra-
tion model. Local committee members support SRP ben-
eficiaries academically, helping them navigate the education 
system and access on-campus academic support services. 
The findings reveal the positive outcomes of this support: 
the majority of SRP beneficiary survey respondents com-
pleted their degrees in Canada, and more than half pursued 
additional education at universities and colleges in Canada. 
According to the interviews with SRP beneficiaries, academic 
success and local committee support contributed to access-
ing satisfying employment at different stages of their career. 
Many SRP beneficiaries found their first jobs on campus with 
the support of the local committee members. These first jobs 
helped build Canadian experience on students’ resumés, 
improved their language skills, and connected them to other 
employment opportunities and networks. 
Having skills, tools, and networks upon arrival and 
early on in the integration process supports refugee youth 
to achieve positive integration outcomes, including feeling 
a sense of belonging to their receiving communities. SRP-
beneficiaries described local committees as their “Canadian 
family” who played a key role in making them feel welcome 
in their community, particularly in the first months. This 
sense of belonging is also reflected by the fact that many SRP 
beneficiaries felt the desire to “give back” to their communi-
ties through volunteer and financial efforts.
Impact on Communities
Early engagement of local committee members with new-
comers and the issues they face leads to long-term involve-
ment through work, volunteer, and civic efforts to support 





Increased awareness among Local Committee 
alumni networks
Figure 4. Increased awareness among local committee alumni networks
Volume 35 Refuge Number  2
83
newcomer integration in their communities, including 
influencing their voting considerations in elections. Their 
participation also influences their choices in working and 
volunteering with newcomer programs and sponsoring refu-
gees beyond the SRP. The SRP provides opportunities for new 
youth volunteers to get involved each year as new students 
begin their studies at post-secondary institutions.
As discussed in the literature review, youth are uniquely 
positioned as innovative leaders who can mobilize their 
peers and community on global issues. While youth in local 
committees are directly involved in and transformed by 
refugee sponsorship through the SRP, this impact extends 
beyond the local committee members. As local commit-
tee members engage their communities through events on 
campus and provide integration support to SRP beneficiaries, 
the wider community becomes more aware of refugee issues 
and how they can support newcomers. This is demonstrated 
through the institutional adaptation seen in refugee student 
admissions at receiving institutions. Local committee efforts 
are directly reducing barriers and making post-secondary 
communities more aware of the barriers while offering solu-
tions to overcome them. These students go on to inform 
more institutional adaptation, as they engage their places of 
employment, family, friends, and other personal networks. 
Lessons Learned and Further Research
WUSC’s model of combining education and youth-to-youth 
refugee integration aims to achieve the objectives of the 
holistic integration model as outlined by Hynie, Korn, and 
Tao. The quantitative and qualitative results of the case study 
show that the SRP addresses many of the desired outcomes 
outlined in the holistic integration model to ensure that 
resettled refugees can start their new lives in Canada with a 
strong foundation, leading to positive long-term integration. 
Although selection criteria of the program may also contrib-
ute to successful integration, it is clear that youth-to-youth 
model enhances integration and creates more welcoming 
communities as a result of the work of local committees to 
engage their peers and communities on and off campus. 
Personal experiences with refugee sponsorship can have 
a positive impact upon perceptions of those working with 
refugees through the SRP. These experiences often result in 
local committee youth’s long-term commitment to global 
issues and acting as change agents to create more welcoming 
communities. In addition, raising awareness builds welcom-
ing communities among the campus and community stake-
holders surrounding the sponsoring group. Further study 
is required to explore if there is an impact on the broader 
networks of local committee members and alumni, through 
changes in behaviours, perceptions, and actions related to 
reducing barriers for refugees and newcomers in Canada, 
and engagement in other forced migration issues. 
Further research on refugee integration is also needed, 
particularly on the peer-to-peer refugee integration models 
that connect refugees and sponsors based on identity fac-
tors such as LGBTQ identities. As more research is done in 
Canada that applies the holistic integration model for reset-
tled refugee groups, it is imperative that this research focuses 
on whether youth-to-youth or peer-to-peer sponsorship 
models would result in more effective integration and build 
adaptive receiving communities. In addition, research com-
paring the SRP to other models in private sponsorship would 
be helpful to better contextualize the program’s strengths 
and areas for improvement. More research needs to be 
done on welcoming communities: how they are created, SRP 
beneficiaries’ experiences in these communities (including 
experiences of racism and how local committees can sup-
port students to navigate these experiences), and the role of 
community engagement on societal and institutional change. 
The SRP plans to strengthen its capacity to monitor more lon-
gitudinal outcomes of the program on the stakeholders and 
beneficiaries, as well as broader Canadian communities. 
Overall, the research conducted on the SRP has elucidated 
some lessons about youth leadership in refugee integration. 
We know that local committee members play a key role in 
supporting SRP beneficiaries to navigate academic and on-
campus systems that help them begin their academic career 
positively and contribute to their completion of their educa-
tion. Local committee members also support SRP beneficiar-
ies’ access to employment by connecting them to their first 
jobs on campus and to different networks on and off campus 
to build experience on their new Canadian resumés, which 
links to later employability. In many cases, local committee 
members form strong bonds with SRP beneficiaries, as they 
are the first to welcome them to their new community and 
are of a similar age group. This contributes to SRP benefi-
ciaries’ later sense of belonging to their communities. Local 
committee members also demonstrate long-term engage-
ment in refugee and global issues through their voting prac-
tices, volunteer work, and advocacy for newcomers in their 
workplaces. As a result of these lessons, WUSC recommends 
that other refugee sponsorship groups consider implement-
ing a youth-to-youth or peer-to-peer model. 
Future Directions for the SRP
While the SRP is a successful model of refugee integration in 
Canada and reaches thousands of Canadians each year, either 
directly or through public engagement events, the number 
of refugees resettled (130 per year) is small relative to global 
need. WUSC is reaching out to new post-secondary partners 
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in college and CEGEP networks to provide more placements 
for refugee students, while supporting long-time partner 
institutions to sponsor more students. Colleges and CEGEPs 
provide unique opportunities for students to access language 
programs, flexible admissions requirements, and often faster 
pathways to employment after completion. Between 2017 
and 2019, WUSC welcomed an additional twenty-two institu-
tions to its network, offering thirty-nine new placements for 
refugee students. 
With the success of the SRP model in Canada, WUSC is also 
sharing the model internationally, as other countries develop 
education and resettlement schemes in commitment to new 
principles for refugee protection and integration. The United 
Nations Global Compact on Refugees, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in December 2018, outlines commitments 
to several principles that are well aligned with the SRP. The 
document emphasizes “a multi-stakeholder and partnership 
approach” that includes refugee and receiving community 
members, development actors, cities, public-private partner-
ships, and academic networks, among others.15 The SRP is 
compatible with this “whole of society” approach to refugee 
protection and education, and thus engages all of these actors, 
often through the work of young local committee members. 
The compact emphasizes the empowerment of refugee and 
receiving community youth to build “their talent, potential 
and energy” to support eventual solutions.16 The compact 
indicates that states and relevant stakeholders should “utilize 
and develop” youth capacities and skills, and facilitate youth 
networking and information sharing, which is in keeping with 
the SRP mandate to create welcoming communities.17 WUSC 
has a long tradition of encouraging youth to share best prac-
tices in refugee sponsorship and public engagement region-
ally and nationally. WUSC is working expanding this network 
transnationally in partnership with student groups in Europe. 
The compact also highlights the importance of comple-
mentary pathways for refugees, in particular through educa-
tional opportunities through partnerships with governments 
and academic institutions.18 The inclusion of education in 
the compact emphasizes its importance as a complemen-
tary pathway to durable solutions and mechanisms through 
which refugees can become part of and maximize their con-
tributions to communities. As more community sponsor-
ship schemes are developed in response to the recommen-
dations from the compact (which is led by the UNHCR with 
buy-in from member-states and civil society), education 
will increasingly be seen as a key component of facilitating 
integration. 
Conclusion
WUSC’s Student Refugee Program, in partnership with aca-
demic institutions across Canada, provides pathways to 
resettlement for refugees through education, as well as an 
opportunity for young refugees to effectively integrate into 
increasingly welcoming communities in Canada. This inte-
gration and welcoming is facilitated not only by education 
itself, but by the youth involved in the program’s youth-to-
youth sponsorship model. Youth studying at post-secondary 
institutions support refugee students’ integration on campus 
and in their community and share their experiences with 
those around them to build more welcoming communities 
for newcomers. With over forty years of experience in these 
areas, WUSC is seen as a global leader with lessons to share 
on youth-to-youth and peer-to-peer sponsorship models. 
While the SRP’s daily operations differ from campus to cam-
pus, WUSC is able to recommend standard practices that can 
apply across the campus network, including the student levy 
funding model. WUSC recommends that more countries con-
sider models of sponsorship and education programs similar 
to the SRP in their plans for fulfilling the recommendations 
of the compact.
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Resettling Refugees through  
Community Sponsorship:
A Revolutionary Operational Approach  
Built on Traditional Legal Infrastructure
Jennifer Bond and Ania Kwadrans1
Abstract
More than a dozen states are exploring the potential of 
introducing community sponsorship programs as a way of 
contributing to the global refugee protection regime. This 
article provides a comparative analysis of the legal and 
administrative frameworks that have underpinned the 
introduction of community sponsorship in four diverse 
countries: Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
and Argentina. We also briefly examine the introduction 
of co-sponsorship in the United States, a country without 
any formal national program. We conclude that while com-
munity sponsorship programs have the potential to revolu-
tionize refugee resettlement, their operationalization is not 
contingent on revolutionary legal infrastructure. 
Résumé
Plus d’une douzaine de pays à travers le monde envisagent 
activement la possibilité d’introduire des programmes de 
parrainage communautaires comme manière de contribuer 
au régime global de protection des réfugiés. Cet article offre 
une analyse comparative des cadres légaux et administratifs 
sur lesquels s’est appuyée l’introduction du parrainage com-
munautaire dans quatre pays: le Canada, le Royaume-Uni, 
la Nouvelle-Zélande et l’Argentine. Nous examinons aussi 
brièvement l’introduction du co-parrainage aux États-Unis, 
un pays qui ne possède pas formellement de programme 
national. Nous concluons que bien que les programmes de 
parrainage communautaires aient le potentiel de révolu-
tionner la réinstallation des réfugiés, leur mise en oeuvre ne 
dépend pas d’une infrastructure juridique révolutionnaire.
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Introduction
Community sponsorship programs empower ordi-nary citizens to welcome and integrate refugee new-comers into their communities. More than a dozen 
countries are exploring the introduction of these programs 
as part of their global commitments to refugee protection, 
and each exploration includes an assessment of feasibil-
ity—including considering what statutory,2 regulatory,3 and 
policy4 structures are required to operationalize the unique 
model. This article fills a gap in academic literature and 
policy documents by providing a comparative analysis of the 
legal and administrative frameworks that have underpinned 
the introduction of community sponsorship programs in 
four diverse countries: Canada, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Argentina. We also briefly examine the United 
States, a country that has recently seen the localized intro-
duction of sponsorship-style programs, despite the absence 
of a dedicated national scheme or any formal framework. As 
discussed below, we term the US model “co-sponsorship.”
Since the inception of Canada’s Private Sponsorship of 
Refugees (PSR) Program in 1979, ordinary individuals have 
resettled over 300,000 refugees to large and small communi-
ties across the country. Comparative data emanating from 
this program over the past forty years demonstrate that spon-
sored refugees have better and quicker integration outcomes 
than refugees resettled through more traditional government 
programs.5 Community sponsorship also engages a broad 
range of Canadian citizens and enjoys consistent bipartisan 
political support.6 Refugee sponsorship received increased 
attention in late 2015, when a brewing political crisis over 
refugees spilled into the mainstream media7 and mobilized 
millions of people around the world looking to directly assist 
the vulnerable individuals flashing across their screens each 
day.8 In Canada, sponsorship provided an ideal vehicle to 
organize and leverage this mobilization and—following a 
time-bound political commitment by a new national gov-
ernment9—tens of thousands of Syrians were sponsored to 
the country in just a few months.10 Canada’s PSR Program 
also provided a unique channel to sustain and broaden this 
engagement: since 2015, over two million Canadians from 
over 400 communities have sponsored refugees11—extraor-
dinary figures that hint at the potential power and scope of 
the community sponsorship model. 
In September 2016 the government of Canada, the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the Open Society Founda-
tions announced the formation of the Global Refugee Spon-
sorship Initiative (GRSI), a partnership aimed at sharing the 
community sponsorship model, and supporting its adoption 
around the world.12 The Giustra Foundation and the Univer-
sity of Ottawa joined the GRSI before it formally launched 
in December 2016, and the new partnership articulated 
three goals: increasing and improving refugee resettlement; 
strengthening and supporting local host communities; and 
improving the narrative surrounding refugees and newcom-
ers.13 In its first two years of operation, the GRSI worked with 
over twenty countries around the world, supporting com-
munity and government stakeholders as they assessed fea-
sibility, designed, piloted, and/or implemented sponsorship 
programs.14 Jennifer Bond co-founded the GRSI and serves 
as its chair, while Ania Kwadrans has played a critical role 
on the team since the initiative launched. While this article 
does not directly draw on that work, our understanding of 
community sponsorship is deeply informed by it. 
 The GRSI’s formation, and its subsequent high level of 
activity, is only one indication of growing global interest in 
community sponsorship programs. Increasing engagement 
is also formally reflected in statements and initiatives by the 
European Union15 and in the final draft of the Global Com-
pact on Refugees (GCR), a multilateral agreement that explic-
itly encourages states to “establish private or community 
sponsorship programmes … including community-based 
programmes promoted through the Global Refugee Spon-
sorship Initiative.”16 Momentum is also visible in individual 
countries, as is clearly reflected in a strong joint statement 
issued by immigration ministers from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Argentina, Spain, and New Zealand. The 
statement notes the benefits of community sponsorship and 
encourages other countries to adopt these programs.17
Collective experience with the process for introducing 
new community sponsorship programs is growing, but 
nascent. The case studies presented in this article aim to 
advance the field by providing examples of varying technical 
structures that have facilitated introduction of sponsorship 
across a range of countries. Each of our case studies explores 
legislation, executive announcements and orders, and any 
operational infrastructure that may have been established 
through regulation and policy documents, and subsequently 
implemented by government organizations or entities 
with delegated authority. On the basis of our five country 
examples, we conclude that while the legislative and policy 
nuances of each community sponsorship program have 
emerged in ways tailored to each state’s particular context, 
the frameworks that underpin these programs contain key 
similarities, including reliance on the same basic infrastruc-
ture as traditional refugee resettlement schemes.
Definitions and Methodology
The terms community sponsorship, private sponsorship, and 
refugee sponsorship have not been universally defined,18 
resulting in conceptual confusion amongst stakeholders—
a topic Jennifer Bond is exploring in a dedicated piece of 
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writing.19 For the purposes of this contribution, we define 
community sponsorship programs as programs that empower 
groups of ordinary individuals—as opposed to governments 
or professionalized agencies—to lead in welcoming, sup-
porting, and integrating refugees.20 While policy design 
features vary between countries,21 the basic model is a “public- 
private partnership between governments who, [at minimum,] 
facilitate legal admission of refugees, and private actors who 
provide financial, social and/or emotional support to receive 
and settle [those] refugees into [their] community.”22 
Under our conceptualization of community sponsorship, 
the model responds to the observation that “by redefining 
basic human needs as ‘problems’ that only professionals can 
resolve … over-professionalization alienates people from the 
helping relationships they could establish with neighbours 
and kin.”23 The deep engagement and high degree of respon-
sibility undertaken by individual refugee sponsors reposi-
tions newcomers from vulnerable outsiders whom private 
individuals watch fail or succeed, to partners in a project of 
collective interests: the newcomers’ success is inherently also 
the sponsors’ success. This profound partnership divides 
sponsorship programs from other forms of refugee support, 
including those that rely heavily on volunteers but are funda-
mentally led by paid professionals. 
This article presents the legal and policy architecture that 
states have used to enable citizen sponsors to lead in reset-
tling refugees. In addition to exploring four countries with 
government-created, national sponsorship programs, we 
also briefly examine the United States, a country with a large 
refugee resettlement program but no formal community 
sponsorship scheme at the legislative or policy level. Despite 
this absence, several local resettlement organizations in the 
United States have developed de facto sponsorship-style ini-
tiatives by sub-delegating authority in a way that manifests 
the type of citizen-led process at the core of our understand-
ing of sponsorship. Since professionalized agencies retain 
official responsibility for newcomers’ integration, these 
programs do not fall within the scope of our definition of 
community sponsorship, and we thus present them using a 
different but related term: co-sponsorship. 
We also deliberately restrict our analysis to countries that 
have introduced sponsorship programs in the context of 
resettlement—the relocation of a refugee from her country 
of asylum to a third country, usually with the support of the 
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).24 Resettlement programs are 
voluntary: while the Refugee Convention codifies obligations 
for states to protect certain non-nationals who claim asylum 
from within their territory,25 they are not legally obliged to 
offer protection to refugees who remain in the jurisdiction 
of other states. Despite this lack of formal requirement, the 
international community has repeatedly recognized the need 
for more “equitable sharing” of responsibility for refugees,26 
and over forty states have established resettlement programs 
as one way of contributing to this objective.27 Each resettle-
ment country has established its own distinct national proce-
dures for operationalizing its program, but Canada’s PSR Pro-
gram was, for many decades, unique because of the way that it 
empowered ordinary individuals to take primary responsibil-
ity for all aspects of welcoming and integrating newcomers.28 
Our focus on community sponsorship in the context 
of resettlement means that our analysis does not consider 
community-driven models that support asylum seekers29 
or other populations of newcomers.30 We also consciously 
omit programs where the “welcomers” are exclusively fam-
ily members,31 as well as programs where costs are shared 
between private and public actors, but integration is led 
primarily by government or professionalized refugee sup-
port organizations as opposed to community groups or indi-
viduals.32 Finally, because we are interested in exploring the 
infrastructure that has enabled the creation of sustainable, 
national sponsorship programs, we have not considered ad 
hoc, community-driven initiatives negotiated with single 
civil society groups via time-limited agreements.33 
This article provides a technical analysis of the statutory, 
regulatory, and policy structures that were required to ini-
tially operationalize a selection of community sponsorship 
programs. As a result, we take a historical view of our first 
case study—Canada—and examine the legislative changes 
that created the foundations for the world’s largest and long-
est-running community sponsorship program. 
Canada
Enabling Legislation and Orders 
Canada acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1969.34 A 
detailed review of Canada’s immigration policy followed in 
1973, culminating in the 1976 Immigration Act,35 which intro-
duced Canada’s first official resettlement program.36 Prior 
to 1976, refugee resettlement was based on ad hoc decisions 
and Cabinet orders-in-council.37 The new legal framework 
explicitly recognized refugees as a distinct class of migrants 
and included a more transparent approach for overseas selec-
tion and resettlement on humanitarian grounds.38 Refugees 
who met the requirements of the Act were to be granted per-
manent resident status upon arrival to the country.39 Since 
1959, Canada has resettled over 700,000 refugees from all 
over the world.40
The 1976 resettlement framework also included a provi-
sion that explicitly enabled refugee resettlement through 
community sponsorship.41 Specifically, the new Immigration 
Act gave power to the Governor-in-Council to make regu-
lations “prescribing classes of persons whose applications 
for landing may be sponsored by Canadian citizens [or] 
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… permanent residents,”42 and “establishing the require-
ments to be met by any [sponsoring] person or organiza-
tion including the provision of an undertaking to assist any 
such Convention refugee, person or immigrant in becoming 
successfully established in Canada.”43 These brief statutory 
references provided the foundation for the world’s first com-
munity sponsorship program. 
Canada’s new approach to resettlement was quickly oper-
ationalized: in December 1978 the country pledged to accept 
5,000 refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as part of 
an international response to the forced displacement of mil-
lions of Indochinese refugees.44 The scale and visibility of the 
crisis continued to increase, however, prompting public calls 
for the government to further expand its commitment.45 In 
June 1979 the Canadian government announced that it would 
admit 12,000 Indochinese refugees—8,000 of whom would 
be government-assisted and 4,000 of whom would be pri-
vately sponsored by individual groups and organizations.46 
That same month, the commitment was increased further to 
50,000 resettled refugees by the end of 1980.47 To manage 
the rapidly increasing numbers, the government established 
a Special Refugee Task Force to specifically manage Cana-
da’s resettlement of Indochinese refugees.48 It also pledged 
to meet its ambitious new targets by offering a “matching” 
model to the Canadian public, whereby it would admit one 
Indochinese refugee to the government-supported stream 
for everyone who was privately sponsored. With this com-
mitment, the country’s new PSR Program rapidly took hold 
as one of Canada’s principal resettlement mechanisms.49
Regulations and Program Administration 
Canada’s Immigration Regulations, 1978,50 contained pro-
visions that contoured the country’s new PSR Program,51 
including defining the eligibility parameters for a sponsored 
refugee52 and specifying that sponsor groups must be com-
posed of at least five adult Canadian citizens or permanent 
residents (or be a Canadian corporation) residing or located 
in the expected community of settlement.53 Eligible groups 
were permitted to resettle refugees after signing a written 
undertaking that they would provide one year of financial 
and settlement support54 and demonstrating sufficient finan-
cial resources and a plan for “adequate arrangements … for 
the reception of the Convention refugee and his accompany-
ing dependants.”55 The new regulations were in place before 
the Governor-in-Council designated the first three classes of 
refugees eligible for the program on 29 January 1979.56
Faith communities and ethno-cultural groups in Canada 
had a long history of supporting resettled refugees before 
the PSR program was introduced57 and were well positioned 
to support the influx of Indochinese newcomers through the 
new sponsorship stream. These national organizations sought 
ways to leverage their own infrastructure, and beginning in 
March 1979, developed master agreements” with the Canadian 
government58 that allowed them to authorize individual con-
gregations across Canada to sponsor Indochinese refugees.59 
These agreements also allowed the government of Canada 
to delegate sponsor-screening responsibilities to agreement-
holding organizations,60 while government officials retained 
responsibility for vetting refugees and thousands of “Groups of 
Five” who were unaffiliated with a larger sponsorship organiza-
tion.61 Within weeks, the government had signed agreements 
with almost all the national church bodies in Canada.62
Today Canada’s refugee law is governed by the Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act, 200163 (IRPA) and its associ-
ated Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 200264 
(IRPR). The IRPA retains the central provision that enables 
sponsorship,65 and the IRPR sets out, inter alia, the eligibility 
criteria for sponsors66 and sponsored refugees.67 The dual 
track set in 1979 between master agreement holders (today, 
“sponsorship agreement holders”) and Groups of Five con-
tinues to underpin the program’s modern form.68 However, 
Canada’s sponsorship program has diversified and today 
includes dedicated and specialized programs for sponsor-
identified refugees; UNHCR-referred refugees;69 individu-
als persecuted for sexual orientation or gender identity;70 
refugees with complex medical needs;71 urgent cases;72 and 
post-secondary students.73 Despite this evolution, the core 
of all of Canada’s community sponsorship programs remains 
robust citizen responsibility and empowerment. 
As described above, the world’s first community sponsor-
ship program was formed simultaneously with, and inte-
grated into, Canada’s new national resettlement program. Its 
unique referral mechanism permitting sponsors to identify 
refugees they wished to resettle was enabled by an explicit 
provision in the 1976 Immigration Act, which also delineated 
very generally the parameters through which persons could 
seek protection, and gave scope for regulations to fill in myr-
iad details.74 This model underscores the minimal legislative 
framework that was necessary to facilitate the introduction 
of this radically different approach to refugee resettlement. 
Unlike Canada, our next two case studies—the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand—each introduced community 
sponsorship into pre-existing and well-established refugee 
resettlement infrastructure. In the following sections, we 
examine the distinct approach each country took to doing so. 
United Kingdom
Enabling Legislation and Orders
The United Kingdom ratified the Refugee Convention on 
11 March 1954.75 It has been resettling refugees since the 
early 1970s via a combination of two informal programs76 
and ad hoc initiatives to respond to specific humanitarian 
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crises.77 Since 1971 the legal basis for refugees to be admit-
ted to, and stay in, the United Kingdom—including through 
resettlement—has been the Immigration Act, 1971.78 The Act 
requires any individuals who are neither UK citizens nor 
members of the European Economic Area to obtain leave79 
from UK authorities before entering the country.80 
Building on its three decades of experience with informal 
and ad hoc resettlement programs, the United Kingdom 
formalized its approach to resettlement in 2004 by introduc-
ing the Gateway Protection Program (GPP).81 The GPP was 
operationalized and continues to function by virtue of sec-
tion 59 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002 
(NIA),82 which enables the secretary of state to “participate 
in [projects] designed to … facilitate co-operation between 
States in matters relating to migration”83 and to “arrange or 
assist the settlement of migrants.”84 The NIA further specifies 
that the secretary of state may provide financial support to 
international organizations in the United Kingdom for their 
migration-related projects, and may partner with other gov-
ernments that advance similar programs.85 
The same broad provision in the NIA that underpinned 
the GPP also facilitated the more recent introduction of 
two newer resettlement programs: the Vulnerable Persons 
Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), and the Vulnerable Children’s 
Resettlement Scheme (VCRS).86 The VPRS was announced on 
29 January 2014 in a statement to Parliament by the home 
secretary,87 in which she committed to creating a new reset-
tlement program for Syrian refugees. The home secretary 
did not initially quantify the scope of the initiative, but on 2 
September 2015 it was announced that the VPRS would reset-
tle 20,000 Syrians by 2020.88 In July 2017 the scope of the 
program was expanded to include refugees not only of Syrian 
nationality but also others affected by the Syrian conflict.89 
The VPRS relies on the UNHCR to refer eligible refugees resid-
ing in Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.90 A cross-
government Syrian Resettlement Team that includes the UK 
Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, the Department for International Develop-
ment, and several other ministries was created to implement 
the program.91 The United Kingdom also pledged to resettle 
3,000 at-risk children and their families from the Middle East 
and North Africa by 2020, a commitment that resulted in the 
creation of the VCRS.92 Refugees resettled through the VPRS 
and VCRS programs are granted refugee status, which enables 
them to work and to access benefits in the United Kingdom.93 
After five years of residency in the United Kingdom, resettled 
refugees may apply for indefinite leave to remain in the coun-
try.94 The United Kingdom resettled over 25,000 refugees 
from all over the world between 2003 and 2018.95
The UK community sponsorship program was introduced 
as a component of the VPRS and the VCRS in a separate and 
very brief political statement by the home secretary at the 
Conservative Party conference on 6 October 2015. There, it 
was announced that the United Kingdom would “develop 
a community sponsorship scheme … to allow individuals, 
charities, faith groups, churches and businesses to support 
refugees directly.”96 This statement launched work to create 
a robust national sponsorship program. Further, by putting 
no limits on the number of refugees who could be sponsored 
from within the broader resettlement scheme, the United 
Kingdom established the most ambitious sponsorship initia-
tive since the one Canada introduced forty years ago. 
The UK sponsorship program relies entirely on the same 
legislative architecture that underpins its broader resettle-
ment program: the only statutory reference to the commu-
nity sponsorship scheme is a ministerial arrangement under 
the Equality Act, 2010, a technical inclusion that addresses 
the fact that the program focuses only on Syrian nationals 
and individuals affected by the Syrian conflict.97 Otherwise, 
the formal legal framework enabling resettlement is silent on 
the introduction of community sponsorship. 
Regulations and Program Administration 
Details of the UK community sponsorship scheme are delin-
eated through policy instructions, guidelines, and forms 
produced by the UK Home Office.98 Collectively, these 
documents establish that citizens and community groups 
chosen as sponsors have primary responsibility for welcom-
ing and integrating UNHCR-referred refugees to their local 
neighbourhoods.99 Prospective sponsors must partner with 
registered charities or community interest companies, but 
these organizations are not required to have expertise in 
working with refugees and do not lead the process—thus 
preserving the core of the sponsorship model.100 Sponsors 
must also obtain written approval of the local authority in 
the sponsored family’s future place of residence;101 demon-
strate financial capacity to sponsor;102 and provide a detailed 
settlement plan that illustrates how they will deliver on their 
responsibilities, including securing housing for two years.103 
After the UK Home Office provisionally approves a sponsor’s 
application, a formal agreement is signed,104 and the spon-
sors must attend a training workshop before being author-
ized to resettle a family.105 Once authorized to sponsor, the 
UK Home Office works with the sponsors and local authority 
to allocate a suitable refugee family to each specific group.106 
The UK community sponsorship scheme has inspired 
hundreds of local neighbourhoods to welcome refugees, and 
millions of pounds of public and private sector funding have 
been invested to develop capacity to recruit, vet, and sup-
port sponsorship groups and to evolve the policy model.107 
This has resulted in significant sponsorship-specific infra-
structure at the government and community level,108 and 
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the program has become an entrenched part of the United 
Kingdom’s resettlement landscape, with its own unique and 
sustainable ecosystem.
As a result of recent success in the United Kingdom, many 
countries considering their own sponsorship programs are 
interested in learning from the UK experience. This makes the 
absence of any dedicated legal architecture to support the UK 
sponsorship scheme noteworthy: unlike the Canadian pro-
gram, which was introduced by a specific statutory reference, 
the robust UK program was enabled exclusively through a 
high-level political statement and detailed administrative 
processes. However, the program is part of a well-established 
overall resettlement program, and some of the state-level 
operations associated with that broader program—including 
the overseas refugee referral mechanism—have been largely 
retained. This means that the focus of the new sponsorship 
scheme has been exclusively on transitioning the modality 
for delivering post-arrival reception and support. 
Our next case study, New Zealand, also introduced spon-
sorship within a well-established resettlement program. 
However, New Zealand relied on the combination of exist-
ing legal architecture and a robust Cabinet document to pilot 
both a new community-based reception program and new 
refugee referral criteria. 
New Zealand
Enabling Legislation and Orders 
New Zealand acceded to the Refugee Convention on 30 June 
1960 and has a long history of welcoming newcomers fleeing 
persecution.109 It has been resettling UNHCR-referred refu-
gees since the early 1980s and operating its formal Refugee 
Quota Programme since 1987.110 
New Zealand’s 1987 Immigration Act111 introduced an 
extensive framework for refugee protection. The Immigration 
Act, 2009112 built on this framework and explicitly author-
ized resettlement.113 The 2009 Act also gave the minister a 
broad mandate to certify immigration instructions relating 
to, inter alia, residence class visas,114 and “any general or spe-
cific objective of immigration policy.”115 These Immigration 
Instructions set out the criteria for granting visas and per-
mitting entry into the country, and provided the legal basis 
for a resettlement program.116 Between 2003 and 2018, New 
Zealand resettled over 10,200 refugees through its state-led 
Refugee Quota Programme.117 
In June 2016 the New Zealand Cabinet agreed to increase 
its annual resettlement quota from 750 to 1,000 UNHCR-
referred refugees118 and to pilot “a community organisa-
tion refugee sponsorship category … as a new form of 
admission.”119 A Cabinet background paper on the commu-
nity organization refugee sponsorship category (published 
on 30 August 2017) informed this decision; proposing that 
the sponsorship program would be distinct from the Refu-
gee Quota Programme and would form a new “part of New 
Zealand’s broader refugee and humanitarian programme.”120 
In September 2018, New Zealand announced that it would 
also increase its core annual quota by an additional 500 refu-
gees per year, beginning in July 2019.121
Many specifics of New Zealand’s pilot sponsorship pro-
gram were laid out in the NZ Cabinet Minute of Decision 
(9 August 2017).122 In particular, individuals selected for the 
Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship Category 
needed to be recognized as refugees by the UNHCR; to pos-
sess a basic facility with English and a minimum of three 
years’ work experience (or a qualification requiring a mini-
mum of two years’ tertiary study); and be between eighteen 
and forty-five years of age.123 Sponsors under the program 
needed to be registered legal entities; to have demonstrated 
experience working with refugees or other vulnerable people 
(although they did not need not be professional resettlement 
agencies); to possess financial and settlement capacity to 
support the sponsored refugees; and be willing to enter into 
an outcomes agreement with Immigration New Zealand for 
the provision of their settlement and integration responsi-
bilities.124 Refugees resettled through the pilot community 
sponsorship program were to be granted permanent resident 
visas.125 
The New Zealand Cabinet also agreed that sponsoring 
community organizations could either nominate refugees 
eligible for the sponsorship program or be matched to refu-
gees referred to New Zealand by the UNHCR.126 The addition 
of new eligibility criteria and the option of sponsor-naming 
represented major Cabinet-directed variations to New Zea-
land’s traditional resettlement program, and it is noteworthy 
that introducing these changes did not require legislative 
amendment. Instead, the very general nature of the exist-
ing statutory framework—focusing on visa criteria rather 
than the specifics of a particular resettlement stream—was 
deemed to provide the requisite legal authority for the pilot 
to be introduced and operationalized. 
Regulation and Program Administration
New Zealand’s 2009 Act is complemented by a series of 
regulations,127 and by the Department of Immigration’s 
“Operational Manual.” Amongst other things, the “Opera-
tional Manual” sets out specific details for the Refugee Quota 
Programme, including its objectives and eligibility require-
ments.128 It also establishes the requirement that resettled 
refugees receive an orientation at the Mangere Refugee 
Resettlement Centre129—a component that was retained in 
the community sponsorship scheme.130 The Cabinet deci-
sion that gave rise to New Zealand’s community sponsorship 
program was also implemented through the “Operational 
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Manual.”131 In addition to repeating the specific program 
requirements mandated by the original Cabinet decision, the 
“Operational Manual” also established the detailed process 
through which both sponsor groups and eligible refugees 
could apply to participate in New Zealand’s pilot program.132
On 13 October 2017 the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment issued a request for applications from com-
munity organizations interested in becoming community 
sponsors under the new sponsorship stream.133 Interested 
organizations needed to establish that they met the require-
ments for sponsorship and were willing to sign a formal 
deed of agreement134 with the government of New Zealand 
guaranteeing that they would provide the required settle-
ment responsibilities.135 According to the deed, approved 
community sponsors were solely responsible for fulfilling 
and could not subcontract to any other entity without first 
obtaining the written permission of the ministry.136 The four 
community-based groups selected to participate in New 
Zealand’s community sponsorship pilot were announced in 
January 2018,137 and it is noteworthy that none were profes-
sional refugee resettlement agencies. The first sponsored 
refugees arrived in New Zealand in July 2018.138
The government of New Zealand is reviewing its pilot 
program and considering whether to continue with a more 
permanent commitment to refugee sponsorship. In antici-
pation of this review, two distinct stakeholder groups—the 
Core Community Partnership and Amnesty International—
each presented proposals to the government urging, inter 
alia, that the community sponsorship program be made per-
manent; that funding be provided for a community-based 
“catalyst entity” to provide future sponsors with support; 
and that non-humanitarian criteria for refugee selection be 
reviewed.139 Amnesty International also presented a petition 
with over 10,000 signatures, encouraging New Zealand to 
continue the program.140 The New Zealand immigration 
minister responded publicly to this petition by noting that 
it was “heartening to see so many signatures from people in 
New Zealand saying they warmly support [the community 
sponsorship] program and encouraging the Government to 
go beyond the pilot.”141 
Like the United Kingdom, New Zealand introduced its 
community sponsorship program by using the legal frame-
work of its existing refugee resettlement scheme, rather than 
introducing any new statutory provisions. However, the New 
Zealand Cabinet both authorized the new program and pro-
vided significant direction on its parameters. This is different 
from all other countries, where detailed policy parameters 
for sponsorship programs were developed under delegated 
regulatory or administrative authority. 
It is also noteworthy that, while New Zealand, Canada, 
and Argentina (described below) have all experimented with 
allowing sponsorship groups to support either a UNHCR-
referred refugee or a sponsor-referred refugee (with some 
specific restrictions in each case), only Canada has intro-
duced legislation that has formally recognized distinct refer-
ral mechanisms. In the other examples, the formal legislative 
instruments are silent on referral methodology. 
Our next case study examines a newer resettlement 
country, Argentina, and explains how administrative pro-
cesses created a resettlement program delivered exclusively 
through a sponsorship model. 
Argentina
Enabling Legislation and Orders
Argentina ratified the Refugee Convention on 15 Novem-
ber 1961142 and has a long history of welcoming newcom-
ers through its asylum system.143 However, the country’s 
approach to resettlement has been noticeably iterative: 
in 1979 and 1980 its first formalized resettlement program 
focused on 300 refugees from Southeast Asia,144 and in 2005 
it participated in the regional Solidarity Resettlement Pro-
gram to resettle Colombian refugees.145 The creation of this 
second resettlement initiative corresponded with a broader 
overall restructuring of the country’s formal legal architec-
ture relating to refugees and immigrants, resulting first in 
introduction of the Migration Law146 in 2004, and then in 
the enactment of the General Law of Recognition and Pro-
tection of Refugees in 2006.147 Neither of these instruments 
specifically references either resettlement or sponsorship, 
but the Migration Law provides the legal basis for an indi-
vidual’s admission to, permission to stay in, or removal from 
Argentina and also enables humanitarian admissions using 
temporary status visas.148 Individuals resettled to Argentina 
with humanitarian visas may petition for refugee status once 
they arrive in the country.149 
Argentina’s most recent resettlement commitment has 
focused on Syrian refugees, and operates under the com-
bined authority of the humanitarian visa regime set out in 
the Migration Law and two presidential decrees.150 The first 
presidential decree was issued in 2010 and sets out more 
detailed parameters for implementing the Migration Law, 
including its humanitarian provisions.151 The 2010 presi-
dential decree also established the National Directorate for 
Migration as the agency responsible for implementing and 
enforcing the Migration Law and for creating associated 
regulations.152 Importantly, the 2010 presidential decree also 
delegated authority to Argentine consulates abroad to issue 
entry permits and visas, including humanitarian visas.153 
A second presidential decree was issued in September 
2016, shortly after Argentina’s president announced at a UN 
summit that the country would resettle 3,000 Syrian refugees. 
The 2016 decree established a National Cabinet for the Syria 
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Program to coordinate efforts of the ministries154 involved 
in the integration of refugees.155 It also stipulated that the 
National Directorate for Migration would coordinate an 
inter-institutional working group to implement the national 
Cabinet’s instructions and provide recommendations to the 
national Cabinet.156 The result was that two key coordinating 
bodies for the Syrian Resettlement Program were established 
through the 2010 and 2016 presidential decrees. 
Further contours of Argentina’s current resettlement 
commitment—the Special Humanitarian Visa Program for 
Foreigners Affected by the Syrian Conflict (Syria Program)—
are delineated in a regulatory scheme established by the 
National Directorate for Migration pursuant to its authority 
under the Migration Act and the 2010 presidential decree. As 
we explain below, Argentina’s entire commitment to resettle 
Syrian refugees was designed to function as a national com-
munity sponsorship program.157
Regulations and Program Administration
In response to international appeals for more states to resettle 
Syrian refugees, Argentina’s National Directorate for Migra-
tion created an administrative provision158 on 14 October 
2014 (First Syria Program Provision), which established the 
country’s Syria Program. The First Syria Program Provision 
introduced the initial iteration of the country’s community 
sponsorship program by relying on the humanitarian admis-
sions section of the Migration Law159 to enable Argentinian 
relatives of Syrian and Palestinian refugees to sponsor their 
family members’ resettlement. Under this original program, 
Argentinian relatives (termed “callers” [llamantes]) needed to 
provide a letter of invitation attesting to their kinship bonds 
with the sponsored refugee;160 proof of identity;161 and proof 
of domicile.162 In 2014 and 2015 over 200 sponsorship appli-
cations were submitted under this original Syria Program, 
and the basic operational framework for Argentina’s first 
community sponsorship program was formally established. 
Momentum for Argentina’s Syria Program was renewed 
in September 2016 when the country pledged to resettle 
3,000 Syrian refugees.163 Responding to this commitment, 
the National Directorate for Migration issued a second pro-
vision164 (Second Syria Program Provision), which updates 
the 2014 Syria Program by broadening the eligibility crite-
ria for sponsors to include not only groups of individuals 
(“callers”)165 but also sponsoring organizations referred to as 
“requesters” (requirentes). The revised program allows both 
callers and requesters to initiate the humanitarian admission 
of individuals affected by the Syrian conflict by presenting 
a letter of invitation explicitly assuming a one-year com-
mitment to provide accommodation and other integration 
support.166 Callers are also given the option of submitting 
a letter of endorsement from an organization, guaranteeing 
that callers will fulfil their commitments,167 and meaning 
that requestors may sponsor refugees directly or act as guar-
antors for callers.168 Significantly, the Second Syria Program 
Provision removes the requirement of familial ties between 
the sponsors and the sponsored refugees,169 enabling the 
introduction of a UNHCR referral mechanism.170 
Argentina’s Second Syria Program Provision also enables 
the National Directorate for Migration to implement mecha-
nisms to collaborate with, and support, callers and requesters 
with the integration process.171 This function is implemented 
by the inter-institutional Working Group coordinated by the 
National Directorate for Migration, which—by virtue of the 
2016 presidential decree—also receives instructions from the 
national Cabinet for the Syria Program.172 Successful imple-
mentation of Argentina’s Syria Program and growth of its 
overall resettlement infrastructure is also supported by the 
UNHCR’s Emerging Countries Joint Support Mechanism173 
and by a 2018 investment by the European Union.174 As of 
July 2018, Argentinian callers and requesters had sponsored 
more than 400 refugees.175 
As we have seen, Argentina relied on broad statutory 
provisions and two presidential decrees to authorize the 
issuance of humanitarian visas and create important infra-
structure for resettlement, including the establishment of 
two key coordinating bodies. Critically, Argentina is the only 
country under examination that plans to deliver its entire 
resettlement program via community sponsorship.176 As 
with other examples, the details of this model were estab-
lished and operationalized at the administrative level, but 
Argentina is unique, both in relation to its degree of reli-
ance on sponsorship and the fact that the model is neither 
mentioned in statutory instruments nor referenced explicitly 
by orders from the executive branch. The cumulative effect 
is that Argentina used entirely administrative processes to 
translate its broad humanitarian visa regime and a political 
commitment to support Syrian refugees into a well-deline-
ated community sponsorship-based resettlement scheme.177 
Our final case study examines the United States—a large 
resettlement country that does not have a national commu-
nity sponsorship program. Nevertheless, a number of Amer-
ican civil society organizations have recognized the poten-
tial of sponsorship and built their own mini infrastructure 
within the country’s broader overall resettlement scheme. 
United States
Resettlement Framework
The United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention 
but did accede to its additional protocol on 1 November 1968 
and is thus bound by articles 2–34 of the convention and to 
the core principle of non-refoulement.178 The country has a 
long history of accepting refugees from all over the world179 
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and in 1980 created the US Refugee Admission Program 
(USRAP) through the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.180 
Introduction of the USRAP created a “standardized system 
for identifying, vetting, and resettling” refugees181 and, since 
then, the United States has resettled more refugees than any 
other country: annual admissions peaked between 1990 and 
1995 with an average of 112,000 refugees resettled annually, 
and remained high into the 2010s, with 78,761 refugees 
resettled in 2016.182 These numbers dropped precipitously 
to 24,559 in 2017183 and to 15,784 in 2018184 under a new US 
administration. Between 2003 and 2018 the United States 
resettled over 640,000 refugees from all over the world.185
The backbone of US immigration and refugee policy is 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a wide-ranging 
statutory regime introduced in 1985.186 The INA continues 
the US resettlement program and gives the president abso-
lute discretion to set the country’s annual refugee resettle-
ment quota, taking into consideration both humanitarian 
concerns and the national interest.187 The scheme specifies 
that, once the president establishes the annual quota, the 
United States must work with the UNHCR, other specially 
trained NGOs, and its embassies abroad to receive referrals 
of individuals eligible for its refugee admissions program.188 
Resettled refugees are admitted to the United States with 
refugee status. After one year of residency, they may request 
permanent resident status, and after five years they are eligi-
ble to apply for US citizenship.189
The INA also established the Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment (ORR) within the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The ORR is tasked with funding and administering 
the domestic implementation of the US resettlement pro-
gram.190 Specifically, the INA gives the ORR authority to work 
with stakeholders to develop policies on resettlement191 and 
to provide grants and contracts to “public or private non-
profit agencies for initial resettlement … of refugees in the 
United States.”192 To deliver on its resettlement mandate, the 
ORR partners with nine professional resettlement agencies,193 
each of which is responsible for ensuring that a refugee’s 
settlement needs are met,194 including housing, furnishings, 
food, clothing, and facilitated access to community and 
state-provided services.195
The ORR’s nine resettlement partners in turn subcontract 
these responsibilities to hundreds of local service providers 
all across the United States. These organizations welcome 
and integrate refugees under authority delegated by the 
ORR.196 There is wide variance in how these local partners 
operate, but the majority use a combination of professional 
case workers and volunteers to provide support. 
Certain US organizations have, however, been inspired 
by the community sponsorship model and have chosen 
to further delegate core integration and decision-making 
responsibilities to highly empowered groups of sponsors.197 
This has the effect of creating de facto community spon-
sorship models within certain communities. Since the US 
government did not create or formally acknowledge these 
programs,198 and since the refugee agencies retain ultimate 
oversight and responsibility for the groups, we term this 
model “co-sponsorship.”
Community-Level Co-sponsorship
One example of a robust and successful community co-
sponsorship program was introduced by Integrated Refugee 
& Immigrant Services (IRIS) in Connecticut—a local affiliate 
of two of the nine US resettlement agencies.199 Under the 
IRIS co-sponsorship model, community groups of at least 
ten people are empowered to take primary responsibility 
for welcoming and integrating resettled refugees into their 
communities.200 Once these groups demonstrate to IRIS that 
they are prepared to welcome a refugee family, they must 
sign a formal agreement pledging to fulfill their responsi-
bilities towards the resettled refugees.201 Responsibilities 
include fundraising to provide housing and basic necessi-
ties; welcoming the family on arrival; providing orientation 
and transportation assistance; assisting in connecting the 
family with health, education, and other services and ben-
efits; helping the family manage its resources and secure 
employment;202 and offering overall logistical and emotional 
support. 
IRIS provides guidance and training to co-sponsorship 
groups as they prepare to meet their responsibilities, and 
subsequently provides light-touch support to sponsors as 
needed. It also delivers federally required case management 
for the refugee family through a number of check-ins during 
the initial resettlement period.203 However, the agency does 
not direct the activities of the co-sponsors, who become the 
key decision-makers and implementers of all aspects of the 
settlement process. This represents a radical shift from the 
more traditional, highly professionalized US resettlement 
model. In 2016 one-third of the 530 refugees referred to IRIS 
were settled by community co-sponsorship groups,204 allow-
ing the agency to increase its overall capacity, welcome more 
newcomers to its area, and significantly grow the number of 
individual citizens engaging in significant ways with newly 
arrived refugees.205 While the United States does not have a 
formal sponsorship program, the IRIS program demonstrates 
that key components of sponsorship can be implemented 
not only within existing legal frameworks, but also within 
traditional operational models. 
Conclusion
Community sponsorship programs have the potential to 
be truly transformative. Countries seeking new ways to 
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contribute to global refugee protection, while simultane-
ously improving integration outcomes and benefiting their 
own local communities, are examining Canada’s long history 
with sponsorship and considering how similar models might 
be introduced in their own domestic contexts. Our work 
with the GRSI has shown us that one of the first steps for any 
country considering a community sponsorship program is 
an examination of what laws, regulations, and policies are 
necessary to make it operational. The case studies presented 
in this article illustrate some of the varying approaches that 
have been taken in this regard. 
Canada is the only country to have embedded sponsor-
ship into its principal immigration and refugee statute 
simultaneously with the introduction of a nascent resettle-
ment program. The United Kingdom and Argentina provide 
interesting contrasts to this approach. Both countries devel-
oped and operationalized sponsorship programs subsequent 
to high-level political announcements. In Argentina the 
commitment was a general one to resettle Syrian refugees, 
while in the United Kingdom it was a specific reference to 
the introduction of a community-led sponsorship program. 
After these announcements, both countries introduced their 
programs without any new supporting legislation: Argentina 
by creating a new regulatory framework under the broad 
authority of its general immigration law; and the United 
Kingdom by leveraging the administrative frameworks asso-
ciated with two pre-existing resettlement programs. It is also 
noteworthy that, while both of these newer sponsorship pro-
grams are limited to refugees affected by the Syrian conflict, 
the specific regulatory infrastructure enabling the UK pro-
gram does not reflect this restriction,206 while Argentina’s 
does. This is consistent with Argentina’s iterative approach 
to resettlement and may mean that additional political direc-
tives or legal authority would be needed for the country to 
retain its sponsorship program as a longer-term feature of its 
overall refugee policy. 
Like the United Kingdom, New Zealand introduced its 
community sponsorship program into a well-established 
resettlement framework. However, while both programs 
rely on existing resettlement infrastructure and were intro-
duced without legislative amendment, a significant amount 
of programmatic detail for the New Zealand program was 
included in the authorizing Cabinet documents. As a result, 
any subsequent policy changes to New Zealand’s program 
will presumably require renewed parliamentary approval. It 
is of course noteworthy that, at the time of writing, New Zea-
land’s sponsorship program was limited to a small-scale pilot 
initiative; it is possible that a future, longer-term commit-
ment will be embedded into the country’s legal infrastruc-
ture in a different way. 
Finally, the development of co-sponsorship programs in 
the United States illustrates how the core elements of spon-
sorship can be implemented by motivated and creative civil 
society actors willing to deliberately de-professionalize their 
approach to refugee resettlement. The successful program at 
IRIS is a particularly strong example of what can be achieved 
in the absence of any formal adjustments to the national 
infrastructure. Of course, these initiatives rely on an exist-
ing resettlement pathway that is legally and administratively 
embedded, and in this way the United States most closely 
resembles the UK example. 
While each of these situations is unique, our overall con-
clusion is that community sponsorship programs do not 
require significant, dedicated legislative infrastructure. In 
fact, Canada is the only country to have introduced a statu-
tory provision explicitly authorizing community engage-
ment in resettling refugees, and that provision is extremely 
broad. More frequently, sponsorship programs have been 
introduced through a combination of political will and 
administrative creativity. 
For the many countries considering new sponsorship 
programs, this is good news: while they may need to care-
fully consider the political, policy, and operational realities 
of these systems, they likely do not need to undertake wide-
scale legislative reform. As true believers in the power of 
sponsorship to transform the lives of both newcomers and 
the communities that welcome them, we hope this means 
that more programs will be introduced in the near term. 
Indeed, with global capacity shrinking at an alarming rate 
and the world desperately in need of creative solutions, the 
future of refugee resettlement may depend on it.
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Australia’s Private Refugee Sponsorship 
Program: Creating Complementary Pathways 
or Privatizing Humanitarianism? 
Asher Hirsch, Khanh Hoang, and Anthea Vogl
Abstract
This article provides the first history and critique of Aus-
tralia’s private refugee sponsorship program, the Commu-
nity Support Program (CSP). As more countries turn to 
community sponsorship of refugees as a means to fill the 
“resettlement gap,” Australia’s model provides a cautionary 
tale. The CSP, introduced in 2017, does not expand Aus-
tralia’s overall resettlement commitment but instead takes 
places from within the existing humanitarian resettlement 
program. The Australian program charges sponsors exor-
bitant application fees, while simultaneously prioritizing 
refugees who are “job ready,” with English-language skills 
and ability to integrate quickly, undermining the principle 
of resettling the most vulnerable. As such, we argue that the 
CSP hijacks places from within Australia’s humanitarian 
program and represents a market-driven outsourcing and 
privatization of Australia’s refugee resettlement priorities 
and commitments.
Résumé
Cet article offre la première histoire et critique du pro-
gramme de parrainage privé des réfugiés en Australie, le 
Community Support Program (CSP). Alors que de plus en 
plus de pays se tournent vers le parrainage communautaire 
pour combler les besoins en matière de réinstallation, le 
modèle australien tient lieu de mise en garde. Le CSP, intro-
duit en 2017, n’étend pas les engagements de l’Australie en 
matière de réinstallation, mais accapare des places au sein 
du programme humanitaire de réinstallation déjà existant. 
Le programme australien impose aux parrains des frais 
de demande exorbitants tout en donnant la priorité aux 
réfugiés qui sont prêts à occuper un emploi, qui ont des 
compétences linguistiques en anglais et qui sont capables 
de s’intégrer rapidement, minant ainsi le principe de réins-
tallation des plus vulnérables. Nous soutenons que le CSP 
détourne des places du programme humanitaire australien 
et représente une sous-traitance axée sur le marché ainsi 
qu’une privatisation des priorités et engagements de l’Aus-
tralie en matière de réinstallation. 
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Introduction
At a time when the global gap between refugee resettlement 
needs and resettlement places made available by govern-
ments is widening, countries around the world are increas-
ingly looking to community sponsorship to expand and 
supplement their refugee resettlement. In September 2016 
a meeting of UN General Assembly states resulted in the 
New York Declaration of Refugees and Migrants, wherein 
member states agreed to negotiate a Global Compact on 
Refugees in order to strengthen the international refugee 
regime’s response to large refugee movements. The resulting 
final draft of the Global Compact on Refugees calls upon 
states “to establish private or community sponsorship pro-
grams that are additional to regular resettlement” in order to 
provide timely access to durable solutions for refugees.1 Fol-
lowing from the New York Declaration, a number of states 
are experimenting with community sponsorship programs, 
following in the footsteps of Canada’s long-running pro-
gram, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Argentin, and some in the European Union.
In the lead-up to the New York Declaration, Australia 
confirmed its intentions to join this list and implement a 
permanent community sponsorship program. Australian 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that “in addi-
tion to our existing programs, Australia will … create new 
pathways for refugees to resettle in Australia through the 
establishment of 1000 places under a Community Support 
Programme, where communities and businesses can spon-
sor applications and support new arrivals.”2
This article provides the first detailed overview of Aus-
tralia’s historical and current approaches to community 
sponsorship. In particular, it addresses the current Commu-
nity Support Program (CSP), which formally began in late 
2017, and the Community Proposal Pilot (CPP), which began 
in 2013 and preceded the CSP. As well, it traces Australia’s 
prior experimentation in this policy area, namely the Com-
munity Refugee Settlement Scheme (CRSS), which ran for 
almost twenty years from 1979 to 1997. In doing so, we argue 
that potentials of private sponsorship cannot be assessed 
independently of the details and national context of specific 
sponsorship programs. The manner in which sponsorship 
programs are framed and promoted by nation states, as well 
as the design, are factors that determine the value of sponsor-
ship programs, particularly when such programs are framed 
as “complementary” pathways to traditional government-led 
resettlement. 
While the CSP provides a much-needed counterpoint 
to Australia’s infamous Operation Sovereign Borders—a 
“military-led” border control program centred upon secu-
ritization and the absolute control of refugee movements3—
there are problematic policies built into the program, which 
include a lack of additionality;4 prohibitively high visa appli-
cation charges and processing fees; discriminatory selection 
criteria; and lack of community engagement in the design 
and participation of the program. Read together, Australia’s 
CSP is best understood as an exercise in the privatization 
of resettlement responsibilities and costs that ultimately 
reduces the Australian government’s overall commitment to 
resettlement. The use of private funding to directly replace 
government-funded places, and the preference for “work-
ready” refugees, which characterize the CSP, entail that the 
Australian program cannot be characterized as creating a 
complementary pathway to resettlement. Instead, we argue 
that in its current form it represents a market-driven out-
sourcing and privatization of the existing refugee program. 
This view is echoed in the government’s own framing of the 
program, which it has promoted not only as “cost saving,” 
but as a revenue-raising measure.
We argue that the Australian experience—in particular, 
the CSP—provides cause for pause and caution. While com-
munity sponsorship has considerable untapped potential 
in Australia, the parameters of community sponsorship 
schemes need to be carefully crafted and managed to ensure 
that governments do not use sponsorship to shift the cost of 
long-standing public programs for resettling refugees onto 
private actors, further entrench controlled migration as a 
precondition to offering protection to refugees, and shift 
resettlement focus away from the most vulnerable refugees—
risks that are inherent within the current CSP framework. 
In the first part of this article, we explain the history, 
design, and focus of the CRSS and the motivation for this 
program, which provides important background to contem-
porary private sponsorship in Australia. The following sec-
tions outline and critique the CpP and the CSP, with a focus 
on the political context of control and deterrence of refugee 
arrivals, into which both programs were introduced. Finally, 
we highlight the risks of “exporting” the Australian model to 
other jurisdictions and examine the sustained community—
and sector-based efforts to promote reform and improve-
ment of the CSP in Australia.
The Community Refugee Settlement Scheme
While there is a vast literature on refugee resettlement in 
Australia,5 there is little mention of Australia’s historical use 
of community sponsorship to support the resettlement of 
refugees and humanitarian entrants. While Australia may 
appear as a newcomer to community sponsorship programs, 
it has, in fact, a significant history with community sponsor-
ship through the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme 
(CRSS) that ran from 1979 to 1997. The CRSS, which helped 
to settle and integrate over 30,000 refugees in Australia, was 
a critical part of Australia’s response to the Indochinese 
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refugee crisis and a key feature of Australia’s resettlement 
policies in the 1980s and early 1990s.6 
The program was introduced on 30 October 1979 by the 
minister for immigration, Michael MacKellar, following a rec-
ommendation of the Australian Refugee Advisory Council.7 
MacKellar had floated the idea of a community sponsorship 
program a year prior, as part of a reconsideration of Aus-
tralia’s strategic response to the Indochinese refugee crisis, 
in particular the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees from 
countries of first asylum.8 A particular challenge facing the 
Australian government at the time was that resettled refugees 
were accommodated and processed in government-run hos-
tels and migrant centres before being dispersed into the wider 
community.9 Not only were these migrant centres and hostels 
costly to run, they also couldn’t cope with large numbers of 
Vietnamese refugee arrivals whom the Australian government 
had agreed to resettle. MacKellar thus identified a “need to 
cope with the transition from hostels to the community.”10 
At its core, the CRSS was a mechanism to allow refugees to 
bypass government-run migrant centres and hostels and be 
moved directly into the Australian community, into the care 
of those members of the local community who had under-
taken to provide assistance. The aims of the CRSS were to: 
• give members of the community an opportunity to 
become directly involved in the settlement of refugees 
and contribute to their integration; 
• provide an alternative means of settlement for refugees 
who have a capacity to integrate quickly into the Aus-
tralian community; 
• encourage greater awareness of the government’s refu-
gee resettlement program; and 
• achieve a more geographically dispersed settlement of 
refugees through the Australian community.11
Initially the CRSS was available only to support Vietnam-
ese refugees, but it was later expanded to cover Eastern Euro-
pean and Latin American refugees.12 The CRSS was open to 
participation by established voluntary agencies (including 
religious organizations), organized groups of individuals, 
employers, and individuals as supporters. It was envisaged 
that the majority of offers of support would come from vol-
untary agencies, but offers from individuals who could dem-
onstrate a capacity to fulfill sponsorship obligations would 
also be considered.13 Individuals were required to have 
“back-up” support from an established group or organization, 
in the event that they could not fulfill their responsibilities.14 
Initially sponsors could also nominate a preference for spon-
soring a specific ethnic group, family size and composition, 
or specific employment or linguistic skills, but they were not 
able to propose a refugee by name for CRSS sponsorship.15 
Applications to participate in the scheme were vetted by 
the Community Refugee Resettlement Committee.16 The 
committee had to be satisfied on both the eligibility of the 
persons or group to participate in the CRSS as sponsors, as 
well as the viability of the support offer. Whether a person 
or group was deemed eligible to participate as a sponsor 
depended on factors that included the standing of the group 
or organization, the level of financial resources, and their 
demonstrated capacity to assist refugees including previous 
experience with refugee settlement and community welfare 
matters. The viability of offers was tested against a range of 
criteria, which were strongly focussed on the quality and 
security of the resettlement assistance being offered. The cri-
teria included the period of support offered, the suitability 
of accommodation, the avoidance of isolation, the prospect 
of securing employment for the refugees in the area, and 
the provision of English-language training. While, in theory, 
the CRSS allowed individuals, businesses, and community 
groups to provide sponsorship, as noted below the majority 
of sponsorships came from family members who used the 
CRSS to facilitate family reunion. The other major source of 
sponsors derived from church-based or ethnic community 
groups.17 There is very little evidence that businesses were 
involved in the CRSS.
The Australian government was responsible for process-
ing and transporting refugees from abroad to Australia, 
and to the locality where they were to receive CRSS sup-
port. Entrants under the CRSS were selected from a pool of 
refugees who had passed the government’s “normal refugee 
selection criteria.”18 Beyond meeting the criteria for a refu-
gee, considerable discretion was left to decision-makers at 
overseas posts to refer resettled refugees for CRSS support. At 
one end of the spectrum, nuclear families and groups who 
could speak English with reasonable employment prospects 
were always “well received.”19 In particular, when Australia 
introduced the Special Humanitarian Program (SHP) in 1981, 
many of these applications for entry also included offers of 
CRSS support. The SHP allowed individuals to nominate fam-
ily members for resettlement to Australia. To be eligible for 
the SHP, applicants were required to “demonstrate a personal 
claim on Australia by virtue of having close relatives settled 
here, close former ties with Australia or, for a small number, 
a strong and well-established community which [was] well-
organised and able and willing to provide all necessary set-
tlement support.”20 By 1983 some 60 per cent of CRSS cases 
were family reunion cases, whereby CRSS offers of support 
upon arrival were attached to refugee and SHP cases (in effect 
a form of co-sponsorship).21 While it is beyond the scope 
of this article to provide a full analysis, the use of CRSS as a 
family reunification program was not well received by the 
Australian government. In essence, the government consid-
ered that the CRSS had morphed from a settlement support 
program into a “queue-jumping” or a “de facto sponsorship” 
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mechanism that circumvented uniform management of the 
humanitarian program.22
At the other end of the spectrum, the CRSS also placed 
special emphasis on “doubly-disadvantaged cases” includ-
ing “the disabled, single parent families, and families who 
have individuals who, for some other reason, have a higher 
than usual chance of encountering settlement difficulties.”23 
In such doubly disadvantaged cases, a CRSS referral might 
“change the balance in favour of approving the application” 
for resettlement to Australia.24 
Another important feature of the CRSS, especially in light 
of Australia’s current program, was the level of government 
support provided to sponsorship groups. Support groups 
were eligible for government support for second and subse-
quent entrants, initially $170 for an individual and $450 for 
a family of four, and $70 for each additional family member 
in 1983.25 Support groups could also benefit from taxation 
concessions in the form of income tax deductions for dona-
tions and exemptions from sales tax for goods purchased 
to support the settlement of entrants. Further, sponsorship 
groups were provided with training by the Department of 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, and a quarterly newsletter 
was published to allow sponsors from each different state 
and territory to share their experiences.
The first group of refugees to be supported under the 
scheme were a group of twenty families, who were settled 
in Whyalla under the auspices of the St. Theresa’s Refugee 
Resettlement Committee.26 In the first eight months of its 
operation, 766 Indochinese refugees were resettled under the 
scheme.27 Between 1980 and 1993, the CRSS helped to settle 
over 30,000 refugees in Australia and, at its peak, accounted 
for approximately 32 per cent of Australia’s overall refugee 
and humanitarian intake (see table 1).
While the CRSS has not been subjected to rigorous aca-
demic study, a number of independent and government ini-
tiated reports pointed to the important role that the scheme 
played in facilitating the successful settlement of refugees in 
Australia.28 The largest study of the CRSS was conducted by 
MSJ Keys Young in 1981,29 commissioned by the Australian 
government and based on interviews with 157 refugee fami-
lies and sponsors around Australia. The report painted the 
CRSS in a very positive light: “It is clear that the CRSS operates 
successfully to assist refugees in settling in Australia. It has 
demonstrated that the genuine care and the great time and 
effort offered by community people ensures that the refugees 
make use of all the services available in their communities.”30
The report also highlighted deficiencies with the operation 
of the scheme, including that matching refugees to sponsors, 
Table 1. Refugees supported through the CRSS, 1980–1993
Year CRSS Total
CRSS as an approximate percentage of 
total refugee and humanitarian intake
1980 766 19,954 4%
1981 1569 22,545 7%
1982 2550 21,917 12%
1983 2242 17,054 13%
1984 2240 15,485 14%
1985 2191 14,207 15%
1986 2154 11,700 18%
1987 2509 11,291 22%
1988 2552 11,392 22%
1989 3480 11,309 31%
1990 3885 12,415 31%
1991 3580 11,284 32%
1992 2733 12,009 23%
1993 3419 11,845 29%
Sources: Data derived from Department of Home Affairs, Historical Migration Statistics (May 2018); Department of Immigra-
tion, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, “Our Good Friends”: Australians Helping Refugees to a New Life (Sydney: Depart-
ment of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, 1991), 62.
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especially in rural areas, resulted in some refugees not being 
able to access appropriate services and employment oppor-
tunities. It also identified that some sponsor groups were not 
adequately prepared for the level of financial support required, 
and that sponsors’ overbearing behaviour caused difficulties.31 
Other reports later in the life of CRSS also raised concerns 
about its implementation. For example, a 1998 report by the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) highlighted defi-
ciencies in the manner in which the CRSS was implemented 
by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 
The ANAO report found that the department’s “procedures 
for review and accountability of [sponsorship] groups are 
not working well.”32 In particular, the department had not 
properly followed its own procedures for accepting groups 
as CRSS sponsors, and, as the result of resource constraints, 
had not monitored sponsorships to the required level.33 Such 
concerns were also highlighted by the Refugee Council of 
Australia (RCOA), which noted that the expectations and 
responsibilities of CRSS groups had grown, while logistical 
and training support from the department had been reduced 
in response to funding restrictions.34 
 The CRSS was formally disestablished in 1997 and 
replaced by the Integrated Humanitarian and Settlement 
Strategy (IHSS).35 The IHSS represented a departure from 
previous settlement policies, as it aimed for entrants to attain 
self-sufficiency as soon as possible rather than encouraging 
dependency. Under the IHSS, settlement services were con-
tracted out to private service providers who were respon-
sible for providing intensive initial settlement support to 
all humanitarian entrants.36 Many of the services available 
under the IHSS were precisely the types of support previously 
provided by community sponsors.37 However, community 
groups were allowed to contribute in a volunteer capacity to 
complement IHSS services and were provided with training 
to do so.38 After the cessation of the CRSS, the sponsorship 
of refugees for entry into Australia continued informally 
through the SHP. 
Overall, the available literature suggests that the CRSS 
was a positive component of Australia’s resettlement policy. 
While the CRSS was not a sponsorship scheme for entry into 
Australia, it provided a post-settlement support mechanism 
and one that enabled the Australian government to reset-
tle refugees throughout the country at a relatively low cost. 
Importantly, the CRSS facilitated and complemented Austral-
ia’s resettlement program that was at the time largely focused 
on vulnerable refugees and family reunification.
Australia’s Contemporary Sponsorship Programs
Given the breadth and relative successes of the CRSS, its 
absence in government discussions surrounding proposals for 
a new sponsorship program is surprising. Our research could 
not find any reference to the CRSS in relevant government 
papers or policies. The very different framing of the programs, 
and the political context into which the CPP and CSP were pro-
posed—of deterrence and control rather than reception and 
integration—goes some way to explaining this absence. This 
section outlines the contemporary community sponsorship 
programs, highlighting the broader political framing of both 
the purpose and potential of the CPP and CSP.39 
Prior to the introduction of the CPP, the Commonwealth 
government expressed interest in a community sponsor-
ship program in its 2012 budget and released a discussion 
paper examining the “feasibility of a pilot which would 
enable organisations to propose a person, in a humanitar-
ian situation, for entry to Australia under the Humanitar-
ian Program.”40 More than sixty submissions were received 
in response to the paper, from humanitarian organizations, 
faith-based groups, community organizations, settlement 
service providers, and state and local governments.41 In 
addition to receiving submissions, in August 2012 the 
Department of Immigration conducted two formal meetings 
with representatives from refugee advocacy and settlement 
organizations and community and faith-based organizations. 
They also held informal meetings and discussions.42 The 
government did not make any of the outcomes or recom-
mendations of this approximately six-month consultation 
period publicly available. Notably, the submissions to the 
2012 discussion paper were not published, despite publica-
tion being the usual practice. 
As these consultations were taking place, the govern-
ment commissioned the report of the Houston Expert Panel 
on Asylum Seekers. In this period, the number of refugees 
arriving by boat to Australia had reached record highs,43 and 
the Labor government was cast by media outlets as “losing 
control” of the border.44 The expert panel was charged with 
producing a report on “how best to prevent asylum seekers 
risking their lives by travelling to Australia by boat.”45 Whilst 
commissioned as an independent report, the document was 
broadly seen as means to enable the Labor government to 
re-establish third-country processing, despite fulfilling an 
election promise to end offshore detention and repealing 
the policy in 2008. The 2012 re-establishment of Australian-
funded detention centres in Papua New Guinea and Nauru 
in order to provide a “circuit breaker to the current surge 
in irregular migration to Australia” was the most immedi-
ate and significant outcome of the report.46 However, the 
panel also made a range of recommendations on Australia’s 
humanitarian program more broadly, and directly addressed 
the possibility of private humanitarian sponsorship. 
In the context of addressing the costs associated with the 
panel’s recommended expansion of Australia’s “orderly” off-
shore humanitarian intake,47 the report suggested,
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Private and community sponsorship within Australia’s humanitar-
ian program could provide some important opportunities to assist 
with its expansion in a productive, cost-effective and community-
based way. It is important that the private and community sponsor-
ship arrangements be responsibly utilised to their full potential. The 
panel expects that it may be possible to develop a sponsorship model 
that reduces the costs of a place under the humanitarian program by 
up to one-third and considers that any savings achieved through such 
an initiative should be used to offset other costs under the expanded 
program.48 
In this and its other recommendations, the focus of the 
report was not on just the implementation of measures to 
“expand regular humanitarian pathways,” but also the “crea-
tion of disincentives” to irregular maritime migration that 
are “immediate and real”—and, by implication, punitive in 
their effect.49 These objectives formed the political context 
in which the CPP was designed and introduced. The prospect 
of reducing the cost of the humanitarian program through 
sponsorship and the promotion of regular, “controlled” 
migration pathways were recurring themes in the introduc-
tion of the CPP and the subsequent CSP. 
In the same period, the government further limited access 
to any meaningful form of family reunion for refugees arriv-
ing without authorization. As noted above, SHP has become 
the primary means by which refugee entrants are able to 
access family reunion in Australia. Alongside the barriers 
of high costs and prohibitively long delays,50 refugees who 
arrived in Australia by boat after August 2012 have no access 
to any form of family sponsorship, and later, in 2016, appli-
cations made by those who arrived by boat before this date 
were directed to be given the lowest processing priority.51 
These policies, directed towards “irregular” arrivals, rein-
force concerns discussed below that private sponsorship in 
Australia is an expensive, proxy form of family reunion and 
exploits the undersupply or absence of other family reunion 
pathways.52 Moreover, it is well recognized that other migra-
tion pathways for family reunion such as partner, child, and 
parent visas are out of reach for many refugees due to their 
high visa applications costs, stringent eligibility criteria, or 
simply because some visas are subject to extremely pro-
longed waiting periods. 
When the CPP was formally announced in mid-2013, it 
constituted Australia’s first program for the full private spon-
sorship of humanitarian entrants by individuals, businesses, 
or community organizations.53 Humanitarian entrants, for 
the purposes of the CPP and the subsequent CSP, are defined 
as refugees or persons outside of their home country who are 
subject to gross violations of their human rights. The pilot 
was to provide for up to 500 places per annum within the 
offshore component of Australia’s humanitarian program, 
rather than in addition to existing humanitarian commit-
ments.54 Sponsors could participate in the program only via 
organizations selected and approved by the Department of 
Immigration, known as Approved Proposing Organisations 
(APOs). APOs were responsible for proposing an applicant 
and managing the sponsorship application, as well as ensur-
ing sponsors were able to meet the costs of sponsorship and 
resettlement. Under the pilot, there were five recognized 
APOs, four of which were based in two Australian states 
(New South Wales and Victoria).55 The costs of sponsorship, 
which we discuss further below, included a fee paid to APOs 
for their services. 
The first CPP applications were lodged in October 2013, 
and the first visas granted in February 2014.56 Notably, 
under the CPP, while sponsorees were required to meet the 
definition of a humanitarian entrant, and CPP applicants 
were prioritized over the SHP entrants,57 applicants were not 
selected or prioritized on the basis of evidence of a job offer, 
English-language skills, or age. Over the course of the 2013–
14 financial year, 154 applications were received under the 
CPP, representing 570 individuals. Over the same period, 245 
visas were granted under the CPP.58 Between the lodgement 
of the first applications under the CPP in October 2013 and 
the review of the program on 29 March 2015, 305 applications 
had been received under the pilot, representing more than 
1,100 individuals. Over this period, 667 visas were granted 
under the CPP. Both demand for the program and the limited 
number of places resulted in the program being “consistently 
oversubscribed,” and even though capacity to integrate was 
not a formal priority, in 2016 the government reported that 
over 61 per cent of places were awarded to applicants under 
forty.59 The highest number of applications and grants were 
made in relation to sponsorees from Syria, followed by Iraq. 
Other visa grants were made to individuals from Afghani-
stan, Eritrea, and Somalia.60 
In 2015 the government sought public submissions in a 
review of the CPP. Under the heading “What happens next?” 
the paper noted that “community feedback through this 
discussion paper will inform government considerations 
on the feasibility and possible model of a Community Sup-
port Programme.”61 Once again neither the submissions 
in response to the discussion paper, nor the government’s 
view of the submissions, was made public. Of the submis-
sions that were published by the submitting organizations, 
the consensus in the nature of the concerns raised about the 
CPP and in the accompanying recommendations for reform 
is noteworthy. In data released to the authors under Free-
dom of Information laws, the government’s own summary 
of public submissions noted that thirteen out of seventeen 
respondents recommended that the CPP operate in addition 
to the existing humanitarian program; that “stakeholders” 
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supported retaining the standard humanitarian eligibility 
criteria (rather than add new criteria such as capacity to 
work), and that “most organisations” submitted that visa 
application charges should be lowered.62 
Despite government engagement of participating organi-
zations and stakeholders in a formal consultation, not one 
of the above recommendations was incorporated into the 
final program. RCOA, the peak body for refugee organiza-
tions in Australia, noted in its representative submission to 
the inquiry that as a result of the high cost of the CPP, and 
its lack of additionality, the CPP’s design risked undermining 
the humanitarian commitments of Australia’s program and 
the potential of securing genuine community involvement 
in “community” sponsorship.63 In RCOA’s annual consulta-
tions in 2016, many community members expressed concern 
that the CSP was accessible only to those who could afford to 
pay the high fees.64
In spite of these concerns, when the CSP was announced in 
2017, the legal frameworks that governed the program more 
or less mirrored the design of the CPP, albeit with an entirely 
new set of selection criteria and higher fees. The most sig-
nificant changes to the policy included an increased annual 
quota of sponsored places to 1,000 per annum from the pre-
vious 500, though again without an increase in Australia’s 
overall offshore humanitarian intake, and the announce-
ment that priority would be given to applicants meeting 
specific criteria on age, language skills, capacity to work, and 
the government’s own “resettlement priorities.” At the time 
of writing, implementation of the permanent CSP program 
is still in very early stages. Eleven APOs were announced in 
early 2018,65 and in May 2018 the CSP was tracking not to 
fulfill the quota for the 2017–18 financial year.66
Critiques of the Community Support Program
Despite the claim that it draws from the experience of Cana-
da’s private sponsorship program,67 Australia’s CSP does not 
enhance or expand Australia’s refugee resettlement program. 
Instead, the program is best understood as an exercise in 
the privatization of resettlement responsibilities and costs, 
which preserves a policy of strict government control over 
the terms of refugee entry and resettlement. Instead of taking 
into account community views, the Australian government 
appears to have heeded assessments of the CPP model as a 
“credible means” of providing humanitarian support “without 
placing additional strain on the Commonwealth budget.”68 
As noted, and unlike Canada, the CSP quota of 1,000 places is 
not additional to the government’s Refugee and Humanitar-
ian Program (RHP). This means that each sponsored refugee 
takes a place away from the government’s own resettlement 
commitment. In 2013 the Australian government announced 
that it would increase the RHP quota from 13,750 to 18,750 in 
2018–19, including 2,750 places reserved for in-country asy-
lum applicants.69 However, with the introduction of the CSP, 
it became clear that this increase would be offset by 1,000 
places set aside for private sponsors. As such, the CSP can be 
seen as a way to outsource the government’s commitments, 
exploiting the community’s good will, or, as is more often the 
case, a family’s desperation.70
Indeed, the CSP has been promoted by the Australian 
government as a means to create “a sustainable model of 
private sponsorship for refugees that minimises costs to 
governments.”71 According to governmental estimates, the 
program “will provide a revenue gain to the budget of $26.9 
million” over the first four years.72 This revenue gain comes 
from the high costs of the visa fees, including a AU$2,740 
non-refundable application fee and a second instalment fee 
of AU$16,444 for the main applicant and AU$2,680 for each 
secondary applicant (family member).73 In addition to visa 
fees, sponsors are required to pay fees to the Apo. These fees 
are not fixed or regulated by the Australian government and 
are as high as approximately AU$20,000, per application.74 
Sponsors are also required to cover the costs of airfares 
and medical checks prior to arrival. Most notably the visa 
application charges do not directly cover or fund the cost of 
the applicant’s resettlement. That is, they are simply trans-
action fees paid to the Australian government that are not 
attached to any clear service provided by the government to 
the humanitarian migrant or sponsor.75 Once the sponsored 
refugee has arrived, sponsors are required to cover all living 
costs and settlement support for the first year, or otherwise 
repay the government for any use of social security benefits 
through an Assurance of Support arrangement.76 All together, 
these fees and payments could total over AU$100,000 for a 
refugee family of five, as shown in table 2.
Beyond the cost of sponsorship, the CSP adds further eli-
gibility criteria that were not present in the CPP, which, read 
together, discriminate in favour of economically self-suffi-
cient and easy-to-integrate humanitarian entrants. Under 
the CSP, applicants must be what we describe as “job ready,” 
including being between the ages of eighteen and fifty, hav-
ing “functional English,” and “a job offer or skills to enable 
you to get a job quickly.”77 Despite the fact that sponsors bear 
the costs of resettlement, priority is given to CSP applicants 
from countries that the government deems as “resettlement 
priorities.” The precise details are unclear. However, the gov-
ernment has confirmed that priority is given to refugees from 
select countries, including “Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Bhutan, Syria and 
Iraq.”78 While other refugees are not formally excluded, they 
have been told that their applications “are highly unlikely to 
be considered, let alone accepted.”79 As well, although refu-
gees from these regions are indeed priority areas for UNHCR, 
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these priorities have been set by the Australian government, 
and no reason has been provided for why other groups are 
deprioritized. 
Aside from the age criterion, the requirements set out 
above are broadly stated and vague, and it is unclear how the 
criteria are being interpreted and applied. Indeed, questions 
of definition and interpretation arise acutely in the “work-
ready” requirement. The government has confirmed that 
“priority [will be] given to applicants who have an employ-
ment offer” and to “applicants willing to live and work in 
regional Australia.”80 But in the absence of an employment 
offer, it is difficult to ascertain exactly who will be deemed 
to be job ready. Indeed, while the government envisions that 
the program will be taken up by corporate sponsors as part 
of their “corporate social responsibility” principles, this is yet 
to be seen. Indeed, it is much easier and cheaper for busi-
nesses to invest in and support refugees already in Australia, 
rather than pay significant fees to sponsor new refugees who 
are not guaranteed to be accepted and may take years to 
arrive. Feedback from APOs suggests that the only businesses 
involved in the CSP are those run by refugee communities 
themselves, through offers of employment to sponsored 
family members.
The overall profile of an eligible applicant confirms that 
the program is not designed, as a matter of priority, to reset-
tle the most vulnerable or at-risk refugees and humanitarian 
applicants.81 The program certainly does not aim to accom-
modate “doubly disadvantaged” entrants, as was the case 
under the CRSS. The considerable definitional scope of the 
criteria and the emphasis on government resettlement prior-
ities confirms that the government will retain high levels of 
discretion in selection. Certainly the elderly, those without 
“relevant qualifications,” and those without English-language 
skills are unlikely to be viable candidates for sponsorship 
under the program. As well, there are clear gendered impli-
cations in the criteria. The “job ready” requirement means 
that female-headed households and those with major care 
responsibilities are less likely to qualify as primary appli-
cants, and the criteria are also likely to compound women’s 
uneven access to, or outright exclusion from, education and 
work in some countries of origin. 
In its review of the Cpp, the Australian government sug-
gested that as a result of sponsorees’ limited access to state-
funded support services, private sponsorship may not be the 
most appropriate avenue for highly vulnerable applicants 
for whom services may be more “appropriately provided by 
Table 2. Fees and costs under the CSP
Stage Fee Cost
Stage A APO Expression of Interest fee $275
Stage B APO fee $3,410
Stage C APO fee




Stage D APO fee
Second Visa Application Charge (to the Australian 
government)
$5,865 
$16,444 (+$2680 per each additional applicant)
Stage E APO bond
Humanitarian Settlement Support fee
Assurance of Support Program 
$5,000 (may be refundable)
$611 per person
The cost of social security use over the first year, which 
can be up to $17,513.60 for an individual or $42,595.28 
for a family of five
Other 
costs
Airfares, pre-departure medical screenings, and costs 






Source: AMES Australia, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” https://www.ames.net.au/csp/faqs.
Note: This is an example based on a specific APO’s service charges. Precise APO fees differ between organizations, but visa 
application fees remain consistent.
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government-funded settlement service providers.”82 While 
there is merit to this view, in the same breath the govern-
ment confirmed that the processing of privately sponsored 
applications would be “assessed with high priority, wherever 
possible” to encourage sponsors to participate in the CSP “as 
a resettlement option over, or in addition to, other resettle-
ment options through the standard humanitarian program.”83 
It is the cumulative effect of these factors that forms the basis 
of our critique. Resettlement places are being allocated away 
from vulnerable applicants, and those places are simultane-
ously being prioritized ahead of other refugee applicants.
Even in cases where applicants are not uniquely vulnerable 
but have “commonplace” resettlement needs, a related con-
cern is the lack of clarity regarding how businesses and cor-
porations might effectively act as sponsors. In 2017 Assistant 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Alex Hawke 
said that the program was a chance for businesses to fulfill 
their corporate social responsibility rather than merely a cost-
saving measure. 84 He explained that “the idea is of course to 
have that support there provided by business groups who may 
know refugees in different camps, who they want to bring out 
[to Australia] who have the skills.”85 While the government 
has clearly emphasized the potential of businesses to meet 
corporate social responsibility targets through sponsorship, 
uptake of the program by businesses is unlikely to be strong 
without the careful and long-term establishment of relation-
ships between refugee organizations, local refugee networks, 
and business communities. Further, the high costs of the pro-
gram are likely to be a disincentive for businesses considering 
supporting refugees. As the Community Refugee Sponsorship 
Initiative (CRSI) has noted, while businesses may play a vital 
role in a sponsorship program, they are not well placed to 
directly sponsor refugees or to “provide ongoing settlement 
support and assistance for sponsored refugees.”86
A final concern with the current CSP model is the lack of 
a truly community-orientated settlement program. Spon-
sors are not required to form a sponsorship group, meaning 
that individuals can act as sponsors. As refugee advocacy 
organizations predicted in the discussion paper for the CSP,87 
the lack of a criteria for wider community participation 
has meant that the CSP has again become an expensive yet 
expedited family reunion program for those desperate to get 
their family to safety. According to information provided by 
an APO, over 90 per cent of applications under the CSP have 
come from individual family members. 
Because there is an insufficient number of family reunion 
pathways for refugees in Australia,88 the CSP offers those 
who can afford it a way to fast-track their family reunion 
application. While the lack of family reunion pathways in 
Australia must be addressed,89 the current CSP risks becom-
ing a privatized and extortionately expensive family reunion 
program rather than a model that utilizes the social capital 
and support of the wider Australian community. Feedback 
from APOs suggests that this is already the case, with over 90 
per cent of applicants being family members of sponsors. A 
truly community-based sponsorship program should enable 
and encourage the wider community to be involved in set-
tling refugees, rather than leaving it to a single family or fam-
ily members.
Private Sponsorship in Australia: A Cautionary 
Tale? 
As noted in our introduction, Australia is one of a number of 
states that have adopted or are adopting new programs for 
private or community sponsorship of refugees. Amongst the 
wide range of approaches to refugee sponsorship, Australia’s 
program is unique insofar as it hijacks humanitarian places 
in order to allocate them into a privately funded resettlement 
program. By contrast, for example, New Zealand’s recently 
introduced community sponsorship pilot, the Community 
Organisation Refugee Sponsorship Category, provides an 
additional twenty-five places to complement resettlement 
places from its quota. However, like the CSP, the eligibility 
criteria for the New Zealand pilot focus on individuals who 
have basic English-language proficiency, are between eight-
een and forty-five years old, and have a minimum of three 
years’ work experience or a qualification requiring a mini-
mum of two years of tertiary study.90
Overall, the Australian and New Zealand approaches dif-
fer markedly from other community sponsorship models. 
The emphasis on employability and English-language profi-
ciency arguably distorts the traditional focus on resettlement 
of the most vulnerable of refugees. Instead, these criteria 
allow states to claim that they are contributing to the global 
resettlement pool, while simultaneously using community 
sponsorship to reduce the cost of resettlement and increase 
their ability to select desired refugees. If other countries were 
to follow suit, this approach would have significant implica-
tions for resettlement principles and policy worldwide. 
To address the concerns outlined above, in 2018 a group 
of leading civil society organizations in Australia formed a 
campaign group to advocate for a better community spon-
sorship model that harnesses the power of community 
support.91 The Community Refugee Sponsorship Initiative 
(CRSI) is calling for the government to provide up 10,000 
community-sponsored places per annum in addition to the 
refugee program, with no revenue-raising visa charges or APO 
fees. In order to foster community engagement in the settle-
ment process, the CRSI has recommended that individuals 
can partner with a registered and suitably credentialed non-
profit association (an “Approved Community Organisation”), 
which will be responsible for raising funds to cover the costs 
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of airfares, other initial settlement costs, and the first year 
of settlement. Sponsored refugees would have access to gov-
ernment social security benefits, the costs of which would 
be billed back to the sponsors by the government after the 
first year of settlement. The CRSI model will “reduce the cost 
of sponsoring a family of five from up to $100,000 (under 
the CSP) to between $20,000 and $50,000, depending on the 
extent to which income support is required in the first year 
after arrival.”92 The initiative also advocates removal of any 
discriminatory selection criteria and the requirement for 
sponsored refugees to be job ready.
The model proposed by CRSI would bring Australia closer 
to the model of community sponsorship in Canada, where 
additionality is a key principle, and umbrella sponsorship 
agreement holders play a key role in mobilizing a broad 
base of community sponsors. The model would also move 
Australia closer to its historical roots under the CRSS, where 
the focus of the program was on community involvement 
in refugee resettlement and the provision of quality of set-
tlement outcomes, rather than requiring the applicant to be 
“integration ready” with no government support. 
A further issue to be considered when reforming com-
munity sponsorship is whether sponsors are able to name 
or select which refugees to sponsor. In Canada the ability to 
name refugees in the private sponsorship program has cre-
ated an “echo effect,” whereby those who are privately spon-
sored in turn use the program to sponsor family members. 
Over time, this has meant that private sponsorship is increas-
ingly dominated by family reunification applications.93 In 
order to address the issue of community sponsorship places 
being predominantly used as a means of family reunifica-
tion, Canada has introduced a Blended Visa Office–Referred 
(BVOR) Program. Under the BVOR, UNHCR refers vulnerable 
refugees to the Canadian government, and they are matched 
to sponsors, and the cost of settlement is split 50/50 between 
the sponsorship group and the government. The uptake of 
BVOR has been limited, and it remains to be seen whether 
the program can shift emphasis away from family reunifi-
cation.94 The United Kingdom has taken a similar route. 
Under the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), 
UNHCR-referred refugees are matched with sponsorship 
groups. Sponsorship groups must have support from their 
local area government and must have an approved settle-
ment plan to sponsor refugees. The criteria for resettlement 
under the BVOR and VPRS are based on vulnerability rather 
than other settlement criteria. Given the limited opportu-
nities for family reunification in Australia, we suggest that 
considerable thought needs to be given to the relationship 
between family reunification and community sponsorship. 
The family reunification issue and the CSP’s focus on job-
ready refugees points to a wider consideration central to 
the design and implementation of private sponsorship in all 
jurisdictions: the relationship between community sponsor-
ship and complementary or alternative migration pathways. 
An obvious question is whether refugees who are readily 
employable ought to be supported by states through conces-
sions that allow them easier access to regular skilled/labour 
migration pathways. Similarly, states could provide refugees 
with easier access to family migration under mainstream 
migration programs. In order to preserve the inherent focus 
of resettlement on vulnerable refugees, states should carefully 
consider the role of community sponsorship in the context 
of a suite of durable solutions available to refugees. In the 
context of the CSP, it is reasonable to ask whether, as a matter 
of principle, Australia’s skilled migration program could be 
amended to achieve similar outcomes without intrusion into 
Australia’s humanitarian program. 
Conclusion
Under the banner of the militarized joint-agency taskforce 
Operation Sovereign Borders, and through implementation 
of a series of aggressive non-entrée policies, including asy-
lum boat turn-backs, Australia has prevented the arrival of 
onshore asylum seekers in favour of its “managed” refugee 
resettlement program. Simultaneously, the Australian gov-
ernment has attempted to promote the CSP as a complemen-
tary pathway for refugee protection. However, rather than 
being “in addition,” as promised when announced at the 
New York Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, the CSP does not 
complement or expand Australia’s humanitarian program. 
Rather, the program represents a continuation of the gov-
ernment’s policies of refugee deterrence and control. Indeed, 
when Prime Minister Turnbull announced the CSP at the 
2016 summit, he stated, “Because we have control of our 
borders, we are able to deliver that generous humanitarian 
programme.”95
This agenda of control is further pursued through the 
eligibility criteria for CSP, which seeks to cherry-pick “job 
ready” refugees with high integration capacity from pre-
ferred countries of origin. In addition, the Australian model 
of private sponsorship reduces the government’s financial 
commitment to humanitarian resettlement in real terms. 
Unlike other programs, it requires sponsors to pay fees that 
bear no clear or direct correlation with the real costs of reset-
tlement. The costs of participating in the program are not 
merely prohibitive but, somewhat surprisingly, have been 
characterized by the government as a revenue-raising meas-
ure. These features of the CSP critiqued in this article are not 
minor details within the overall program. They reveal the 
core neoliberal principles of economic rationalization and 
market-driven privatization of public services, guiding pri-
vate sponsorship in Australia. Given these elements of the 
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The Migrant Passage: Clandestine Journeys from Central America
• 
Noelle Kateri Bridgen
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018, 264 pp.
In The Migrant Passage: Clandestine Journeys from Central America, Noelle Kateri Bridgen beautifully blends theo-ries and methodologies from international relations (IR) 
and anthropology to present an ethnography spanning the 
4,500 kilometres between El Salvador and the U.S.-Mexican 
border. Bridgen weaves together migrant narratives and 
analysis of national policies to call attention to the dangers 
of the migration trail through Mexico and to illustrate how 
migrants attempt to avoid these dangers. The major theoreti-
cal contribution of the book lies in how it engages practices 
of “improvisation”—those of the migrants and the people 
they attempt to avoid along their journey. 
The book is laid out in three “acts”: Exposition, Ris-
ing Action, and Climax. This clever layout aids the reader 
in understanding Bridgen’s overarching point: that the act 
of migrating from Central America to the United States 
through Mexico is a constantly shifting improvisational 
play, being performed over and over again by migrants and 
the people they encounter along the route; and that these 
improvisations and interactions are constantly being shared, 
secreted away, and reinterpreted in ways that change not 
only the concept of migration through Mexico, but also the 
actual landscape over which the migrants must travel to stay 
ahead of immigration enforcement, gangs, and cartels. 
Bridgen lays the groundwork for the reader in act 1, chap-
ter 1, by introducing the migrants with whom she worked 
and the map-making exercise that she used to tease out 
how migrants understand the migration trail. She dubs 
these maps and the corresponding stories they elicit “sur-
vival plays.” It is through these survival plays that she 
demonstrates how ambiguous and shifting the migratory 
path is, and how each individual migrant has a different idea 
about how they might get from point A to point B, what they 
might experience along the journey, and what they see them-
selves leaving behind and moving towards. In this section of 
the text she also lays out background research on the social, 
political, and historical factors that have shaped the current 
migration process in North and Central America. We learn 
that alongside globalization and the role of the nation-state 
in creating borders, migrants have become “unwilling props 
in the political theater of borders” (18).
In chapters 2 and 3, Bridgen lays out the plot of her eth-
nography, unpacking migration stories that illuminate the 
processes through which she sees human mobility occurring. 
These chapters also outline her methodological and theoreti-
cal frameworks, discussing how she mirrored the migration 
process in order to gather her data, spending two years on 
the migrant route through Mexico, volunteering in migrant 
shelters, riding “la Bestia,” the freight train that moves peo-
ple swiftly north while atop its unsafe freight cars, and visit-
ing the hometowns of Salvadoran migrants. Here Bridgen 
also lays out her conceptual framework, which draws from 
anthropology and IR. She notes the use of anthropological 
concepts surrounding flows and clandestine activity, helps 
to break down false binaries such as mobile/immobile and 
legal/illegal, and discusses how these concepts fill a gap in 
the IR literature surrounding transmigration and globali-
zation. She also offers a “disruption of the boundaries of 
politics” (33) in order to show how unanticipated changes 
in the state–society relationship are contingent upon each 
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other’s actions and reactions. In chapter 3, she explains how 
ever-changing political shifts in the United States, Central 
America, and Mexico have shaped the migration journey. 
These include push-pull factors such as poverty in El Sal-
vador vs. economic opportunity in the United States. These 
factors have encouraged migration from 1979 to the present 
day, despite the steady increase in danger for migrants as 
U.S. and Mexican politics have become less friendly towards 
migration from the south. 
Act 2, which encompasses chapters 4 and 5, discusses the 
performance of “survival plays” on the migration trail. Uti-
lizing the survival plays, or survival strategies, of her inform-
ants, Bridgen demonstrates how migrants attempt to impro-
vise aspects of their identity such as nationality, race, class, 
and gender; and what larger effects these strategies have on 
the social and political scenes in which they are performed. 
Bridgen had her informants draw maps so she could better 
understand “the construction of the social imagination of 
the route” (149). Through this exercise she teases apart ideas 
about the transit political economy and how migration has 
changed local cultures and the legal economy. She ends by 
discussing how helpful visualizations of the migration route 
can be for researchers who desire a way to understand, and 
thereby advocate for, vulnerable populations. 
In act 3, the climax and conclusion, Bridgen describes the 
tragedy of migration for the many migrants who are caught 
between their homes, the transit route, and their destination. 
These “permanent wanderers” offer a cautionary tale to poli-
ticians and the proponents of neo-liberalism about the real 
risks, to both the imagined boundaries of the nation-state 
and to the lives of transnational migrants, posed by current 
migration policies. She argues that the “sovereign stagecraft 
of policymakers” can no longer ignore the humanity of 
migrants, as people and cultures continue to move across 
transnational spaces in defiance of the borders that nation-
states so forcefully continue to uphold. 
Bridgen’s fascinating account of the improvisations that 
are formed by and help form the migration route through 
Mexico sheds light on the motivations behind migration, the 
increasing dangers of the migration journey in North Amer-
ica, and the role the United States has played in the political 
turmoil in Central America that pushes many migrants to 
face the journey north. Likewise, she explains how the “blind 
eye” approach to immigration practices that Mexican officials 
take denies human rights protections to migrants travelling 
within their borders who face violence at the hands of drug 
cartels, the Mexican police, and immigration enforcement. 
This ethnography would be an excellent addition to anthro-
pological courses on Latin America, cultural anthropology, 
and migration studies, and would be a superb resource for 
shifting the sights of international relations towards a more 
grounded understanding of the socio-political factors of 
migration that shape and are shaped by globalization, global 
politics, and neo-liberalism today. 
Kimberly Sigmund is a PhD researcher in the Anthropology 
Department at the University of Amsterdam. The author may 
be contacted at k.r.sigmund@uva.nl.
Forging African Communities: Mobility, Integration and Belonging
• 
Edited by Oliver Bakewell and Loren B. Landau
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 321 pp.
Through human mobility, identities and communities are forged. This is the central message of Forging Afri-can Communities, and the editors use the metaphor of 
the “forge” deliberately, playing with the word’s double mean-
ing. First, to forge is to build or create, “transform[ing] … 
existing material into new, potentially unrecognizable forms 
that nonetheless build on past histories” (3). This sense high-
lights the emergence of new possibilities, while also acknowl-
edging the continued importance of what came before. But 
to forge is also to fake, falsify, and misrepresent—actions 
that, the editors argue, are “often central to migrants’ experi-
ences and strategies” (4). Both senses of the metaphor imply 
agency: as they move across multiple sites and scales, people 
actively make and remake communities and themselves.
This edited volume presents pieces from scholars across 
a variety of disciplines—including development studies, 
demography, sociology, and anthropology—that illustrate 
community building and self-making through mobility in 
African contexts. Africa, the editors suggest in their introduc-
tion, holds particular relevance for this kind of exploration 
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because the fragility of states and formal institutions on the 
continent means that people are especially likely to move and 
integrate in informal ways that are poorly understood and 
often overlooked. This premise aligns with the book’s focus 
on looking beyond official policies to examine empirically 
how migrants actually join communities, and how members 
of host communities participate in this process. 
The book is divided into three sections. The first, “Agents 
of Integration: Decentring Policy and the State,” questions the 
policy- and state-centric assumptions evident in much of the 
literature on migrant “integration.” Instead, the chapters in 
this section focus on migrants’ perspectives and explore how 
official policies may sometimes lead to unintended results. 
In chapter 2, Hovil examines the situation of Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania, where a seemingly generous offer of 
citizenship from the Tanzanian government introduced new 
forms of precarity, since it was contingent on relocating away 
from their areas of settlement and thus threatened to disrupt 
social ties. This example shows how formal membership, 
such as citizenship, does not necessarily facilitate belonging. 
Chapter 3, by Tati, focuses on West African migrant fishing 
communities in Pointe-Noire, Congo, where official migra-
tion policies are virtually non-existent but where migrants 
and local actors formed alliances against an encroaching oil 
company. Chapter 4, by Berriane, explores the case of sub-
Saharan African male migrants in transit to Europe through 
the Moroccan city of Fes. The Moroccan government’s poli-
cies toward migrants are repressive and criminalizing, and in 
any case, most migrants have little desire to stay in Morocco. 
Nevertheless, migrants manage to establish temporary places 
on neighbourhood streets, engaging in economic activities 
that do not yield much money but allow them to form social 
ties with other sub-Saharan Africans and with some locals. 
In chapter 5, Bakewell returns to questions of membership 
with the case of Angolan refugees in rural Zambia. While the 
Zambian government has pursued a policy of refugee repa-
triation, Zambian border villages have nevertheless become 
spaces of inclusion and belonging for refugees, with the sup-
port of the local population. 
The chapters in the second section, “Negotiating Scales 
and Spaces of Belonging,” set aside questions of state and 
policy to focus more specifically on how migrants join and 
create new communities. In chapter 6, Konkonde explores 
how migrant Pentecostal church leaders in South Africa use 
strategies of “tactical creolization,” drawing on doctrines 
and ritual practices familiar to migrants while also adapt-
ing them in ways that attract new South African members. 
But while these strategies create unified congregations, they 
have not led migrants to form significant social connections 
with South Africans outside of church settings. Chapter 7, 
by Mangezvo, examines how Nigerian male migrant traders 
in Zimbabwe cope with an insecure environment by form-
ing short-lived but meaningful social connections with one 
another in churches, markets, and neighbourhood streets. 
Ngoie’s chapter 8 shows how Nigerian and Chinese commu-
nities in Lubumbashi at once seek to make connections with 
local Congolese people in economic “contact zones” while 
also maintaining a degree of social separation. In chapter 
9, Binaisa discusses the experiences of Ugandan migrants 
returning to Kampala from the United Kingdom. Having 
endured one form of racism in the United Kingdom, returned 
migrants find their efforts to belong in Uganda unexpectedly 
complicated by ethnic and class differences. Together, the 
chapters in this section show how belonging is not absolute 
but rather relative, partial, and context-dependent.
The third section, “Emergent Socialities and Subjectivities,” 
considers new forms of social life produced through mobil-
ity. Chapter 10, by Gordon, presents a quantitative analysis of 
data from South Africa, suggesting that social fragility and 
insecurity shape the behaviour of host community members 
towards migrants. In chapter 11, Cazarin shows how Nigerian 
and Congolese Pentecostal pastors in Spain and South Africa 
help create “imagined communities” through narratives that 
combine Pentecostal values with African cultural nostalgia, 
instilling trust and hope in contexts of xenophobic hostility. 
In chapter 12, Landau and Freemantle focus on migrant and 
host populations in Nairobi and Johannesburg, arguing that 
the multiculturalism that emerges is characterized not by 
“conviviality,” but rather by precarious coexistence generated 
through the convergence of material interests.
Finally, in an afterword, Cohen reflects that while several 
of the book’s chapters emphasize the exclusionary policies of 
states and the inclusive practices of communities, they also 
show how these roles may be reversed; in some cases, the 
most problematic social relations and xenophobic attitudes 
may be found in local communities.
Overall, Forging African Communities provides an impres-
sive range of perspectives from the contributing authors, who 
not only represent multiple disciplines but also are in many 
cases based at African universities. Some readers may be disap-
pointed that so few of the chapters engage analytically with the 
thought-provoking metaphor of the forge. Still, taken collec-
tively, these diverse pieces effectively show that while the social 
relationships built through migration must not be romanti-
cized, fraught as they often are with mistrust and insecurity, 
exploring how people actively create and recreate communities 
and selves is crucial to understanding contemporary mobility.
Susanna Fioratta is an assistant professor in the Department 
of Anthropology at Bryn Mawr College. The author may be 
contacted at sfioratta@brynmawr.edu.
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The Criminalization of Migration: Context and Consequences
• 
Dirigé par Idil Atak et James C. Simeon
Montréal et Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018, 423 pp.
Le discours populiste et anti-immigrant du président américain et la crise politique de l’Union Européenne – présentée comme une crise des réfugiés – ont géné-
ralisé pour le grand public l’idée que nous vivons une péri-
ode de sécurisation et de criminalisation de l’immigration 
et du refuge. À la veille des élections fédérales canadiennes 
de 2019, le gouvernement libéral – qui avait pourtant opéré 
un changement de cap important en matière de discours 
sur la migration – semble maintenant vouloir satisfaire un 
électorat conservateur en resserrant l’Accord sur les tiers 
pays sûrs, une forme claire de « néo refoulement » (Hynd-
man et Mountz 2008). Après une décennie active de poli-
tiques répressives du précédent gouvernement conservateur, 
il semble donc que la tendance coercitive de fond continue 
aussi au Canada.
Il ne fait ainsi aucun doute que le moment actuel est 
marqué par une criminalisation de l’immigration. D’ailleurs, 
comme le soulignent James C. Simeon et Idil Atak en con-
clusion de l’ouvrage, on note dans plusieurs pays un recours 
de plus en plus fréquent au droit criminel pour punir des 
stratégies migratoires, ainsi que l’imposition de sanctions 
migratoires comme conséquences d’un dossier criminel. 
Pourtant, malgré ce que le populaire néologisme « crim-
migration » peut laisser supposer, les intersections entre le 
droit pénal et le droit de l’immigration sont multiformes, 
et la notion de criminalisation est elle-même polysémique. 
Comme l’indiquait déjà Weber en 2002, le terme peut 
faire référence à une criminalisation formelle (c’est à dire 
l’interdiction de certaines pratiques migratoires par le droit 
pénal), une quasi-criminalisation ou criminalisation procé-
durale (comme dans le cas de la détention administrative), 
et une criminalisation rhétorique (qui est souvent, mais pas 
toujours, articulée conjointement aux deux autres formes). 
Puis, si la situation politique globale actuelle laisse plusieurs 
analystes pessimistes, la criminalisation actuelle n’est pas 
nouvelle, mais s’inscrit dans le long tournant restrictionniste 
des 20 à 30 dernières années.
L’heure est donc aux bilans et ce livre offre, en ce sens, 
une contribution édifiante. Au premier regard, plusieurs 
éléments attirent l’attention sur cet ouvrage collectif. Le titre, 
d’abord, qui promet un survol exhaustif de la question, mais 
surtout la liste impressionnante des auteurs dont l’expérience 
et l’expertise ne font aucun doute. Par exemple, le fait que 
collectivement les auteurs aient contribué – à titre d’avocats 
ou de conseillers juridiques – à plusieurs des cas emblé-
matiques récents entendus à la Cour suprême du Canada 
et qui ont marqué la jurisprudence sur des questions liées 
à la criminalisation de l’immigration et du refuge : Appulo-
nappa et B010 (Grant), Tran (Shazadi Meighen) et Ezokola 
(Waldman). Joseph Rikhof – un pionnier des travaux sur ce 
sujet – y a aussi un chapitre, et François Crépeau – l’ancien 
Rapporteur des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’homme des 
migrants (2011-2017) – signe la préface. D’autres auteurs ont 
aussi été actifs à la Commission de l’immigration et du statut 
de réfugié du Canada ou son équivalent britannique (Glee-
son, Simeon, Weisman).
Idil Atak et James C. Simeon – qui ont en commun d’avoir 
siégé sur l’exécutif de l’Association canadienne d’études sur les 
réfugiés et la migration forcée, dont un colloque a mené au 
projet de livre – ont ainsi rassemblé les contributions de 16 
chercheurs reconnus. Si la plupart des auteurs sont juristes 
et plusieurs des chapitres offrent des commentaires sur le 
droit, on retrouve aussi des texte plus philosophiques, crimi-
nologiques, sociologiques et historiques que nous avons 
beaucoup appréciés (Ben-Arieh, Horner, Godspeed, Han-
nan et Bauder, Hudson, Molnar). En particulier, les chapitres 
basés sur des entretiens ou sur un travail en archives ajoutent 
une richesse empirique qui rend la lecture très agréable tout 
en permettant d’offrir une grille de lecture novatrice et de 
dégager des tendances que l’analyse des politiques officielles 
tend à perdre de vue.
L’ouvrage collectif rassemble donc divers chapitres sous 
le thème très général de criminalisation de l’immigration, 
offrant ainsi un genre de « reader » qui est le bienvenu. Les 
étudiants en droit de l’immigration et leurs enseignants, les 
personnes qui veulent mieux connaître les formes que prend 
la criminalisation de l’immigration et du refuge au Canada 
(objet de la majorité des chapitres), ainsi que les chercheurs 
qui travaillent sur l’exclusion de la protection en vertu de 
l’alinéa 1F de la Convention de 1951 et de l’arrêt Ezokola 
(traitée par le tiers des chapitres) trouveront dans ce livre un 
survol exhaustif des enjeux importants ainsi que des clés de 
lecture pour saisir les implications juridiques et politiques de 
ces développements. 
En effet, les textes apportent tous une perspective originale 
et sont de bonne facture. Il n’y a pas, à notre avis, de chapitre 
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dont la qualité contrasterait avec l’ensemble. La répartition 
inégale des approches, enjeux, et situations géographiques 
donne cependant l’impression que les chapitres sont inégale-
ment intégrés, et les thèmes qui englobent chacune des sec-
tions semblent parfois un peu aléatoires. En effet, mise à part 
la Section 2 sur Ezokola et l’exclusion des réfugiés qui est très 
bien intégrée thématiquement, il est difficile d’identifier le fil 
conducteur qui unit les contributions dans chacune des sec-
tions. De même, comme la plupart des chapitres portent sur 
des cas canadiens, les textes qui divergent de cette tendance 
pour s’intéresser à la Turquie, à l’Union Européenne, ou aux 
États-Unis – tous très intéressant en eux-mêmes – se retrou-
vent tout de même un peu isolés. Par ailleurs, si Graham fait 
un travail franchement remarquable de problématisation 
des notions de « crimmigration » et de criminalisation et 
questionne la pertinence de l’analogie comme stratégie pour 
contrer les violences causées par le contrôle de l’immigration, 
et si Simeon et Atak offrent en conclusion une discussion de 
ces notions, plusieurs des auteurs ne définissent pas vraiment 
ce qu’ils entendent par criminalisation, crimmigration ou 
sécurisation, et les concepts semblent parfois interchangea-
bles et vagues. 
Cela dit, c’est le défi que rencontrent tous les ouvrages col-
lectifs : il faut choisir entre une collection très intégrée mais 
un peu pointue, et un ouvrage de plus grande amplitude mais 
plus diversifié. Le choix des directeurs de ce livre d’opter pour 
la deuxième option – malgré les limites inhérentes au genre 
– a clairement porté fruit. Ce premier titre de la nouvelle 
série McGill-Queen’s Refugee and Forced Migration Studies 
est un choix parfait pour lancer cette collection et devrait 
nous inciter à suivre avec intérêt le futur de la série. Un livre 
pertinent qui tombe à point et représente une contribution 
importante aux débats contemporains.
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Refugee Resettlement: Power, Politics, and Humanitarian Governance
• 
Edited by Adèle Garnier, Liliana Lyra Jubilut, and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik
Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 2018, 317 pp.
In the first decades after the Second World War, refugee policy meant resettlement and foreign aid. Since the 1980s, resettlement took a back seat to repatriation and 
asylum as dominant themes within refugee policy discourse. 
And now, it seems that it is back.
Since 2015, when the global refugee crisis commanded a 
greater share of international news, expanding resettlement 
has been seen as an important part of the solution. The 
Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed in December 2018 
by the UN General Assembly, identified expanded access to 
third-country solutions as a key objective of international 
cooperation. 
For this reason, Refugee Resettlement: Power, Politics, and 
Humanitarian Governance is timely. Few volumes have stud-
ied refugee resettlement within an international comparative 
framework. This alone makes the book worthwhile: to obtain 
a perspective on third-country solutions with a wider set of 
cases and longer time horizon than other books on resettle-
ment in the United States, Canada, and Australia—the three 
primary destinations for resettled refugees.
The volume’s organizing concept is “humanitarian gov-
ernance,” the ways in which refugee resettlement involves 
both care for the vulnerable and control over their lives. In 
the introductory chapter, the editors describe how this con-
cept directs the analysis of the chapters that follow, as they 
consider the ways in which power operates in resettlement. 
Resettlement works in a multi-level system in which inter-
national organizations, national governments, and other 
agencies all shape the journeys and opportunities of refugees 
moving through resettlement. 
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The subsequent chapters trace the ways in which reset-
tlement has operated as a form of humanitarian governance 
at the international and regional levels, at the national level, 
and in particular cases. A chapter by van Selm considers the 
rise of “strategic use of resettlement,” and those by Sandvik 
and Jubilut and Zumar examine the evolution of resettlement 
within Africa (as a source of refugees) and South America 
(as a destination), respectively. The latter two chapters are 
distinctive for their novelty, by revealing how resettlement 
has featured within the refugee policies of states and institu-
tions that are often peripheral to a policy conversation typi-
cally focused on a few countries in the Global North.
The following section turns to several of these states for 
national-level analysis: the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and Norway. The first of these chapters focuses on “the con-
flicting values embedded in U.S. refugee policy”—that is, 
humanitarianism and promoting employment as a means to 
settlement. It is not self-evident that these values are neces-
sarily at odds, when employment is strongly associated with 
successful integration. Darrow calls for “a new identity of 
refugee service based on rights,” but surely the right to work 
would be among those given high priority for refugees. 
Garnier’s chapter on Canada is also focused on refugee 
access to the labour market, and the role played by “humani-
tarian constituencies” (pro-refugee groups). She argues that 
these groups have lobbied to change regulations to allow for 
the selection of more vulnerable refugees, in spite of a law 
that technically allows selection to take into account a refu-
gee’s ability to become economically established in Canada. 
Other groups also play a key role facilitating refugees’ access 
to the labour market, but most of their successes are with 
highly educated refugees. Unfortunately, Garnier does not 
make the observation that a logical consequence of select-
ing more vulnerable, less educated refugees for resettlement 
will likely make labour market access more challenging for 
this population. These are genuine dilemmas within refugee 
resettlement that deserve thoughtful analysis. The following 
chapter on Australia engages more directly with these issues, 
and Losoncz argues that the poor labour market outcomes 
for refugees are often due to labour market discrimination. 
Rekleve and Jumbert’s chapter takes a different direction, 
focusing on the debate on burden sharing in Norway follow-
ing the Syrian refugee crisis.
The third part of the book examines in detail refugees’ 
experiences as they encounter different levels in the refugee 
regime. Lewis and Young’s chapter compares ethnographic 
narratives of Cambodian and Karen refugees in the United 
States. The chapter on Congolese refugees follows and 
contextualizes one refugee’s effort to “fortify” her case for 
resettlement. Thomson narrates, from the perspective of a 
refugee, a repertoire of strategies to win a spot in the reset-
tlement lottery. Instead of suggesting a moral equivalence 
between strategies that include bribery and prayer, Thomson 
observes that these are among the measures taken by those 
with limited information about or power over how decisions 
are made about their lives. Similar issues surface in the final 
chapter by Vera Espinoza on refugee experiences in Chile 
and Brazil.
The concluding chapter of the volume by Suhrke and 
Garnier distills many of the challenges associated with 
researching and writing about refugee resettlement in an 
international comparative context. The resettlement regime 
(to the extent it can be called one) is weak and fragmented. It 
is state-centric, with almost no duties held by domestic gov-
ernments. Furthermore, the regime is normatively diverse: 
the numbers and criteria of selection for resettlement vary 
wildly across states. Finally, UNHCR depends on just a hand-
ful of states to carry most of the burden of global resettlement. 
Indeed, until states embrace a significant degree of 
responsibility for resettlement, this aspect of the interna-
tional refugee regime will remain weak and fragmented. 
This presents a challenge to scholars who are trying to study 
resettlement. How much can we understand from a com-
parative perspective, when the international institutions that 
are the basis for comparison have such little power over the 
decisions of states? The lack of multilateral authority can 
make the use of power throughout the regime appear to be 
arbitrary, and, from the perspective of many refugees, almost 
random. If one could point to a gap in this volume, it is that 
it does not seriously consider the role played by international 
humanitarian organizations within the resettlement regime. 
These organizations—many of them related to religious 
groups—are often the thread that ties together the patch-
work of international and domestic law, policy, institutions, 
and individuals implicated in this regime of “humanitarian 
governance.” Oftentimes, they are the actors who keep the 
regime itself “humanitarian” at all.
Geoffrey Cameron is research associate, Global Migration 
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Forced Migration: Current Issues and Debates
• 
Edited by Alice Bloch and Giorgia Donà 
Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2018, 178 pp.
With contributions by key thinkers in the field, Alice Bloch and Giorgia Doná’s slim edited volume tackles some of the most profound shifts in the 
global context of forced migration today. The book com-
bines a frank assessment of how unsuitable the current legal 
and humanitarian frameworks are today, with empirical evi-
dence of people’s struggles for rights, resources, and belong-
ing in a changing landscape of displacement. Although the 
editors deliberately avoid offering “solutions” to address the 
twenty-first-century realities presented here, the questions 
raised throughout require readers to rethink our reliance on 
current paradigms that frame the field of practice. Authors 
give readers the benefit of not only their long experience tus-
sling with the conceptual minefields of terminology and the 
historical boundaries of the field, but also helpful guidance 
for where to go next. 
Bloch and Doná identify the major challenges, debates, 
and knowledge gaps in forced migration studies, and organ-
ize them along three themes in the introductory chapter: 
(1) the reconfiguration of borders, (2) the expansion of 
prolonged exile, and (3) changes in protection and rights. 
The chapters that follow are divided into two sets, with the 
first four (Zetter, Banerjee and Sammadar, Voutira, and 
Hyndman and Giles) providing a theoretical overview that 
loosely maps onto the book’s themes. Zetter sets out a strong 
analysis of why the field still has not yet settled on a com-
mon understanding of what or who comprises our subject 
matter. His chapter goes well beyond describing tensions 
between normative concepts such as refugee and descrip-
tive but ambiguous concepts like forced displacement to 
call for a realignment of our conceptualization itself with 
the drivers and processes of forced migration. His evalua-
tion points away from the contemporary reconfiguration 
of borders towards a global order structured by displace-
ments (through armed conflicts, environmental degradation, 
development projects, and natural disasters) that must be 
reconceptualized accordingly. Banerjee and Sammadar write 
more explicitly on bordering and the failure of forced migra-
tion studies to include the vast displacements produced by 
colonial systems and post-colonial disruptions. Their call 
to widen the scope of the field geographically and histori-
cally is taken up by Voutira, who has long modelled these 
recommendations through her pioneering scholarship on 
post–Second World War re-bordering and displacements 
that asked us to review historical patterns of state and eth-
nic formations while unpacking the dilemmas of rights and 
identities. Voutira’s chapter again reminds us that we define 
large-scale forced displacements as unconnected “crises” at 
the risk of forgetting what we have learned about the partici-
pation of displaced people in societies in which we all live. 
Hyndman and Giles round out this accomplished group of 
theoreticians with a sharp analysis of how and why “pallia-
tive” humanitarianism must be replaced with practices that 
remove the us/them divide that supports “protracted refugee 
situations.” They do this through an artful combination of 
robust policy analysis and grounded theory from their work 
with Dadaab-based research participants. This chapter is the 
best argument yet for why forced migration studies needs 
to move beyond the paradigm of “durable solutions” to call 
states out on this unattainable policy goal.
The second set of chapters (Majidi and Schuster; Landau, 
Doná and Godin; and Chimienti, Counilh, and Ossipow) 
present equally sharp critiques of current policies that shape 
access to rights for people forcibly displaced, together with 
their lived experiences and ongoing formation of identi-
ties. Majidi and Schuster’s contribution on deportation and 
forced return is a well-crafted rebuke of the wishful thinking 
behind lingering support for durable solutions. This brief 
unpacking of this “inhumane and illiberal practice” takes 
into account the history, practice, impact, and business of 
deportation. But, following upon the previous chapter, it 
shines an uncomfortable light on the idea of “permission to 
remain” within state boundaries, and all that implies. Next 
in this set is Landau’s beautifully holistic rumination on the 
transformation of cities and current interactions among 
urban forced migrants and other residents, humanitarians, 
and municipal policy-makers. Landau and his colleagues 
have tracked experiments that provide services to refugees 
and other urbanites without legal protection, recognizing 
the agency of forced migrants themselves in strategizing 
their own livelihoods while working with local authorities 
to build solidarity around pro-refugee micro-interventions. 
The last two contributions also draw on their authors’ 
empirical work among people remaking lives and identities 
in contemporary displacement. Doná and Godin demon-
strate the short- and long-term uses of mobile technologies 
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for people on the move and the diaspora-identified who 
strive to maintain belonging while separated geographically 
from other community members. The authors also cover 
the use of technology for activism and humanitarianism, as 
well as its flip side, surveillance. Their grounded analysis of 
mobile technology and all its uses at the securitized border 
at Calais, France, points to the emergence of mobile-centred 
economies and infrastructures, and how they relate to power 
differentials. The last empirical contribution discusses cur-
rent experiences and discourses of children from three 
ethno-national communities who came to Switzerland as 
refugees. Chimienti, Counilh, and Ossipow find that their 
complex emotions about the countries of their parents’ birth 
have emerged through transnational engagement such as 
money transfers, home visits, and activism. Their feelings 
of belonging to Switzerland, meanwhile, strengthen even 
while their heritage identities transform as a result of these 
activities. This chapter side-steps the usual either/or dis-
course around nation-based identities and contributes to 
our understanding of the complexities of displacement in 
the contemporary era. 
The volume concludes with Bloch and Doná’s brief sum-
mary of the questions raised by the contributing authors, and 
some suggestions for moving forward through a rethinking 
of tired narratives and discourses of the post-colonial world 
order. Zetter’s aggregation of estimates of refugees, asylum 
seekers, internally displaced people, UNRWA-registered 
Palestinians, disaster-displaced people, and development-
displaced people (but not including those displaced by land-
grabs) proposes that at least 99.6 million people today are 
living with displacement. Bloch and Doná’s scholarly contri-
bution illuminates the signposts towards a person-centred 
framework that puts into practice an alternative vision to the 
unworkable “people out of place” approach. The collection is 
underserved by the rather poor quality of Routledge’s pro-
duction; while books today may be required to economize 
through tiny text and inferior paper, the binding of my copy 
has already failed to hold the book’s pages together. A final 
plea to all of us working in the academic world of forced 
migration studies: let us try harder to translate our crucially 
important ideas into formats and writing styles that are clear 
to non-scholars. Some authors in this collection manage this 
better than others, and a suggestion for all editors is to bring 
all contributions up to the same level of cogent writing. 
Anita H. Fábos is professor, Department of International 
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